Critique of Kant's Schemata

Up until this point, Kant’s theory has had one gaping hole: how do concepts relate to intuitions? That is, how can pure concepts of understanding be applied to intuitions in a way that the representations can be judged and understood? As concepts are intellectual and intuitions are sensible, there must be something which bridges the gap between the two and allows for the subject to understand particular intuitions as they relate to general concepts. As Kant says, “the representations of the [object] must be homogeneous with the [concept].” (CPR 271) Kant’s answer for this is the idea of schemata.

Schemata are the homogeneous, mediating representations between categories and intuition and are produced by the imagination. Schemata are not really images, but methods for generating images. (273) They are pure intuition, seemingly a blend between pure concepts and empirical intuition, and are hence founded in time (transcendental schematism).

Kant’s idea of schemata is somewhat problematic. How can something be both sensible and intellectual? If there are only two divisions of representations, intuitions and concepts, then it would seem that the gap cannot be bridged. Schemata would have to be concepts that are somehow related to intuitions, or intuitions formed from concepts. Both of which are impossible, based on Kant’s own definitions. But, if schemata can be thought of as both sensible and intellectual, then the gap is not really there. Intuitions and concepts would then already be linked without need for this third division of representations. Schemata seem to be either impossible or unnecessary.

It seems to me that schemata are really just concepts which are applied to intuitions. Thinking of a perfect triangle does not seem to be possible without some image applied to it. One can think of the idea of a perfect triangle, i.e. that it has three perfectly straight sides and the angles all add up to exactly 180°, but one cannot actually think of the triangle without an image. Maybe this ‘idea of perfect triangle’ is actually what Kant means by schemata, but I would argue that one could hold in one’s mind the image of a perfect triangle. To me, schemata do not seem to be necessary, though I would argue that Kant’s idea of concepts as distinct from intuition is merely just imposed definitions on the world and not necessarily the way it has to be, but that is for another time.

So, while some notion of a representation which can allow concepts to be applied to intuitions seems necessary in Kant’s theory of experience, it remains to be seen whether such a representation is possible given Kant’s constructions.