In the second chapter concerning the Transcendental Analytic lies a section entitled "The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding", in which Kant attempts to establish a priori grounds for the possibility of all experience. He begins by stating recognizing the absurdity of a priori concepts that relate to objects of experience, saying, “It is entirely contradictory and impossible that a concept should be generated completely a priori and be related to an object although it belongs itself within the concept of possible experience nor consists of elements of a possible experience” (CPR 226-7).
On this note, Kant proceeds assert that although pure a priori concepts can contain nothing empirical, they must “nevertheless be strictly a priori conditions for a possible experience” (CPR 227). Kant goes on to explain that the relation between a priori concepts and empirical reality is that the a priori concepts provide a rational grounding for all the objects of possible experience and serve to make intelligible that which human beings experience through their senses and intuition. In order to prove this, Kant provides a four-part deductive argument concerning the conditions of the knowing subject and how a priori concepts make experience possible for them.
Kant begins by discussing the concept of unity and its role in the creation of a priori concepts that govern all experience. In a section entitled “On the synthesis of apprehension in the intuition”, he explains the way in which the manifold nature of intuitions must be understood before the experience can be made intelligible by pointing out that the manifold representations that are possible of an object must be unified into one temporal representation before the process of understanding can take place. This process he dubs the synthesis of apprehension, and states that “without it we could have a priori neither space nor time, since these can be generated only through the synthesis of the manifold” (CPR 229).
Next, Kant goes on to explain the next step in his argument for a priori principles governing experience, which he refers to as the synthesis of reproduction. This, he explains, involves the recognition of the totality of the aggregate of previous representations in the understanding of a representation as a single concept. He explains this as recognition that the manifold of a certain representation is not due to each individual representation having a particular, distinct identity, but rather are reproductions of a governing concept. Essentially, he is explaining the role that different representations of identical concepts (i.e. counting integers, recognizing that each is the product of successive addition of other representations) is that it reminds the knowing subject of the manifold nature of the representation itself, and that in order to recognize something as having a unified identity, the previous conceptions of that representation must be kept in mind.
In the third section of his argument, Kant explains that the previous two premises coalesce together to form what he calls the unity of rule. Basically, Kant states the next step in establishing a priori conditions for possible experience is the recognition of the a priori concept itself as a general rule for all subsequent representations. He uses the example of the concept of a body, saying, “the concept of a body serves as the rule for our cognition of outer appearances by means of the unity of the manifold that is thought through it.” (CPR 232) If we consider those categorical outer representations that we experience as falling in accordance with a priori rules established for their recognition, then it becomes clear that a priori rules indeed provide the ground for all possible experience by providing a system by which the knowing subject can make their outer intuitions and experiences intelligible. Kant wraps up this argument in the fourth by stating that “the synthetic unity of perceptions [which was outlined in the previous three sections] is precisely what constitutes the form of experience”, thus confirming what he originally posited about the role of a priori concepts in establishing the foundation for all experience.
Thursday, February 25, 2010
Tuesday, February 23, 2010
Kant pushes the idea that judgment and intuition share a common root which is called the pure concept of understanding. "The same function that gives unity to the different representations in a judgement also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representation in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of understanding."(CRP 211) He then creates a Table of Categories, similar to his previous table the Table of Judgments, in A70/B95, but this table lists categories that Kant believes are of a pure concept, not attained through any sensuous means.
Somehow I find it amusing that Kant thinks his table is uncommonly useful, a little egotistic don't you think? (CPR214) He goes on to show how his table of Categories have some bearing on the nature of understanding, such as the mathematical and the dynamical categories. Unity, truth, and perfection are the criteria of all cognition of things, which I believe Kant is emphasizing in the last bit of his doctrine of The Analytic of concepts.
Kant's second chapter of The Transcendental Analytic begins with an examination of how concepts can relate to objects a priori, which he calls transcendental deduction, and tries to clarify its difference from empirical deduction, which is a concept acquired from experience. (CPR 220) However, due to my limited knowledge/understanding, I don't fully understand how Kant arrives to these two terms because the way I see it, our cognition allows us to deduce certain concepts whether they are attained through empirical means or a priori. In other words, how is it that deductions itself can be distinguished from empirical or a priori?
Monday, February 22, 2010
The Hitchhiker’s Guide to All Pure Concepts of the Understanding
After establishing the conditions for experience and how objects can be intuited in the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant goes on to develop on their cognitive qualities, or, in other words, how objects can be thought, in the Transcendental Analytic. He begins his exposition by introducing the idea of transcendental logic. This concept refers to one in the distinction of two versions of logic, the other one being general logic. While General knowledge “contains the absolutely necessary rules of thinking […] without regard to the difference of the objects to which it may be directed” (CPR 194), transcendental logic refers to the rules governing thought, giving consideration to objects. This in turn is divided into two parts, the analytic and the dialectic, the former referring to the specific conditions under which though has objects and, and the latter referring to the fall of the understanding into “ the dangers of making a material use of the merely formal principles of pure understanding […] and of judging without distinction about objects that are not given to us” (CPR 199). The most salient and attention-given one of these two is the Transcendental Analytic.
As it consists of the analysis of all a priori knowledge, Kant assigns it four essential parts. (1) The concepts must be pure, (2) belong to intuition, (3) be elementary, (4) and that the table of them be complete (CPR 201), the latter one being of much further interest to Kant. He explains that the concepts must cover the whole field of understanding not in an arbitrary fashion, but rather as part of the idea of a whole of a priori knowledge and a division of the concepts composing that knowledge (CPR 201). But never fear, Kant provides us with the ultimate guide to the discovery of all pure concepts of the understanding. He explains that since these concepts “spring, pure and unmixed, as absolute unity” (CPR 204), they must be related to one another on the basis of the same concepts. This connection also serves as a rule that can determine the completeness of all the a priori concepts. We can apply this rule when concepts come into use, which can only be done through judgment. In other words, since concepts can only make use of objects through their judgment, it is through these judgments that we can learn of these a priori concepts. As the “mediate cognition of an object” (CPR 205), judgment serves as the expositor of a priori concepts. The functions of judgment can be categorized in four ways, each containing three modes: quality (affirmative, negative, infinite), quantity (universal, particular, singular), relation (categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive), and modality (problematic, assertoric, apodictic). Yet, although Kant claims this list to avoid arbitrariness, his claim, to me, seems unfounded.
Kant explains pure concepts lie in the human understanding “until with the opportunity of experience they are developed and exhibited in their clarity” (CPR 203). If experiences expose a priori concepts, granting that these concepts that precede experience do in fact exist, then it follows that these are what allow us to see the functions of judgments. It seems, then, arbitrary to limit judgment to only the list Kant provides us with. We can always conceive the idea that, as we progress, we may one day come across experiences that may be conceptualized, or “judged,” in other ways different from those he mentions. Even if we can’t think of other ways, we cannot limit causality as the concept of all experience, especially if Kant gives no justification for doing this other than out of necessity. As such, we can never “complete the table of concepts,” not until we exhaust every experience that might “develop and exhibit the clarity of pure concepts,” which I cannot conceive as possible. In this way, Kant just leads us back to “milking the billy-goat” instead of the discovery of all pure concepts of the understanding.
As it consists of the analysis of all a priori knowledge, Kant assigns it four essential parts. (1) The concepts must be pure, (2) belong to intuition, (3) be elementary, (4) and that the table of them be complete (CPR 201), the latter one being of much further interest to Kant. He explains that the concepts must cover the whole field of understanding not in an arbitrary fashion, but rather as part of the idea of a whole of a priori knowledge and a division of the concepts composing that knowledge (CPR 201). But never fear, Kant provides us with the ultimate guide to the discovery of all pure concepts of the understanding. He explains that since these concepts “spring, pure and unmixed, as absolute unity” (CPR 204), they must be related to one another on the basis of the same concepts. This connection also serves as a rule that can determine the completeness of all the a priori concepts. We can apply this rule when concepts come into use, which can only be done through judgment. In other words, since concepts can only make use of objects through their judgment, it is through these judgments that we can learn of these a priori concepts. As the “mediate cognition of an object” (CPR 205), judgment serves as the expositor of a priori concepts. The functions of judgment can be categorized in four ways, each containing three modes: quality (affirmative, negative, infinite), quantity (universal, particular, singular), relation (categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive), and modality (problematic, assertoric, apodictic). Yet, although Kant claims this list to avoid arbitrariness, his claim, to me, seems unfounded.
Kant explains pure concepts lie in the human understanding “until with the opportunity of experience they are developed and exhibited in their clarity” (CPR 203). If experiences expose a priori concepts, granting that these concepts that precede experience do in fact exist, then it follows that these are what allow us to see the functions of judgments. It seems, then, arbitrary to limit judgment to only the list Kant provides us with. We can always conceive the idea that, as we progress, we may one day come across experiences that may be conceptualized, or “judged,” in other ways different from those he mentions. Even if we can’t think of other ways, we cannot limit causality as the concept of all experience, especially if Kant gives no justification for doing this other than out of necessity. As such, we can never “complete the table of concepts,” not until we exhaust every experience that might “develop and exhibit the clarity of pure concepts,” which I cannot conceive as possible. In this way, Kant just leads us back to “milking the billy-goat” instead of the discovery of all pure concepts of the understanding.
Thursday, February 18, 2010
Kant-Space vs. MySpace
Kant’s arguments for the principles of space can be broken down into: two arguments for why space is a priori, two arguments for why it is an intuition, and one argument using geometry to show how it is both a priori and an intuition. Reducing a couple of his arguments to their logical forms, I take issue with a some of his points.
First, his argument in which he relates that, “One can never represent that there is no space, though one can very well think that there are no objects to be encountered in it” (CPR 175). Essentially, it is possible to conceptualize the absence of all objects and appearances in space, but impossible to conceptualize the absence of everything, including space. I find this to be contradictory when translated into a sufficient and necessary condition. If S represents the existence of space, and O represents the existence of objects, than Kant is saying: if S, then O; but if not O, then still S. Normally it would follow that if Space is a necessary and sufficient condition for the appearances of objects, than the absence of all appearances would mean no space, if not O, then not S. I’m not sure why it’s not possible to think of a complete non-existence of space, of absolute nothingness. At the same time, I realize that a discussion of a void of existence is more of a subjective, hypothetical argument.
Another point I have trouble with is his distinction, “if one speaks of many spaces, one understands by that only parts of one and the same unique space. And these parts cannot as it were precede the single all-encompassing space as its components, but rather only thought in it” (CPR 175). I interpreted this as a conceptualization of the whole is needed to conceptualize its parts. In addition to this, however, is the distinction that what makes something considered space is its relationship to Space, and what distinguishes different spaces from each other is only their relations to one another within Space. I originally took this to be a form of reductionism, but Kant seems to be saying that Space has properties not entirely explained by the sum of its parts. Essentially, Space gives identity to its infinitely divisible parts, but does not receive any reciprocal identities. I am in agreement, however, that an awareness of Space is necessary to distinguish between smaller spaces. I’m just puzzled why smaller pieces of space cannot be thought of as components of Space.
Kant basically uses the same argument forms when discussing Time, but I don’t really have the same problems with them as I do with Space. Basically, it’s easier for me to understand Time as an a priori intuition as opposed to Space, which I imagine more as a physical substance.
First, his argument in which he relates that, “One can never represent that there is no space, though one can very well think that there are no objects to be encountered in it” (CPR 175). Essentially, it is possible to conceptualize the absence of all objects and appearances in space, but impossible to conceptualize the absence of everything, including space. I find this to be contradictory when translated into a sufficient and necessary condition. If S represents the existence of space, and O represents the existence of objects, than Kant is saying: if S, then O; but if not O, then still S. Normally it would follow that if Space is a necessary and sufficient condition for the appearances of objects, than the absence of all appearances would mean no space, if not O, then not S. I’m not sure why it’s not possible to think of a complete non-existence of space, of absolute nothingness. At the same time, I realize that a discussion of a void of existence is more of a subjective, hypothetical argument.
Another point I have trouble with is his distinction, “if one speaks of many spaces, one understands by that only parts of one and the same unique space. And these parts cannot as it were precede the single all-encompassing space as its components, but rather only thought in it” (CPR 175). I interpreted this as a conceptualization of the whole is needed to conceptualize its parts. In addition to this, however, is the distinction that what makes something considered space is its relationship to Space, and what distinguishes different spaces from each other is only their relations to one another within Space. I originally took this to be a form of reductionism, but Kant seems to be saying that Space has properties not entirely explained by the sum of its parts. Essentially, Space gives identity to its infinitely divisible parts, but does not receive any reciprocal identities. I am in agreement, however, that an awareness of Space is necessary to distinguish between smaller spaces. I’m just puzzled why smaller pieces of space cannot be thought of as components of Space.
Kant basically uses the same argument forms when discussing Time, but I don’t really have the same problems with them as I do with Space. Basically, it’s easier for me to understand Time as an a priori intuition as opposed to Space, which I imagine more as a physical substance.
Monday, February 15, 2010
The Transcendental Looking Glass
In Kant’s "The Transcendental Aesthetic (B)" he essentially breaks down and attempts to explain the human capacity to comprehend and interpret all sensibilities. According to Kant, our representations of all sensations are merely the appearances of things. He further breaks down the notion of appearances by explaining it in regards to matter and form.
Matter would be the a posteriori, or actual, sensations that constitute our appearances. Whereas form, which is a priori, is the capacity “which allows the manifold of appearance to be ordered...” (CPR, 172-173). I originally had a tough time trying to grasp Kant’s notion of form (and all a priori intuitions for that matter!) but I eventually came about my own way of understanding it. I imagined form to be a sort of innate constitution or pre-manufactured adjusted sensing machine. This sensing machine of ours we can simply just say is the biological construct of our brains; it is developed in such a way, which produces the appearances of things that we encounter.
But this is me just attempting to makes some sense of Kant and I also must say that I know very little of our biological construct to make any real grounded claims.
In the chapter, Kant states his explanations/arguments for the identity of space and time. They pretty much remain the same from his listed arguments from the (A) edition so there is no need in repeating them. But it must be remembered that Kant goes through his listed arguments of both space and time to justify his philosophy of transcendental ideality.
However, I never really interpreted transcendental ideality as much of a philosophy but rather as an argument of how we interpret appearances. While trying to grasp it I came to think of it as a looking glass in which we interpret all of our experience through. Kant, while explaining outer intuition states how it “has its seat merely in the subject, as its formal constitution…” (CPR, 176). The a priori intuitions, namely space and time, are lenses by which we perceive appearance, constituting our subjective reality.
I can see most of Kant’s views of transcendental ideality as being valid. However, I am not sure of his justification as to how all people necessarily share similar intuitions and therefore similar appearances. He states, “For we cannot judge at all whether the intuitions of other thinking beings are bound to the same conditions that limit our intuition and that are universally valid for us” (CPR, 177). At first I thought he was claiming that no one could know how others perceive their reality, but at the end of the sentence his clause “universally valid for us” seems to imply a sort of collective human intuition. This seems to be somewhat of a metaphysical leap. I am not sure how Kant can justify why “other thinking beings” (other implying not human) may not interpret reality differently than every other single human. Making such a claim, that all humans share the same conditions for reality seems to be making a claim as a thing in itself.
What I mean by this is that it appears that others share similar experiences, and this could be assumed through conversations or other modes of communication, but there is no certain way to know whether anyone outside yourself perceives things the same way that you do.
Matter would be the a posteriori, or actual, sensations that constitute our appearances. Whereas form, which is a priori, is the capacity “which allows the manifold of appearance to be ordered...” (CPR, 172-173). I originally had a tough time trying to grasp Kant’s notion of form (and all a priori intuitions for that matter!) but I eventually came about my own way of understanding it. I imagined form to be a sort of innate constitution or pre-manufactured adjusted sensing machine. This sensing machine of ours we can simply just say is the biological construct of our brains; it is developed in such a way, which produces the appearances of things that we encounter.
But this is me just attempting to makes some sense of Kant and I also must say that I know very little of our biological construct to make any real grounded claims.
In the chapter, Kant states his explanations/arguments for the identity of space and time. They pretty much remain the same from his listed arguments from the (A) edition so there is no need in repeating them. But it must be remembered that Kant goes through his listed arguments of both space and time to justify his philosophy of transcendental ideality.
However, I never really interpreted transcendental ideality as much of a philosophy but rather as an argument of how we interpret appearances. While trying to grasp it I came to think of it as a looking glass in which we interpret all of our experience through. Kant, while explaining outer intuition states how it “has its seat merely in the subject, as its formal constitution…” (CPR, 176). The a priori intuitions, namely space and time, are lenses by which we perceive appearance, constituting our subjective reality.
I can see most of Kant’s views of transcendental ideality as being valid. However, I am not sure of his justification as to how all people necessarily share similar intuitions and therefore similar appearances. He states, “For we cannot judge at all whether the intuitions of other thinking beings are bound to the same conditions that limit our intuition and that are universally valid for us” (CPR, 177). At first I thought he was claiming that no one could know how others perceive their reality, but at the end of the sentence his clause “universally valid for us” seems to imply a sort of collective human intuition. This seems to be somewhat of a metaphysical leap. I am not sure how Kant can justify why “other thinking beings” (other implying not human) may not interpret reality differently than every other single human. Making such a claim, that all humans share the same conditions for reality seems to be making a claim as a thing in itself.
What I mean by this is that it appears that others share similar experiences, and this could be assumed through conversations or other modes of communication, but there is no certain way to know whether anyone outside yourself perceives things the same way that you do.
Thursday, February 11, 2010
Time Isn't Holding Us, Time Isn't After Us
Until now, we have more or less been considering space and time as a single concept, without greatly distinguishing between them: both are pure, a priori intuitions that ground all experience and make sensation possible. But in writing about the transcendental aesthetic, Kant begins to make distinctions that separate space and time. In particular, space is “the form of all appearances of outer sense…under which alone outer intuition is possible for us” (CPR 159), while time is “the form of inner sense, i.e., of the intuition of our self and inner state” (163).
Whatever the differences between space and time, another commonality that Kant asserts to exist between them is their transcendental ideality, such that they do not exist outside of perceiving subjects. Kant holds that not only are space and time a priori intuitions, but that they definitely do not objectively exist as things-in-themselves. He does not hold a more modest, agnostic view on this question of their objective existence, but is certain that they have no such existence.
He sets out to prove it so: if one thinks that space and time have an “absolute reality” (166), then one must see them as either subsisting or inhering. If one holds the former view, then one “must assume two eternal and infinite self-subsisting non-entities (space and time), which exist (yet without there being anything real) only in order to comprehend everything real within themselves (166-167). Why this “must” be the case, I do not understand. It seems to me that one could think of space and time as finite and having been caused by something, as in the Big Bang theory.
If one holds the latter view, then one “must dispute the validity or at least the apodictic certainty of a priori mathematical doctrines in regard to real things (e.g., in space),” because our understanding of space would be through experience and thus not produce apodictic certainty. For Kant, this outcome is unacceptable: mathematics, he is sure, is certain and thus a priori.
But is the concept of space and time as objectively existent mutually exclusive with the concept of space and time as a priori intuitions? That is, can space and time be a priori intuitions (and therefore give mathematics an apodictic certainty) and nonetheless have an absolute reality? Kant’s argument seems to assume that the two are mutually exclusive: if they objectively exist, then they are not a priori intuitions. Whether or not Kant is too hasty in assuming this will have ramifications for his position that space and time cannot have an objective existence.
Whatever the differences between space and time, another commonality that Kant asserts to exist between them is their transcendental ideality, such that they do not exist outside of perceiving subjects. Kant holds that not only are space and time a priori intuitions, but that they definitely do not objectively exist as things-in-themselves. He does not hold a more modest, agnostic view on this question of their objective existence, but is certain that they have no such existence.
He sets out to prove it so: if one thinks that space and time have an “absolute reality” (166), then one must see them as either subsisting or inhering. If one holds the former view, then one “must assume two eternal and infinite self-subsisting non-entities (space and time), which exist (yet without there being anything real) only in order to comprehend everything real within themselves (166-167). Why this “must” be the case, I do not understand. It seems to me that one could think of space and time as finite and having been caused by something, as in the Big Bang theory.
If one holds the latter view, then one “must dispute the validity or at least the apodictic certainty of a priori mathematical doctrines in regard to real things (e.g., in space),” because our understanding of space would be through experience and thus not produce apodictic certainty. For Kant, this outcome is unacceptable: mathematics, he is sure, is certain and thus a priori.
But is the concept of space and time as objectively existent mutually exclusive with the concept of space and time as a priori intuitions? That is, can space and time be a priori intuitions (and therefore give mathematics an apodictic certainty) and nonetheless have an absolute reality? Kant’s argument seems to assume that the two are mutually exclusive: if they objectively exist, then they are not a priori intuitions. Whether or not Kant is too hasty in assuming this will have ramifications for his position that space and time cannot have an objective existence.
Tuesday, February 9, 2010
Bridging Reality and Ideality
This is being posted early Tuesday morning because I am too compulsive to wait until class is over. I'm going to be following on Steve's lead and discuss the form of space in the first edition of the Transcendental Aesthetic.
We've all read the Inaugural Dissertation, so there's already some idea as to why space is a pure form. Furthermore, Steve also laid out the individual points made in the Critique : space is a the grounds for all outer sensation, and it is impossible to conceive of objects outside of ourselves without first having a universal concept of space to orient these objects. What separates the Critique from the Dissertation is that Kant more clearly states the validity and necessity of space for our intuitions. He "asserts the empirical reality of space...though to be sure at the same time its transcendental ideality" (CPR 160). Steve also mentioned this quote but I'd like to delve into it with a bit more detail.
What this quote means is that space is absolutely necessary and a valid orientation of all empirical perceptions, while still at the same time being inapplicable to things thought of in themselves, i.e. concepts. While everything that is an object of experience must exist in space and time, we can still think of things in themselves without necessary spatial extension. Using this method Kant preserves both the subjective role of the knower in examining objects as well as the necessary application of space to the sensible world.
This distinction primarily seems to serve as a criterion for metaphysics: space cannot be applied to concepts or ideas to be coherent. However, it also has some interesting repercussions for the empirical world. Kant notes "we cannot judge at all whether the intuitions of other thinking beings are bound to the same conditions that limit our intuition and that are universally valid for us" (CPR 160). Therefore, hypothetical non-human thinking beings might not orient the empirical world in terms of space and time. While this would certainly make conversation interesting, it likely would not affect our own experiences a great deal as even the evidence of such thought would be received by us within the constraints of space and time. Does anyone else think Kant would have made a good science fiction writer?
We've all read the Inaugural Dissertation, so there's already some idea as to why space is a pure form. Furthermore, Steve also laid out the individual points made in the Critique : space is a the grounds for all outer sensation, and it is impossible to conceive of objects outside of ourselves without first having a universal concept of space to orient these objects. What separates the Critique from the Dissertation is that Kant more clearly states the validity and necessity of space for our intuitions. He "asserts the empirical reality of space...though to be sure at the same time its transcendental ideality" (CPR 160). Steve also mentioned this quote but I'd like to delve into it with a bit more detail.
What this quote means is that space is absolutely necessary and a valid orientation of all empirical perceptions, while still at the same time being inapplicable to things thought of in themselves, i.e. concepts. While everything that is an object of experience must exist in space and time, we can still think of things in themselves without necessary spatial extension. Using this method Kant preserves both the subjective role of the knower in examining objects as well as the necessary application of space to the sensible world.
This distinction primarily seems to serve as a criterion for metaphysics: space cannot be applied to concepts or ideas to be coherent. However, it also has some interesting repercussions for the empirical world. Kant notes "we cannot judge at all whether the intuitions of other thinking beings are bound to the same conditions that limit our intuition and that are universally valid for us" (CPR 160). Therefore, hypothetical non-human thinking beings might not orient the empirical world in terms of space and time. While this would certainly make conversation interesting, it likely would not affect our own experiences a great deal as even the evidence of such thought would be received by us within the constraints of space and time. Does anyone else think Kant would have made a good science fiction writer?
Monday, February 8, 2010
The Transcendental Aesthetic and The Final Frontier
Kant kicks off the main body of his critique with a few, extremely familiar concepts and clarifications. Again, he mentions sensibility, which is “The capacity to acquire representations through the way in which we are affected by objects” (CPR 155). This acquisition of sensibility is thought through understanding to become concepts. Along with sensation, Kant defines empirical, “intuition which is related to the object through sensation” (CPR 155), and appearance, “The undetermined object of an empirical intuition” (CPR 155). Matter relates to the appearance through sensation, whereas form relates to the appearance through relations. Of course, this idea of some basic form (big surprise) is universal and necessary, therefore the grounds for certain a priori concepts. This is, of course, regarding sensible a priori concepts, which present a problem for this transcendental aesthetic. How can concepts that we receive through our senses be realized completely void of experience? That could possibly be answered with a definition of a priori as independent of, but not preceding experience, seeing all experience through our sensations as simply reminders of what we already knew (as Plato might argue), a principle that these concepts shape our experiences before they even happen (my favorite), or any number of interpretations. I guess I pose this question to you.
In any case, Kant accepts certain concepts, namely time and space, as a priori concepts of sensibility, by separating everything we perceive of them and leaving their essential qualities remaining. He starts on space, since it is probably easier to strip of the notions conceived in it, and comes up with five points to prove his assertions.
1) “Space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer experiences” (CPR 157). Basically, representations of things being as outside of one another come naturally to us, before defining things, and must therefore be a priori.
2) “Space is a necessary representation, a priori, which is the ground of all outer intuitions” (CPR 158). This is a basic fact since we can’t fathom there not being space, just a lack of things inside of it.
3) All geometric principles, considered a priori are based on this concept. Therefore, space itself must be a priori in order to govern them.
4) Space is not a concept of relations, but a pure intuition, since one can only represent an individual space as part of a whole.
5) “Space is represented as given an infinite magnitude” (CPR 159).
He concludes that space represents no relations or property, and that it is the form of appearance of the outer sense. It “comprehends all things that appear to us externally, but not all things in themselves” (CPR 160). This extension implies his “empirical reality” of space, which regards experience, and his “transcendental ideality” of space, which disregards its confines in experience. He concludes his examination of space with this assertion that it is the only necessary physical concept, which makes it a piece of the transcendental aesthetic.
In any case, Kant accepts certain concepts, namely time and space, as a priori concepts of sensibility, by separating everything we perceive of them and leaving their essential qualities remaining. He starts on space, since it is probably easier to strip of the notions conceived in it, and comes up with five points to prove his assertions.
1) “Space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer experiences” (CPR 157). Basically, representations of things being as outside of one another come naturally to us, before defining things, and must therefore be a priori.
2) “Space is a necessary representation, a priori, which is the ground of all outer intuitions” (CPR 158). This is a basic fact since we can’t fathom there not being space, just a lack of things inside of it.
3) All geometric principles, considered a priori are based on this concept. Therefore, space itself must be a priori in order to govern them.
4) Space is not a concept of relations, but a pure intuition, since one can only represent an individual space as part of a whole.
5) “Space is represented as given an infinite magnitude” (CPR 159).
He concludes that space represents no relations or property, and that it is the form of appearance of the outer sense. It “comprehends all things that appear to us externally, but not all things in themselves” (CPR 160). This extension implies his “empirical reality” of space, which regards experience, and his “transcendental ideality” of space, which disregards its confines in experience. He concludes his examination of space with this assertion that it is the only necessary physical concept, which makes it a piece of the transcendental aesthetic.
Thursday, February 4, 2010
Introduction
The general framework of Kant’s critique appears in his first introduction, by explaining the basic limits of reason and what a critique of its pure form aims to accomplish. It attempts to show where such a priori concepts can be formulated outside of experience. Kant starts by addressing experience itself, and extolling that it can stimulate reason, but not satisfy it, since there are a priori concepts, and no concrete proof of universality. By this denial, Kant asserts pure reason through original concepts that surpass the limits of our experience.
Since he’s mentioned this before he moves onto something a little more important. A question is presented as to which types of judgments can be made through pure reason, so Kant puts forward two types. Analytic judgments, in which the predicate is contained in the subject, are a good deal like Plato’s ideas of the forms, from which all things come, and synthetic, in which the predicate lies outside of the subject, which is seemingly empiricism. In analytic judgments, cognition merely reproduces what we already know, while synthetic judgments aim to understand something outside of the subject, which has a method of explaining experience.
Next Kant talks about this examination of pure reason in terms of a transcendental philosophy useful for the purification of our reason, with a Doctrine of Elements and a Doctrine of Methods. He again mentions sensation and understanding, which, through the former, objects are given to us, and, through the latter, they are thought of.
In the second introduction Kant offers more qualifiers for a priori concepts and their separation from experience. He focuses more strongly on their complete independence from experience, and even goes as far to say that we may know these concepts before experience and allow them to shape experience. These a priori judgments are qualified by two aspects, necessity and universality. If a concept has both of these, then it is an a priori concept originated purely without experience. The issue here presented is the problem with dogmatic assumptions in metaphysics, which qualify things like God without any background or reason, and, when one assumes so much, they cannot be accurately contradicted.
He again mentions analytic and synthetic judgments, calling them “judgments of clarification” and judgments of amplification.” He also emphasizes synthetic judgments, clarifying that all judgments of experience are synthetic, and that the sciences of math and physics that he believes metaphysics should follow are grounded in the same type. This leads to troubles with metaphysics, since it tries to solve problems of pure reason created by itself. Due to these unique troubles, a critique of pure reason is needed for this special science, since pure reason, “contains the principles for cognizing something absolutely a priori.” With his mission statement now out there, a reason defined for his practice, and a few qualifiers regarding how one should picture pure reason, Kant is ready to begin his framework for the basis of human reasoning.
Since he’s mentioned this before he moves onto something a little more important. A question is presented as to which types of judgments can be made through pure reason, so Kant puts forward two types. Analytic judgments, in which the predicate is contained in the subject, are a good deal like Plato’s ideas of the forms, from which all things come, and synthetic, in which the predicate lies outside of the subject, which is seemingly empiricism. In analytic judgments, cognition merely reproduces what we already know, while synthetic judgments aim to understand something outside of the subject, which has a method of explaining experience.
Next Kant talks about this examination of pure reason in terms of a transcendental philosophy useful for the purification of our reason, with a Doctrine of Elements and a Doctrine of Methods. He again mentions sensation and understanding, which, through the former, objects are given to us, and, through the latter, they are thought of.
In the second introduction Kant offers more qualifiers for a priori concepts and their separation from experience. He focuses more strongly on their complete independence from experience, and even goes as far to say that we may know these concepts before experience and allow them to shape experience. These a priori judgments are qualified by two aspects, necessity and universality. If a concept has both of these, then it is an a priori concept originated purely without experience. The issue here presented is the problem with dogmatic assumptions in metaphysics, which qualify things like God without any background or reason, and, when one assumes so much, they cannot be accurately contradicted.
He again mentions analytic and synthetic judgments, calling them “judgments of clarification” and judgments of amplification.” He also emphasizes synthetic judgments, clarifying that all judgments of experience are synthetic, and that the sciences of math and physics that he believes metaphysics should follow are grounded in the same type. This leads to troubles with metaphysics, since it tries to solve problems of pure reason created by itself. Due to these unique troubles, a critique of pure reason is needed for this special science, since pure reason, “contains the principles for cognizing something absolutely a priori.” With his mission statement now out there, a reason defined for his practice, and a few qualifiers regarding how one should picture pure reason, Kant is ready to begin his framework for the basis of human reasoning.
Tuesday, February 2, 2010
Why Make Useless Distinctions?
In his first introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant makes a distinction between two different types of judgments. He defines analytic judgments as “judgments of clarification” because within these only one concept is explored (Critique, 130). For instance, the judgment ‘all trees have branches’ is an analytic judgment because even though it involves two concepts - (A) trees and (B) branches - the nature of the B is included in the nature of A. In other words, Kant defines any judgment that only explicitly defines an aspect of one concept as analytic. The judgments that add something outside of one concept are synthetic or “judgments of amplification” (Critique, 130). For example, ‘all trees are beautiful” would be a synthetic judgment because B (beauty) is adding something that is not inherent in concept A (trees).
After I read the his explanation, I expected Kant to deal with analytic judgments since these are concerned with the clarity of ideas. But Kant thinks that, while important, analytic arguments are limited to “only ... attaining ... distinctiveness of concepts” and allowing the proper application of synthetic judgments (Critique, 132). I think he dismisses them as a way of moving forward with his critique. Then he discusses the peculiarities of synthetic judgments and also dismiss them from further consideration (Critique, 132). From this line of arguments Kant made a confusing leap to what he is proposing to do in his Critique: find a way “for the purification of our reason” (Critique, 133). If his critique is not intended to amplify pure reason as he explicitly claims (Critique, 133), why did he make a distinctions regarding the types of judgments in the first place? It seems that the two part are completely unrelated, or at the very least their connection is unclear. The latter is most likely the case since up to this point the page numbers between his first introduction in 1781 and his second in 1788 are close and after it there’s a 10 page difference between the two versions.
I may be completely wrong, and please comment to let me know, but I think the relationship between the two parts of his first introduction is as follows. The reason Kant made the distinction between analytical and synthetic judgments is to prepare the reader to understand what he means by pure reason. As I read it, pure reason is similar to analytical judgments since he defines pure as “not mixed with anything foreign to it,” i.e. pure reason deals only with clarifying it’s a priori concepts within reason (Critique, 132). Additionally, synthetic judgments provide a means building complex ideas out of those basic concepts.
After I read the his explanation, I expected Kant to deal with analytic judgments since these are concerned with the clarity of ideas. But Kant thinks that, while important, analytic arguments are limited to “only ... attaining ... distinctiveness of concepts” and allowing the proper application of synthetic judgments (Critique, 132). I think he dismisses them as a way of moving forward with his critique. Then he discusses the peculiarities of synthetic judgments and also dismiss them from further consideration (Critique, 132). From this line of arguments Kant made a confusing leap to what he is proposing to do in his Critique: find a way “for the purification of our reason” (Critique, 133). If his critique is not intended to amplify pure reason as he explicitly claims (Critique, 133), why did he make a distinctions regarding the types of judgments in the first place? It seems that the two part are completely unrelated, or at the very least their connection is unclear. The latter is most likely the case since up to this point the page numbers between his first introduction in 1781 and his second in 1788 are close and after it there’s a 10 page difference between the two versions.
I may be completely wrong, and please comment to let me know, but I think the relationship between the two parts of his first introduction is as follows. The reason Kant made the distinction between analytical and synthetic judgments is to prepare the reader to understand what he means by pure reason. As I read it, pure reason is similar to analytical judgments since he defines pure as “not mixed with anything foreign to it,” i.e. pure reason deals only with clarifying it’s a priori concepts within reason (Critique, 132). Additionally, synthetic judgments provide a means building complex ideas out of those basic concepts.
Monday, February 1, 2010
Metaphysics: The Battleground
All right, let’s do this.
In this first section of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, we find two Prefaces: that of the First Edition, and that of the Second Edition. I’ll follow the popular current and refer to them as Edition A and B, respectively.
Preface A and Preface B represent very different writing styles of Kant. Preface A is a tangle-free nine pages of analysis. Preface B is considerably longer and wordier, and as such does a great job at explaining Kant’s overarching goal in this work: To offer a critique of pure reason.
Kant asserts that Metaphysics is an unstable sort of science, because utilizing its principles causes Reason to miss its mark time and again. Kant states that in metaphysics, “reason continuously gets stuck, even when it claims a priori insight (as it pretends) into those laws confirmed by the commonest experience.” (Critique of Pure Reason, 109 / Bxiv) Kant goes on to suggest that we must shift our approach in thinking about objects in metaphysics. He asserts that instead of assuming that our knowledge must conform to objects, we should consider that objects may need to conform to our knowledge, which is better aligned with the concept of a priori cognition. He likens this concept to the “first thoughts of Copernicus who, when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest.” (Critique, 110 / Bxvi)
Mindblowing, no? So what Kant wants to do is free us of the thinking that we cannot have knowledge outside of experience. And rightfully so, since a priori knowledge is (to Kant) infeasible without the ability to intuit an object before being presented with it. In essence, the Critique is not intended to devise (or implement) a new approach to the realm of speculative reason, but rather, to evaluate the current approach—that is, the view that in reasoning, we must not extent ourselves beyond the limits of experience. Kant suggests that in extending ourselves in this way, we are actually creating more limits (by discovering contradictions in reason), not relieving them (Critique, 110).
The Prefaces to the Critique are full of great nuggets of wisdom, but I felt this to be a major contemplation in these pages. This helps to lay the groundwork for the entire argument he will present in the rest of the Critique, and employs carefully-selected language in order to make the point.
In this first section of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, we find two Prefaces: that of the First Edition, and that of the Second Edition. I’ll follow the popular current and refer to them as Edition A and B, respectively.
Preface A and Preface B represent very different writing styles of Kant. Preface A is a tangle-free nine pages of analysis. Preface B is considerably longer and wordier, and as such does a great job at explaining Kant’s overarching goal in this work: To offer a critique of pure reason.
Kant asserts that Metaphysics is an unstable sort of science, because utilizing its principles causes Reason to miss its mark time and again. Kant states that in metaphysics, “reason continuously gets stuck, even when it claims a priori insight (as it pretends) into those laws confirmed by the commonest experience.” (Critique of Pure Reason, 109 / Bxiv) Kant goes on to suggest that we must shift our approach in thinking about objects in metaphysics. He asserts that instead of assuming that our knowledge must conform to objects, we should consider that objects may need to conform to our knowledge, which is better aligned with the concept of a priori cognition. He likens this concept to the “first thoughts of Copernicus who, when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest.” (Critique, 110 / Bxvi)
Mindblowing, no? So what Kant wants to do is free us of the thinking that we cannot have knowledge outside of experience. And rightfully so, since a priori knowledge is (to Kant) infeasible without the ability to intuit an object before being presented with it. In essence, the Critique is not intended to devise (or implement) a new approach to the realm of speculative reason, but rather, to evaluate the current approach—that is, the view that in reasoning, we must not extent ourselves beyond the limits of experience. Kant suggests that in extending ourselves in this way, we are actually creating more limits (by discovering contradictions in reason), not relieving them (Critique, 110).
The Prefaces to the Critique are full of great nuggets of wisdom, but I felt this to be a major contemplation in these pages. This helps to lay the groundwork for the entire argument he will present in the rest of the Critique, and employs carefully-selected language in order to make the point.
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