Kant stop, won't stop.

Building on his previous writing, Kant begins by trying to establish a relationship between experience and cognition, what we can perceive and what we can mentally acquire through time.(CPR 295) There is certainly a synthesis of perceptions, which leads to the perception of the subject in temporal space(time itself). If all 'things' are known, or perceived, through experience the three analogies provided a characterization and categorization of the subjects. I believe that it seems as if Kant is trying to define substance in relation to time, through experience of the three analogies to be mentioned. The determining factors--Persistence, Succession and Simultaneity--are all key components to understanding Kant's writing of temporal relations, and more specifically must be proven through a priori reasoning. Otherwise, how one can determine that a subject is the same as it once was before or if in fact it changed from the previous state?(CPR 319) Persistence relates to substance by remaining static, by simply not changing. Succession is a temporal series, or progression(perhaps even digression?) of events. Simultaneity, lastly, is the relation of time as a sum or totality.

Theoretically, this approach appears to follow a cohesive line of logic and reasoning.

In order to experience something it must exist in the temporal space, and the objects within the temporal space are defined by the three analogies, Persistence, Succession and Simultaneity, which all describe the possible relations of substance in the temporal.

An interesting example is found in Kant's explanation of the manifold of experience, how substance remains the same and only the accidents change. This follows most everything taught on the laws of energy and transfer of motion. Energy is neither created nor destroyed. It is rather absorbed then transferred from substance to substance, highlighting Kant's analogy. This is where one would expect trouble with the writing, but alas, there is no fight to be had.

The manifold is given considerable attention in the second addition of CPR, and rightfully so. It is at the heart of the reading, proving that there must be a combination between experience and the nexus, or connection of time. Unfortunately, this is exactly where everything falls apart in grand fashion for me on an intellectual level...

The refutation of material idealism strikes at the heart of Decartes' Cogito, Ergo Sum
and the dogmatic idealism of Berkely. "Idealism," Kant postulates," is the theory that declares the existence of objects in space outside us to be either merely dubtful and indemonstrable(Descartes), or else false and impossible(Berkely)."(CPR 326) Kant denounces both, as shown deliberately by the quote above. So Idealism is now acceptable, what happened to the transcendentally aesthetic Immanuel?

Kant proposes problematic idealism as a solution to answer both problems with Descartes and Berkely, that the assertio of Descartes can not physically prove existence of other substance, and that Berkely's thoughts lead to an imaginary state of the universe. So far, I am with Kant--Cogito does not provide an affirming empirical basis, and that the inseparable condition of Berkely leaves out the possibility for knowing something exists without the experience of it.

This is where it falls into place, the purpose of the differentiation and distinguishing factors of temporal space were derived in order to provide a formal response to material idealism. Kant writes, "the consciousness of my own experience is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me." To paraphrase, inner experience is not the only immediate experience--we are defined by our understanding of the immediate outside world as known through ourselves.

But does this generate the best doctrine? Do we only know of foreign lands just because some other individual has been there before? How do we know what the universe consists of? What of existence itself? There seems to be a very strong argument here, but it is not completely defensible. Notice the use of language, postulates of modality. Even though Kant addresses this lapse, it still seems suspect(CPR 332). It is still very uncertain to me. The metaphysical questions can not stop here, and will not stop here, this is just the beginning.

Making Connections, from Descartes to Kant

Because you all have read Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, it seemed to me that this might be a good place to begin making connections with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. I have listed four different points of intersection between Descartes and Kant in what follows. 

Both think:
(1) there is some doubt about the relation between representations and the objects they represent. This is for Descartes the principal reason that we cannot trust our knowledge through the senses. Although Kant does not thematize this issue, it is implied in the basic transcendental framework: if we can’t know the object except through its appearances, there must be some doubt about the relation of our representations to it.

(2) that “extension” and the principles of mathematics (including space and time) are something known “innately” by the mind. Descartes explains in his fifth Meditation that these are the characteristics of sensuous objects that we can always know clearly and distinctly, precisely because they are features that are known by reason and (although Descartes never says as such) synthesized in the judgment of the sensuous thing. Kant thinks that space and time are effects of our pure form of intuition. That is, we may only have experience through these forms of space and time. The difference is, that Descartes thinks these characteristics must actually belong to the things in the world, the example of this being the infinite, which is known by reason but must equally, according to Descartes, be attributable to an infinite being which is the cause of the idea of the infinite.

(3) that the idea of causality is an “innate” idea. Descartes does insofar as he assumes this for his cosmological proof. The objective reality of an idea must have a cause of equal or less formal reality (but not more than, note!). Without this idea, Descartes can’t get past the fragile certainty of the “cogito ergo sum”. Kant also thinks we have a concept, as he will call it, of causality, which is used to synthesize experience, and which is drawn from the purely logical use of the understanding. But he will not extend the usage of this concept beyond experience, whereas for Descartes, it’s essential if he wants to prove the existence of God (clearly something beyond experience).

(4) that the thinking subject is the starting place of our removal from skepticism. For Descartes, it is the “cogito ergo sum” that removes us from the abyss of unknowing. For Kant, it is the “critique” of this faculty that allows us to know what we can know. However, it will always be somewhat strange that Descartes is ready to make the Copernican turn, as Kant actually does, and yet immediately falls back into the hands of the Scholastic tradition and the proof for the existence of God. Despite our disappointment with Descartes’ results, we must remember that for him it will always be primarily an epistemological rather than metaphysical inquiry. This is a vital movement, anticipating Kant’s.