Thursday, March 4, 2010

Kant's Definition of Stupidity

            Kant begins his Second Book by reminding us that the higher faculties of cognition are understanding, the power of judgment, and reason, but that only understanding and the power of judgment are analytical (CPR 267).
In his intro to The Analytic of Principles, Kant discusses why he will be referring to the power of judgment. According to Kant, the analytic of principles is relevant to the power of judgment because “it teaches it to apply to appearances the concepts of understanding, which contain the condition for rules a priori” (CPR 267). Therefore, the concepts of understanding are important because they are used in making judgments and “are the basis for the formation of all other, empirical concepts,” whose truths The Transcendental Analytic tries to determine though these judgments and rules (Gardner 116).
            Following is Kant’s introduction to the transcendental power of judgment, where he contrasts the understanding, which is the “faculty of rules” and the power of judgment, which is the faculty of “subsuming under rules” for the understanding (CPR 268). These rules are “given in the pure concept of the understanding,” where concepts originate (CPR 269). However, it seems that not everyone has that power of judgment, and that unfortunately, if you don’t posses it, you can’t learn it. Ultimately, if you lack the power of judgment, you are stupid (make sure to read his asterisk note). So, is one merely born with this power then? Do we have no control over this?
Yet, Kant  appears to contradict himself by initially saying originally that that you can’t be taught the power of judgment, but then a few lines later says that you can “sharpen the power of judgment” (and not of understanding) through learning from empirical examples (CPR 268, 269). He states that learning from these examples is important to every person who lacks judgment, but that they must remember that these examples are not principles. The examples cannot be universal principles because they are based on experiences, and they don’t usually “fulfill the condition of the rule” (CPR 269).  So, you can’t learn the power of judgment, but can empirically improve upon what powers you do happen to be born possessing?
Throughout, Kant also contrasts general logic with transcendental logic, and says that transcendental logic is more important and relevant to the power of judgment because the origination of the rules is determined through transcendental logic, as well as is the “a priori the case to which the rules ought to be applied” (CPR 269).
            

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