1. In the last class we talked about the distinction between the pure and the empirical: pure concepts form the basis for empirical concepts (which seems similar in proposition to me when recalling previous discussions of the relationship between pure and empirical intuitions). I guess this is an issue that has been bothering me for the whole class: how is Kant justifying the "pure" as truly a priori? I concede the point that we have certain innate understandings of things like space, but don't we truly only frame those cognitions through experience? I think this entire business is arbitrary.
2. I have multiple questions concerning the categories, but first I want to make sure I'm understanding something correctly. Is Kant's intention to place all these concepts into the realm of understanding? All of these seem to be logical propositions (either p or ~p, especially in the categories of modality, is kind of jumping off the page all over the place) and would those not be related to simple reason, as mere logic?
3. What exactly is meant by the "unity of consciousness" as necessary for the relation of intuition or concepts to experience? This seems like a clandestine way of saying causality to me.
4. I am no fan of the ontological proof, but if Kant describes non-existence as a category (which he does on pp. 212), he also places no other categories contingent to it - like reality, or inherence or substance, so then doesn't his criticism "existence is not a predicate" fail? God could be a reality with non-existence, yes?
5. Can we just recap transcendental deduction?
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