Skeptics Hating On Kant

G.E. Schulze is a supporter of Hume and a skeptic. His paper, Aenesidemus, is a criticism of Reinhold's support of Kant's philosophy and Kant himself. He basically brings up a defense of skepticism and Hume. He begins by questioning the connection between our representations and the things outside us, (105) i.e. the existence of causality, the soul, or the thing-in-itself. The Philosophy of the Elements however will be the center of this blog since Schulze dedicates quite a bit his attention to it. So what is the Philosophy of the Elements? Basically it is a theorem of the nature/concept of the faculty of representation. It is the cause and ground of the actual presence of representations; is present prior to ever representation , and is so in a determinate form; differs from representation as cause from effect and may be inferred only from its effect.(107) However, it implies causality of the representation but of course Schulze does not agree because it is not mentioned to be a proof unlike the Theory of the Faculty of Representation (Reinhold's support of Kant), which claims that the being and the actuality of a faculty of representation, which must exist objectively, can not be thought apart. In other words, the there must exist a cause which has some effect from the being of another which takes a physical form/ or a form all together.(?)( the faculty of representation) Not sure if I follow this at all. But overall Schulze is basically saying that the Philosophy of the Elements is a contradiction to the Critique of Pure Reason. The reason for Schulze's disagreement is because he believes that causes require that it be thought of as different from their effects but not manifested through the effects.(110-111) In other words, Schulze claims that the cause that Kant and Reinhold claims to have proven is really a fallacy of begging the question. (111)

Wag the Tail

In his critic of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, as Henry Allison informs us in his account, Eberhard sets out to “recover [us] from the stupor induced by the Critique of Pure Reason” (Allison 16). He attempts to do so by providing a clear critique of the publication, which he mostly develops around on Leibnizian arguments. Allison outlines his arguments into four clearly delineated parts. Eberhard firsts critics Kant’s work on the limits of knowledge; secondly, he provides the justification of knowledge derived from non-sensible conditions; he then critics Kant’s argument about the nature of sensible conditions, namely space and time; and lastly, he questions the originality of Kant’s work as he likens it to a lesser version of Leibniz’s philosophy (Allison 16). In his first argument, Eberhard claims knowledge cannot be simply limited to sensible conditions as intuitive knowledge. In other words, there is another “purely, rational non-intuitive knowledge about […] things in themselves” (Allison 17). This, of course, Kant argued against, for, according to him, we can only have knowledge about things as they are given to us in experience within the sensible conditions of space and time. Any claims about anything else outside of experience equate to stretching the bounds of our understanding beyond its grasp. Eberhard explains that this limitation cannot be carried out since we can make claims about super-sensible things that are consistent with themselves but also comply with the nature of reality. He asserts the Leibnizian argument that as compliant with the basic human principles, namely sufficient reason and the principle of non-contradiction, the “transcendental validity” (which would equate to Kant’s term, “objective reality”) of such claims stands (Allison 17). As such, anything “that follows logically from these principles” (Allison 17) contains truth. The validity of claims is dependent only on the parameters of these principles, not dependent on their pertaining to the sensible conditions of knowledge. From this view, he argues that doubting any claims made by reason would lead to skepticism. Truth, for Eberhard, is “ the agreement […] with the necessary laws of reason and the understanding” (Allison 18). Under this definition, doubting claims made by reason outside of the sensible conditions would deprive us of any certain truth. For Eberhard, as long as something complies with the principle of non-contradiction and providing sufficient reason can provide logical knowledge outside of sensible conditions. Yet, Kant is not leading us into skepticism. He is not challenging the logic of such principle, if anything he asserts within experience. What he is challenging is the extension of these principles beyond their realm. His critique of Leibnizian rationalism derives from its presupposed “erroneous identification of our concepts of things with the things themselves” (Allison 21). Eberhard seems to ignore this and simply makes the same claim that principles that coincide with the nature of things as we experience them must hold validity outside of experience for the very same reason that they hold validity with experience. Simply because we cannot think of anything within our experience that could not escape the principle of non-contradiction does it mean that we can extend this principle to things outside of experience. Regardless of whether Kant succeeds in his quest to evaluate the validity of reason and its claims, Eberhard simply regresses from any progress Kant made by simply brushing off any challenges made to the presupposed validity of reason with the same justification that Kant challenges.

The Super Best Friends

I couldn’t think of a title, and I just watched South Park, so that’s the best I could do.

In rejecting the possibility of apodictic proofs as well as blind faith providing for God’s existence, Reinhold is enamored with Kant’s faith through practical reason. He holds that Kant manages to combine the best of both worlds, as he uses both doctrines for grounds in his argumentation. More importantly, Reinhold argues that a proper balance is stricken between reason and faith. While both are necessary, they cannot be allowed to encroach upon one another. Practical reason leads to the necessity of faith, not to its elimination.

Despite all this adoration, Reinhold doesn’t actually spend too much time in this letter actually discussing what Kant has proved, so I had to cheat and look at what Kant says. Kant argues that through reason, one can neither prove God’s existence, nor his non-existence. Instead, he classifies God as the faultless ideal, something that can never be proven yet never refuted (B669 589). Due to the transcendental qualities we ascribe to God (infinity, unity, omnipresence, omnipotence, etc.), only a transcendental theology could explain them. And as we are incapable of producing such a theology, we can never empirically prove or disprove God’s existence. Conversely, Kant also ascribes the concept of God to morality. Specifically, the idea of God is necessary when trying to conceptualize the highest idea of good. In this sense, one cannot separate the idea of God from the idea of supreme happiness. Thus, the ideal of the highest good is a necessary part of the moral world, which is seen as a consequence of the sensible world (A811 680). Therefore, God is a necessary idea behind the motivations of the good and morality.

Reinhold seems to encapsulate this when he argues that both wise sages and common men seem to accept the idea that there is some future rewarder or judge that will either approve or condemn one’s actions. Thus, Reinhold argues the best part of Kant’s proof is that it grounds the cognition of God’s existence, while still allowing for faith.

Ultimately, the problem I have with this is the effort Kant goes to explain the abilities and boundaries of pure reason, only to determine that it is unable to provide a definitive answer to God’s existence. And then to say that some idea of God is necessary for morality almost seems contradictory to me. If we cannot prove the existence of God, yet God is linked to the prime motivation of morality, then what’s the real point behind morality? I’m not saying this is a call to start rioting in the streets, just that there’s a bridge of faith in Kant’s reasoning that I’m uncomfortable with. I’m accepting of the symbiotic relationship between faith and reason in determining the idea of God, but not the subsequent inference into the reason for morality.

Kant's got soul, and it's super bad.

Disclaimer: For those of you who don’t get the reference, please listen to James Brown. It’s for your own good.

So Kant, in a pretty unexpected move, decides to talk about the immortal soul or, as he calls it, the physiology of inner sense. I figured the whole immortal soul thing kind of fell under the category of those blasted dogmatic thinkers that Kant seems to dislike so much, but I guess Kant has to face the music at some point.

Basically, he mentions the doctrine of the soul and the doctrine of bodies as opposites, with the soul concerning inner sense and bodies concerning objects of outer sense, which are basically anything that exists in space. So that leaves time as the only thing governing our souls, which doesn’t seem to make too much of any kind of sense. Unfortunately for Kant, he digs himself even deeper by saying that all of our a priori concepts can only be found in the doctrine of bodies, since the doctrine of the soul has “in it nothing abiding” (A381 pg432). With no a priori concepts to fall back on how can Kant give any account of the soul at all, since it clearly isn’t something we can observe.

All that is really left to the soul is its possession of some type of “I,” or sense of self-identity, which ties together some constant flux of the soul with no manifold to unite. So it seems that Kant believes a soul must exist somehow, although he doesn’t give it much credit. He seems to at least think that the observer needs to have this thing to tie everything together and be able to synthesize experience. I think he kind of gives up on the soul here, and just begins to focus on exploring whatever the I is, since that only turns out to be some presupposed intuition with no meaning at all.

I guess in Kant’s view, the soul doesn’t have too much of a purpose then, which would, in a way, accomplish his goal of vanquishing the dogmatics and their penchant for eternal life. However, he establishes a thinking Self, which I suppose is a piece of the soul, and the purpose of its study. He says that study of the soul helps us “remain within the limit of those questions that do not go beyond that whose content can be provided by possibly inner experience” (A382 pg433), which is a fancy way of saying that we should limit our treatment of inferences as facts. This inner sense which is so important for the soul and the thinking Self again asserts out need to synthesize experience with a priori synthetic concepts and all of that fun, transcendental idealist method.

So even though Kant doesn’t place as much importance on the soul as most other philosophers do, he takes his own view that falls in line with his usual doctrine of synthesis of experience. He still said it loud, he’s a transcendental idealist and he’s proud.

Kant's Definition of Stupidity

            Kant begins his Second Book by reminding us that the higher faculties of cognition are understanding, the power of judgment, and reason, but that only understanding and the power of judgment are analytical (CPR 267).

In his intro to The Analytic of Principles, Kant discusses why he will be referring to the power of judgment. According to Kant, the analytic of principles is relevant to the power of judgment because “it teaches it to apply to appearances the concepts of understanding, which contain the condition for rules a priori” (CPR 267). Therefore, the concepts of understanding are important because they are used in making judgments and “are the basis for the formation of all other, empirical concepts,” whose truths The Transcendental Analytic tries to determine though these judgments and rules (Gardner 116).

            Following is Kant’s introduction to the transcendental power of judgment, where he contrasts the understanding, which is the “faculty of rules” and the power of judgment, which is the faculty of “subsuming under rules” for the understanding (CPR 268). These rules are “given in the pure concept of the understanding,” where concepts originate (CPR 269). However, it seems that not everyone has that power of judgment, and that unfortunately, if you don’t posses it, you can’t learn it. Ultimately, if you lack the power of judgment, you are stupid (make sure to read his asterisk note). So, is one merely born with this power then? Do we have no control over this?

Yet, Kant  appears to contradict himself by initially saying originally that that you can’t be taught the power of judgment, but then a few lines later says that you can “sharpen the power of judgment” (and not of understanding) through learning from empirical examples (CPR 268, 269). He states that learning from these examples is important to every person who lacks judgment, but that they must remember that these examples are not principles. The examples cannot be universal principles because they are based on experiences, and they don’t usually “fulfill the condition of the rule” (CPR 269).  So, you can’t learn the power of judgment, but can empirically improve upon what powers you do happen to be born possessing?

Throughout, Kant also contrasts general logic with transcendental logic, and says that transcendental logic is more important and relevant to the power of judgment because the origination of the rules is determined through transcendental logic, as well as is the “a priori the case to which the rules ought to be applied” (CPR 269).

            

5 Q's

1. Why do space and time possess transcendental ideality?
2. If a concept is not immediately related to an object, how is it still related to the object’s representation?
3. Why does Kant make the distinction between affirmative judgments versus infinite judgments? I’m not quite sure I understand the difference.
4. Why is affinity a necessary consequence of the synthesis in imagination?
5. How can the understanding both be a faculty of rules and the source of the laws of nature?

Kant Questions

Hello all,

I will try and start off the question assignment:

1) How does the imagination link the faculties of sensibility and the understanding?
2) What is the difference between an appearance and a representation? I keep thinking I have this straightened out and then I get confused again.
3) Is there a definite and certain number of derivative concepts for Kant? And if so, why does he decline to actually enumerate them?
4) If we can only cognize ourselves as appearances of the inner sense, how does the self act as a synthetic unity for all experience?
5) Does the use of the apperception as a means of unity for our experience open Kant up to a solipsism?

Sensibility and Understanding Were Made For Each Other

Having already established the innate concepts of understanding, i.e., quantity, quality, relation and modality, Kant now provides us with the transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of understanding. In this section, he further elaborates on how our a priori understanding works in conjunction with our intuition so that we can synthesize experience. He also emphasizes the importance of the original synthetic unity of apperception as the fulcrum of our understanding in general.

As we all know, our sense data would be “unruly heaps” of representations if we did not have a means of synthesizing our experience (CPR 239). In fact, experience would not even be possible without the unity of given concepts that precede the combination of representations (246). As humans, we almost automatically combine the representations that experience gives us. Thus, I think Kant is right to point out that we must have some way of consistently shaping our experience. However, this shaping is not arbitrary because it must be deduced from these concepts that we have all been given. In other words, we must inherently have a coherent way of filtering through our experiences that are only possible within space in time. But the question remains, how does Kant’s notion of the understanding surpass the boundaries of merely rational and empirical claims, and seal the bond between the immaterial world of thought and the physical world that exists in space and time?

Well, the answer to this question is still somewhat unclear, though Kant is certainly making strides. Specifically, he claims that the original synthetic unity of apperception, or the act of combining what is intuited in one consciousness, is the “supreme principle of all intuition in relation to the understanding” (248). The significance of this claim rests on the fact that our minds are what give order to nature, as he mentions earlier in the Analytic (242). Thus, he continues along the tradition of relating everything abstracted from nature back to the subject. Kant’s tendency to focus on the subject in relation to the objects seems counterintuitive at first, but in this section he gives us glimpses of objectivity that show us that he is gradually closing in on truth.

Kant distinguishes the transcendental unity of apperception from the subjective unity of consciousness. He does this by grouping objectivity with the former and the inner sense, or time, with the latter (250). Here we find a sliver of separation between what is intuited and what can be considered truthful. Thus, after bringing sensibility and understanding together through the unity of apperception, he reveals to us, our very own ability to sift through reality in an objectively a priori manner. At the moment, it seems that our ability to conceptualize the relation of representations is our only hope of ever knowing the ever so elusive "things in themselves."

Kant-Space vs. MySpace

Kant’s arguments for the principles of space can be broken down into: two arguments for why space is a priori, two arguments for why it is an intuition, and one argument using geometry to show how it is both a priori and an intuition. Reducing a couple of his arguments to their logical forms, I take issue with a some of his points.

First, his argument in which he relates that, “One can never represent that there is no space, though one can very well think that there are no objects to be encountered in it” (CPR 175). Essentially, it is possible to conceptualize the absence of all objects and appearances in space, but impossible to conceptualize the absence of everything, including space. I find this to be contradictory when translated into a sufficient and necessary condition. If S represents the existence of space, and O represents the existence of objects, than Kant is saying: if S, then O; but if not O, then still S. Normally it would follow that if Space is a necessary and sufficient condition for the appearances of objects, than the absence of all appearances would mean no space, if not O, then not S. I’m not sure why it’s not possible to think of a complete non-existence of space, of absolute nothingness. At the same time, I realize that a discussion of a void of existence is more of a subjective, hypothetical argument.

Another point I have trouble with is his distinction, “if one speaks of many spaces, one understands by that only parts of one and the same unique space. And these parts cannot as it were precede the single all-encompassing space as its components, but rather only thought in it” (CPR 175). I interpreted this as a conceptualization of the whole is needed to conceptualize its parts. In addition to this, however, is the distinction that what makes something considered space is its relationship to Space, and what distinguishes different spaces from each other is only their relations to one another within Space. I originally took this to be a form of reductionism, but Kant seems to be saying that Space has properties not entirely explained by the sum of its parts. Essentially, Space gives identity to its infinitely divisible parts, but does not receive any reciprocal identities. I am in agreement, however, that an awareness of Space is necessary to distinguish between smaller spaces. I’m just puzzled why smaller pieces of space cannot be thought of as components of Space.

Kant basically uses the same argument forms when discussing Time, but I don’t really have the same problems with them as I do with Space. Basically, it’s easier for me to understand Time as an a priori intuition as opposed to Space, which I imagine more as a physical substance.

Bridging Reality and Ideality

This is being posted early Tuesday morning because I am too compulsive to wait until class is over. I'm going to be following on Steve's lead and discuss the form of space in the first edition of the Transcendental Aesthetic.

We've all read the Inaugural Dissertation, so there's already some idea as to why space is a pure form. Furthermore, Steve also laid out the individual points made in the Critique : space is a the grounds for all outer sensation, and it is impossible to conceive of objects outside of ourselves without first having a universal concept of space to orient these objects. What separates the Critique from the Dissertation is that Kant more clearly states the validity and necessity of space for our intuitions. He "asserts the empirical reality of space...though to be sure at the same time its transcendental ideality" (CPR 160). Steve also mentioned this quote but I'd like to delve into it with a bit more detail.

What this quote means is that space is absolutely necessary and a valid orientation of all empirical perceptions, while still at the same time being inapplicable to things thought of in themselves, i.e. concepts. While everything that is an object of experience must exist in space and time, we can still think of things in themselves without necessary spatial extension. Using this method Kant preserves both the subjective role of the knower in examining objects as well as the necessary application of space to the sensible world.

This distinction primarily seems to serve as a criterion for metaphysics: space cannot be applied to concepts or ideas to be coherent. However, it also has some interesting repercussions for the empirical world. Kant notes "we cannot judge at all whether the intuitions of other thinking beings are bound to the same conditions that limit our intuition and that are universally valid for us" (CPR 160). Therefore, hypothetical non-human thinking beings might not orient the empirical world in terms of space and time. While this would certainly make conversation interesting, it likely would not affect our own experiences a great deal as even the evidence of such thought would be received by us within the constraints of space and time. Does anyone else think Kant would have made a good science fiction writer?

Introduction

The general framework of Kant’s critique appears in his first introduction, by explaining the basic limits of reason and what a critique of its pure form aims to accomplish. It attempts to show where such a priori concepts can be formulated outside of experience. Kant starts by addressing experience itself, and extolling that it can stimulate reason, but not satisfy it, since there are a priori concepts, and no concrete proof of universality. By this denial, Kant asserts pure reason through original concepts that surpass the limits of our experience.

Since he’s mentioned this before he moves onto something a little more important. A question is presented as to which types of judgments can be made through pure reason, so Kant puts forward two types. Analytic judgments, in which the predicate is contained in the subject, are a good deal like Plato’s ideas of the forms, from which all things come, and synthetic, in which the predicate lies outside of the subject, which is seemingly empiricism. In analytic judgments, cognition merely reproduces what we already know, while synthetic judgments aim to understand something outside of the subject, which has a method of explaining experience.

Next Kant talks about this examination of pure reason in terms of a transcendental philosophy useful for the purification of our reason, with a Doctrine of Elements and a Doctrine of Methods. He again mentions sensation and understanding, which, through the former, objects are given to us, and, through the latter, they are thought of.

In the second introduction Kant offers more qualifiers for a priori concepts and their separation from experience. He focuses more strongly on their complete independence from experience, and even goes as far to say that we may know these concepts before experience and allow them to shape experience. These a priori judgments are qualified by two aspects, necessity and universality. If a concept has both of these, then it is an a priori concept originated purely without experience. The issue here presented is the problem with dogmatic assumptions in metaphysics, which qualify things like God without any background or reason, and, when one assumes so much, they cannot be accurately contradicted.

He again mentions analytic and synthetic judgments, calling them “judgments of clarification” and judgments of amplification.” He also emphasizes synthetic judgments, clarifying that all judgments of experience are synthetic, and that the sciences of math and physics that he believes metaphysics should follow are grounded in the same type. This leads to troubles with metaphysics, since it tries to solve problems of pure reason created by itself. Due to these unique troubles, a critique of pure reason is needed for this special science, since pure reason, “contains the principles for cognizing something absolutely a priori.” With his mission statement now out there, a reason defined for his practice, and a few qualifiers regarding how one should picture pure reason, Kant is ready to begin his framework for the basis of human reasoning.

Making Connections, from Descartes to Kant

Because you all have read Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, it seemed to me that this might be a good place to begin making connections with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. I have listed four different points of intersection between Descartes and Kant in what follows. 

Both think:
(1) there is some doubt about the relation between representations and the objects they represent. This is for Descartes the principal reason that we cannot trust our knowledge through the senses. Although Kant does not thematize this issue, it is implied in the basic transcendental framework: if we can’t know the object except through its appearances, there must be some doubt about the relation of our representations to it.

(2) that “extension” and the principles of mathematics (including space and time) are something known “innately” by the mind. Descartes explains in his fifth Meditation that these are the characteristics of sensuous objects that we can always know clearly and distinctly, precisely because they are features that are known by reason and (although Descartes never says as such) synthesized in the judgment of the sensuous thing. Kant thinks that space and time are effects of our pure form of intuition. That is, we may only have experience through these forms of space and time. The difference is, that Descartes thinks these characteristics must actually belong to the things in the world, the example of this being the infinite, which is known by reason but must equally, according to Descartes, be attributable to an infinite being which is the cause of the idea of the infinite.

(3) that the idea of causality is an “innate” idea. Descartes does insofar as he assumes this for his cosmological proof. The objective reality of an idea must have a cause of equal or less formal reality (but not more than, note!). Without this idea, Descartes can’t get past the fragile certainty of the “cogito ergo sum”. Kant also thinks we have a concept, as he will call it, of causality, which is used to synthesize experience, and which is drawn from the purely logical use of the understanding. But he will not extend the usage of this concept beyond experience, whereas for Descartes, it’s essential if he wants to prove the existence of God (clearly something beyond experience).

(4) that the thinking subject is the starting place of our removal from skepticism. For Descartes, it is the “cogito ergo sum” that removes us from the abyss of unknowing. For Kant, it is the “critique” of this faculty that allows us to know what we can know. However, it will always be somewhat strange that Descartes is ready to make the Copernican turn, as Kant actually does, and yet immediately falls back into the hands of the Scholastic tradition and the proof for the existence of God. Despite our disappointment with Descartes’ results, we must remember that for him it will always be primarily an epistemological rather than metaphysical inquiry. This is a vital movement, anticipating Kant’s.