2. Likwise, if a judgement is a unity of subject and predicate, then how can we find truth by uniting a subjective representation with a separate object which may not be as it appears to be. Is it even truly possible?
3. How would imagination synthesize reproduction and a continuity of moments, since they would consist of real, not imaginary events? Are the two even that relatable?
4. If we can understand experience as a manifold, then wouldn't the manifold consist of differing times as well as experiences, which would contradict Kant's view of time being a whole concept, not that of isolated bits? Would this a priori synthesis exist involving time before experience, thus making the experience's synthesis of moments less momentous?
5. So would our methods of synthesis of experience be a priori, even though experience is, by definition, not? Wouldn't we first need experience to learn how to synthesize it, thus negating its status as a priori, since we would have to learn it through our experiences?
1 comment:
1. Kant's entire distinction seems to be that while appearances are empirically real, they are transcendentally ideal. The point of this distinction, or at least my interpretation of it, is our application of empirical intuitions or concepts cannot go beyond this empirical reality to objects that potentially exist outside these conditions. While I am still not sure about this God business in Kant, he argues in the Aesthetic that making time and space absolute (or transcendentally real) would necessitate them being applied to God, which contradicts his nature (or at least his nature in many theologies). So empirical realism is still distinct from transcendental realism, which Kant rejects.
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