Philaletes Skeptic Letters

In the first two letters to Aenesidemus, Philaletes challenges Aenesidemus’ philosophy, going through Aenesidemus’ arguments step by step. Although they are both trying to lay the grounds for skepticism, Philaletes claims that that is the only thing that they have in common. Additionally, Reinhold, Hume, and Kant are also the victim of Philaletes critiques.

            A main argument that Philaletes brings to the table is the topic of what representations are, and how we come to have them. He disagrees with critical philosophy, which follows that representations are “ideas of reason that are grounded in its nature” and instead puts forth his own view that representations are “grounded only in the nature of the imagination” (161). Where and if reason comes into Philaletes philosophy, I am not sure.

            In Philaletes’ argument on representations, the principle of contradiction and the principle of consciousness are important. If I understand correctly, Philaletes claims that the principle of contradiction is the superior principle. However, I am unclear in his explanation because Reinhold contrarily believes the principle of consciousness to be higher because it includes the more important functions, like the thinking and representing of objects, while the principle of contradictions only relates to thought (164). Regardless, Philaletes agrees that the principle of consciousness may depend on the principle of contradiction (because the possibility has to be established first), but disagrees with Aenesidemus that it is determined by it (163).

            The principle of consciousness cannot become necessary or a universal law because “it can…mean something different for anybody” (167). We cannot even know that others have a consciousness, or if they do, if it is the same as ours. Each of our own consciousnesses apparently is a unique constant presence in our daily lives and affects how we each perceive objects.

            When we perceive an object, we are only forming what Philaletes calls a “partial representation” because the representation of the perceived object has been reproduced in our mind by the imagination, using our memory to recreate the object (169). Our representation of an object is our consciousness’ best attempt to recreate the original object that we had initially perceived through our senses.  

            I like Philaletes’ discussion on how the “original sensible perception [i.e. the actual chair, not the chair reproduced in your mind through the imagination] does not represent anything besides itself – and this means that in fact it does not represent anything at all” (169). What! But it makes sense that what I’m calling the original objects are not representations in themselves, and therefore do not represent themselves, or anything. They just are.

            However, we never call anything something in itself, we only call things representations. When I look at a chair, I don’t think that I’m looking at the actual thing in itself. I’m perceiving what I recreate through my faculties and consciousness as a chair. Possibly because that’s how we perceive everything. We only ever ‘see’ objects as representations in our minds, thanks to our memory and imagination. Philaletes says that this is an “illusion of the imagination” (169). Unlike Reinhold, we must remember that “every perception refers to a thing-in-itself” (170). Got it. 

Skeptics Hating On Kant

G.E. Schulze is a supporter of Hume and a skeptic. His paper, Aenesidemus, is a criticism of Reinhold's support of Kant's philosophy and Kant himself. He basically brings up a defense of skepticism and Hume. He begins by questioning the connection between our representations and the things outside us, (105) i.e. the existence of causality, the soul, or the thing-in-itself. The Philosophy of the Elements however will be the center of this blog since Schulze dedicates quite a bit his attention to it. So what is the Philosophy of the Elements? Basically it is a theorem of the nature/concept of the faculty of representation. It is the cause and ground of the actual presence of representations; is present prior to ever representation , and is so in a determinate form; differs from representation as cause from effect and may be inferred only from its effect.(107) However, it implies causality of the representation but of course Schulze does not agree because it is not mentioned to be a proof unlike the Theory of the Faculty of Representation (Reinhold's support of Kant), which claims that the being and the actuality of a faculty of representation, which must exist objectively, can not be thought apart. In other words, the there must exist a cause which has some effect from the being of another which takes a physical form/ or a form all together.(?)( the faculty of representation) Not sure if I follow this at all. But overall Schulze is basically saying that the Philosophy of the Elements is a contradiction to the Critique of Pure Reason. The reason for Schulze's disagreement is because he believes that causes require that it be thought of as different from their effects but not manifested through the effects.(110-111) In other words, Schulze claims that the cause that Kant and Reinhold claims to have proven is really a fallacy of begging the question. (111)