Skeptical Skeptics and Skepticism: A Skeptical View

In his paper, Aenesidemus, skeptical thinker G.E. Schulz attacks the very grounds on which the determinations and conclusion of the First Critique rest. Schulz claims that in producing the First Critique, Kant fails to properly refute the skeptical system of David Hume, namely on the ground that Kant bases his system of philosophy on the principles toward which Hume directed all of his skeptical doubt rather than resolves them before moving forward. Among the most critical failures delineated by Schulz is Kant's failure to provide sufficient ground for the objective actuality of the "faculty of representation" (i.e. the condition of the knowing subject.

Schulz asserts that Kant fails in proving the objective validity of the faculty of representation by breaking down the syllogism on which Kant's claim is based: that, if any two things cannot be thought apart from one another, then they cannot be apart from one another (if objects cannot be thought apart from an objectively real faculty of representations, then this faculty of representation must, by necessity, exist if objects are to exist) (pg. 108). Schulz points out that if this were to hold true in all cases, then the Kantian claim that reason is incapable of determining the nature of things-in-themselves would be disproven, since we would have a principle with which we can deduce the nature of anything (pg. 108).

Schulz's attacks on the foundation of Kant's philosophy raise some interesting and provocative questions about the validity of Kant's claims and the basis of his system of critical philosophy. If this syllogism is to be regarded as true and as a sufficient proof for the validity of the faculty of representation, then is it also the case that every effect must contain within it all elements of its cause? For the syllogism to hold true, then representations (i.e., the effects of the faculty of representation) must contain in them the essence of this faculty. However, it seems that Kant asserts time and time again that it is not the representations that account for the essence of the conditions of the knowing subject, but rather the conditions and faculties of the knowing subject that determines the essence of the representations. Furthermore, if Kant's system of reasoning is indeed valid, then effects in general must be entirely reflective of their causes in all cases (that is, all aspects of a cause must be able to be seen in their effects). However, this appears impossible, since the entire essence of a cause cannot be transferred to its effect without the essence of the cause being eliminated altogether.

Though Schulz's accusations come from an unabashedly skeptical frame of reference, they nonetheless are important criticisms of Kant's critical philosophy. If the first critique indeed does refute Hume's skepticism, then the problems raised by Hume must be adequately addressed and thought through before they can be reconciled.