Grow Up! Get Over Your (Empirical) Idealism

In his criticism of the fourth paralogism, Kant once again visits the debate between realism and idealism and concludes that empirical idealism can't work. Mind you, the transcendental dialectic is based about errors in logic, but the error made by empirical idealism is too big. But first, let's define what Kant means by an idealist: "someone who … does not admit that [external objects are] cognized through immediate perception and infers from this that we can never be fully certain of their reality from any possible experience” (CPR p.426 A369 ). Kant goes on to illustrate the difficulty faces by empirical idealist since he believes that they are also transcendental realist (CPR p.427 A372). If this is the case, however, the issue is confused because it “must always remain doubtful whether the cause [of our perception of objects] is in us or outside of us” since the idealist would claim that the cause is in us and the realist would claim that it is outside of us (CPR 427).

The correct position according to Kant should be that of transcendental idealism where all objects (outside of ourselves) are just “mere representations” (CPR 426). Furthermore, this position is better because it makes an object’s reality “immediately perceived” that doesn’t need to “be inferred” (CPR 427). Instead of doubting the actual reality of the objects in the world (empirical idealism), we should realize the limits of our reason: this is the task that Kant has set out to accomplish in the transcendental dialectic. In the transcendental analytic he established that we can’t know anything about things in themselves and that we only interact with the appearance of things (CPR 424). Due to this fact, we can only work with the perception we have, objects “cannot be actual [read ‘real’] in any other way” and that is precisely what the transcendental idealism states (CPR 429).

But overall, empirical idealism doesn’t make sense because, as Hume thought, we can’t really believe it. We wouldn’t be able to function if we truly thought the world was a figment of our imagination. Nevertheless, this type of idealism was a precursor to what Kant is suggesting with his transcendental critique. In other words, the empirical idealist claim is true in as far as our ability to describe outside objects; just wrong in doubting that they are really there. But doesn’t it seem logical to doubt the existence of something you know you can’t say anything about? Shouldn’t the standard for existence be that we can say something positive about the object? Not if you’re Kant. He is only interested in setting out the bounds reason. Existence is based around what must be the case to have the possibility of experience, not on what we can exhaustibly describe.

Book Two: Easier and with More Goodies

Where are we?
Transcendental Doctrine of Elements → Part II → Division II → Book II, that’s where.
Today’s topic: The Transcendental Dialectic. In this book, Kant will revisit the topic of “the thinking self” as it relates to issues of logic, reason, nature, and awareness. He puts forth a number of theories and refutes them, mostly on the grounds that the theories confuse the self with …um … the other self. I wanted to focus on this concept because Kant is very clear that the self needs to be defined in a certain way for these statements to have any validity.
Kant goes on to describe what he calls the transcendental illusion, which takes several different forms. The first of which is the illusion of the self, which is where he begins his Paralogisms of Pure Reason. These are, essentially, syllogisms that are not acceptable as valid. Rational psychology follows the reasoning that the self is a substance, since it is the subject of one’s own thoughts (following the assumption that anything that is the subject of judgment is a substance). Kant rejects this claim, asserting that while the “I” is always the subject of one’s own thoughts, it does not make the “I” a substance in the real sense.

Wait, what?

Okay, so Kant believes that the “I” (as in “I think…”) is the subject of thoughts. However, simply being a subject of our own thoughts does not make the “I” a substance, because the logical realm and the real realm are distinct (and mutually exclusive, I assume). Basically, he’s saying that the logical subject is an intangible entity, but cannot be substantively experienced (CPR 411-2).
He goes on to address other paralogisms, including “the soul is simple.” This is the concept that the soul is simple in some fundamental way. Kant says that “…the assertion of the simple nature of the soul is of unique value only insofar as through it I distinguish this subject from all matter, and consequently except it from the perishability to which matter is always subjected.” (CPR, 420 A356). Basically, Kant’s saying that the only reason we would say the soul is simple is to distinguish it from regular matter in nature, and thus distinguish it from the rules of mortality that constrains regular matter in nature (basically, to suggest the soul is immortal).
I thought this was a good point on which to focus because this distinction between the “logical I” and the “real I” is a fundamental principle on which Kant will refute a number of paralogisms in these chapters.

3 Sexy Analogies

The first:

"In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature." We can determine changes in objects of our perception, and not just a change in the way we are perceiving them, only by viewing our perceptions as successive states of persisting substances. Because we can never know the origination or cessation of substances themselves, but only changes in their states, Kant believes that the sum of all substances is permanent and unchanging. This means that substance remains and doesn’t change, while substance has particular ways for it to exist, called accidents (or determinations). Kant offers the analogy of a philosopher asking how much smoke weighs. The philosopher replies: “If you take away form the weight of the wood that was burnt the weight of the ashes that are left over, you will have the weight of the smoke.” Therefore, the philosopher is recognizing that the substance itself has not changed, merely its appearance. Kant also offers the proposition “Nothing comes form nothing” for another proof that persistence, or the existence of the proper “substance” in appearances.

The second:

“All alterations occur in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect.” Here in the second analogy Kant is arguing that in order to grasp a succession of appearances (i.e. the wood becoming smoke and ash) we must observe causality and understand that what is left later in time (smoke and ash) is a consequence of what occurred previously (burning wood). However, Kant goes on to say that the manifold of the appearance of the house, which we have just determined to be successive, might be successive in itself (the manifold), and therefore is merely an appearance and not a transcendental object. “…I must therefore derive the subjective sequence of apprehension from the objective sequence of appearances, for otherwise the former would be entirely undetermined and no appearance would be distinguished form any other.” The subjective sequence, however, proves nothing unless the manifold of appearances in the apprehension of one thing that follows another thing adheres to the rule of causality.

The third:

“All substances, insofar as they can be perceived in space as simultaneous, are in thoroughgoing interaction.” In his third analogy Kant tackles another attribute of time, simultaneity. In order to argue a co-existence of objects simultaneously Kant argues for a “community” of objects, which by co-existing, also interact to allow for empirical perception of any place, by using the relation of the surrounding matter to determine it. Without this community all perception is broken off from all other perception, and can no longer combine or be synthesized together to form a more whole picture.

Immanuel doesn't pun. He Kant.

Even Oscar Wilde appreciated a good Kant pun. Kant takes a break from some heavy duty postulating to bring you: The Refutation of Idealism! 

Kant begins his refutation of idealism by clearly defining what it is he is arguing against. He terms it "material idealism" and divides it into two categories, with each holding that the existence (or reality?) of external objects is either uncertain or flat-out impossible. These two related but differing schools of thought are attributed to Descartes and Berkeley, respectively. We are familiar with what Kant is referencing in each case: 

     - Descartes' Meditations hold that the only thing which can be empirically ascertained is the mind; "I think therefore I am" holds that the mind can only be proven to be real at the exact moment in which that thought occurs. Everything else is kind of a crapshoot. Kant terms this "problematic idealism." 

     - Next comes the "dogmatic idealism" of Berkeley, who holds space to be purely fictitious and all things thence contained in space as the same. 

Kant rather brusquely swats aside Berkeley's dogmatism with reference to the Transcendental Aesthetic. He claims that the only way one can arrive at a standpoint of dogmatic idealism is by considering space to be a property, but as we know, space is a priori, a pure intuition, and doesn't represent any property of things-in-themselves, and is also the answer to life, the universe, and everything. So now the only issue at hand becomes Descartes' doubt. Kant will attempt to prove that experience actually happens, which can be established only if our inner experience ("I am") can be possible if the external reality of the world (outer experience) is presupposed. The man managed to pack a lot into p. 326, B275. 

In a rare burst of syntactic clarity that is unlikely to be repeated, Kant's thesis is "the mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me." He goes about supporting it thusly: 

1. I am aware of the fact that I exist in time.

2. There is something persistent in this perception. (Did someone say...THE FIRST ANALOGY? see p. 299 for more on this)

3. Whatever this persistent thing is, it cannot be internal, as my own existence is only made clear to me through this persistence in the first place.

4. Because this persistent thing is not inside of me, it must therefore be external to me (as a thing, and not just the mere representation of a thing internally).

5. In other words: the awareness of my existence is only possible because of external things.

6. Awareness of my own existence is simultaneously an awareness of the existence of externalities. 

(All of this to be found on p. 327, B276.)

Kant finishes laying the smackdown on idealism with three Notes, wherein he decides to make up for his previous clarity by ironically obfuscating the point more with what was intended to elucidate his argument.

Note 1: Idealism's major flaw is its assumption that immediate experience is confined to the internal, and from this external realities must be inferred. Rather, it is outer experience that is truly immediate to us: it is only through outer sense that we become aware of the mind's determination in time (that is, inner sense). Outer objects are a requirement for the determination of the subject. (p. 327-8, B277)

Note 2: Sensibile experience completely proves this to be the case. We only understand time via the changes of objects in space (case in point: a day is the rotation of the Earth around the Sun). The only other way we could possibly understand the persistence of the proof would be through matter, but this too is presupposed a priori, and also comes to inner sense through the existence of outer things. Consciousness is merely a representation of the subject and cannot be the persistence. (p. 328, B 278)

Note 3: Just because it must be the case that outer objects exist for there to be a determinate consciousness, this does not mean that every time we perceive an object it exists. We could be completely imagining that stuff. (p. 328-9, B 279)

This concludes our broadcast, we now return you to your regularly scheduled programming. 

5 questions

1. Are the concepts of space and time prior to even perception? I understand that A priori means that there is no experience involved, and the concept is entirely innate, but how is that possible?

2. What is a synthetic A priori judgment, are they purely mathematical? How do those words fit together when synthetic and judgment both imply some sort of construction through experience and A priori means that the concept exists in ones' mind prior to any judgments or experience.

3. What are Kant's attitudes towards God or a god figure (a constructor of the universe)?

4. What is Pure reason? And how is the concept of reason or the rational world possible if not through experience?

5. We were given a handout about quantity, quality, relation and modality. That sheet attempted to define an infinite judgment, but I am still confused by it, can anyone offer a clarification?

Kant stop, won't stop.

Building on his previous writing, Kant begins by trying to establish a relationship between experience and cognition, what we can perceive and what we can mentally acquire through time.(CPR 295) There is certainly a synthesis of perceptions, which leads to the perception of the subject in temporal space(time itself). If all 'things' are known, or perceived, through experience the three analogies provided a characterization and categorization of the subjects. I believe that it seems as if Kant is trying to define substance in relation to time, through experience of the three analogies to be mentioned. The determining factors--Persistence, Succession and Simultaneity--are all key components to understanding Kant's writing of temporal relations, and more specifically must be proven through a priori reasoning. Otherwise, how one can determine that a subject is the same as it once was before or if in fact it changed from the previous state?(CPR 319) Persistence relates to substance by remaining static, by simply not changing. Succession is a temporal series, or progression(perhaps even digression?) of events. Simultaneity, lastly, is the relation of time as a sum or totality.

Theoretically, this approach appears to follow a cohesive line of logic and reasoning.

In order to experience something it must exist in the temporal space, and the objects within the temporal space are defined by the three analogies, Persistence, Succession and Simultaneity, which all describe the possible relations of substance in the temporal.

An interesting example is found in Kant's explanation of the manifold of experience, how substance remains the same and only the accidents change. This follows most everything taught on the laws of energy and transfer of motion. Energy is neither created nor destroyed. It is rather absorbed then transferred from substance to substance, highlighting Kant's analogy. This is where one would expect trouble with the writing, but alas, there is no fight to be had.

The manifold is given considerable attention in the second addition of CPR, and rightfully so. It is at the heart of the reading, proving that there must be a combination between experience and the nexus, or connection of time. Unfortunately, this is exactly where everything falls apart in grand fashion for me on an intellectual level...

The refutation of material idealism strikes at the heart of Decartes' Cogito, Ergo Sum
and the dogmatic idealism of Berkely. "Idealism," Kant postulates," is the theory that declares the existence of objects in space outside us to be either merely dubtful and indemonstrable(Descartes), or else false and impossible(Berkely)."(CPR 326) Kant denounces both, as shown deliberately by the quote above. So Idealism is now acceptable, what happened to the transcendentally aesthetic Immanuel?

Kant proposes problematic idealism as a solution to answer both problems with Descartes and Berkely, that the assertio of Descartes can not physically prove existence of other substance, and that Berkely's thoughts lead to an imaginary state of the universe. So far, I am with Kant--Cogito does not provide an affirming empirical basis, and that the inseparable condition of Berkely leaves out the possibility for knowing something exists without the experience of it.

This is where it falls into place, the purpose of the differentiation and distinguishing factors of temporal space were derived in order to provide a formal response to material idealism. Kant writes, "the consciousness of my own experience is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me." To paraphrase, inner experience is not the only immediate experience--we are defined by our understanding of the immediate outside world as known through ourselves.

But does this generate the best doctrine? Do we only know of foreign lands just because some other individual has been there before? How do we know what the universe consists of? What of existence itself? There seems to be a very strong argument here, but it is not completely defensible. Notice the use of language, postulates of modality. Even though Kant addresses this lapse, it still seems suspect(CPR 332). It is still very uncertain to me. The metaphysical questions can not stop here, and will not stop here, this is just the beginning.

Questions

1. I still am not quite grasping how synthetic a priori judgments are possible...how can I extend my knowledge without experience?
2. I have this question written in my notes from 03.02: 
Can the pure forms of intuition present experience by themselves?
3. Can we go over those subreptive axioms?
4. So, is objective knowledge entirely impossible?
5. Can someone simply summarize all those transcendental doctrines for me?
...and just out of curiosity, how does Kant feel that God fits into all of this?

Critique of Kant's Schemata

Up until this point, Kant’s theory has had one gaping hole: how do concepts relate to intuitions? That is, how can pure concepts of understanding be applied to intuitions in a way that the representations can be judged and understood? As concepts are intellectual and intuitions are sensible, there must be something which bridges the gap between the two and allows for the subject to understand particular intuitions as they relate to general concepts. As Kant says, “the representations of the [object] must be homogeneous with the [concept].” (CPR 271) Kant’s answer for this is the idea of schemata.

Schemata are the homogeneous, mediating representations between categories and intuition and are produced by the imagination. Schemata are not really images, but methods for generating images. (273) They are pure intuition, seemingly a blend between pure concepts and empirical intuition, and are hence founded in time (transcendental schematism).

Kant’s idea of schemata is somewhat problematic. How can something be both sensible and intellectual? If there are only two divisions of representations, intuitions and concepts, then it would seem that the gap cannot be bridged. Schemata would have to be concepts that are somehow related to intuitions, or intuitions formed from concepts. Both of which are impossible, based on Kant’s own definitions. But, if schemata can be thought of as both sensible and intellectual, then the gap is not really there. Intuitions and concepts would then already be linked without need for this third division of representations. Schemata seem to be either impossible or unnecessary.

It seems to me that schemata are really just concepts which are applied to intuitions. Thinking of a perfect triangle does not seem to be possible without some image applied to it. One can think of the idea of a perfect triangle, i.e. that it has three perfectly straight sides and the angles all add up to exactly 180°, but one cannot actually think of the triangle without an image. Maybe this ‘idea of perfect triangle’ is actually what Kant means by schemata, but I would argue that one could hold in one’s mind the image of a perfect triangle. To me, schemata do not seem to be necessary, though I would argue that Kant’s idea of concepts as distinct from intuition is merely just imposed definitions on the world and not necessarily the way it has to be, but that is for another time.

So, while some notion of a representation which can allow concepts to be applied to intuitions seems necessary in Kant’s theory of experience, it remains to be seen whether such a representation is possible given Kant’s constructions.

Kant's Definition of Stupidity

            Kant begins his Second Book by reminding us that the higher faculties of cognition are understanding, the power of judgment, and reason, but that only understanding and the power of judgment are analytical (CPR 267).

In his intro to The Analytic of Principles, Kant discusses why he will be referring to the power of judgment. According to Kant, the analytic of principles is relevant to the power of judgment because “it teaches it to apply to appearances the concepts of understanding, which contain the condition for rules a priori” (CPR 267). Therefore, the concepts of understanding are important because they are used in making judgments and “are the basis for the formation of all other, empirical concepts,” whose truths The Transcendental Analytic tries to determine though these judgments and rules (Gardner 116).

            Following is Kant’s introduction to the transcendental power of judgment, where he contrasts the understanding, which is the “faculty of rules” and the power of judgment, which is the faculty of “subsuming under rules” for the understanding (CPR 268). These rules are “given in the pure concept of the understanding,” where concepts originate (CPR 269). However, it seems that not everyone has that power of judgment, and that unfortunately, if you don’t posses it, you can’t learn it. Ultimately, if you lack the power of judgment, you are stupid (make sure to read his asterisk note). So, is one merely born with this power then? Do we have no control over this?

Yet, Kant  appears to contradict himself by initially saying originally that that you can’t be taught the power of judgment, but then a few lines later says that you can “sharpen the power of judgment” (and not of understanding) through learning from empirical examples (CPR 268, 269). He states that learning from these examples is important to every person who lacks judgment, but that they must remember that these examples are not principles. The examples cannot be universal principles because they are based on experiences, and they don’t usually “fulfill the condition of the rule” (CPR 269).  So, you can’t learn the power of judgment, but can empirically improve upon what powers you do happen to be born possessing?

Throughout, Kant also contrasts general logic with transcendental logic, and says that transcendental logic is more important and relevant to the power of judgment because the origination of the rules is determined through transcendental logic, as well as is the “a priori the case to which the rules ought to be applied” (CPR 269).

            

Me + Kant = Ice Cream and Vinegar

We just don't mix. Of course, I'm the ice cream because I'm much easier to "digest" than Kant is. That being said, here's my junk:

1. I don't get the difference between Understanding and Pure Understanding.

2. Synthesis of Recognition in the Concept and Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding... huh?!

3. My class notes are a hot mess. What's the end of this sentence?: "A logical form of judgment gives clues to the ______."

4. So Intuition and Understanding are both needed for the possibility of experience, right?

5. Can someone remind me why we can't derive general concepts from other general concepts?

I think it's still Wednesday in American Samoa...

1. In the last class we talked about the distinction between the pure and the empirical: pure concepts form the basis for empirical concepts (which seems similar in proposition to me when recalling previous discussions of the relationship between pure and empirical intuitions). I guess this is an issue that has been bothering me for the whole class: how is Kant justifying the "pure" as truly a priori? I concede the point that we have certain innate understandings of things like space, but don't we truly only frame those cognitions through experience? I think this entire business is arbitrary.

2. I have multiple questions concerning the categories, but first I want to make sure I'm understanding something correctly. Is Kant's intention to place all these concepts into the realm of understanding? All of these seem to be logical propositions (either p or ~p, especially in the categories of modality, is kind of jumping off the page all over the place) and would those not be related to simple reason, as mere logic?

3. What exactly is meant by the "unity of consciousness" as necessary for the relation of intuition or concepts to experience? This seems like a clandestine way of saying causality to me.

4. I am no fan of the ontological proof, but if Kant describes non-existence as a category (which he does on pp. 212), he also places no other categories contingent to it - like reality, or inherence or substance, so then doesn't his criticism "existence is not a predicate" fail? God could be a reality with non-existence, yes?

5. Can we just recap transcendental deduction?

Questions

1. Is the dialectic of logic identical with the misuse of logic (wherein one asserts an objective fact using only logic)? Or is the dialectic simply the part of logic in which one would commit this error, IF one were to commit this error?

2. I'm afraid I know very little geometry, though Kant uses his notion of the subject as evidence in several sections. Can geometry somehow be a human 'construct,' such that it is apodictic because that is how we 'make' it? As an a priori certainty, Kant seems to take it to be more sacrosanct than that.

3. Some commentators talk about Kant's dependence on Euclidean geometry for his ideas about geometry. How, if at all, does non-Euclidean geometry affect his ideas?

4. Was anyone else surprised to find out that Konigsberg was that far east, in what is now Kaliningrad? Always thought it was in present-day Germany.

5. To paraphrase Kant (hopefully correctly), he talks of experience triggering a priori concepts. What is the relationship between these latent faculties and the experience that activates them?

The Q's

1. What is the function of the "Table of Categories" present on page 212? I understand that it identifies what Kant believes to be the extent of types of "judgments" but what is the purpose or judgement of identifying and separating all of them into this chart?

2. Why does Kant have an A version focusing on the subjective faculties such as intuition, imagination, and understanding, followed by a B version that focuses on objective ideas about why concepts must apply to objects? Why is there such a sudden switch and how does it intrinsically change his ideology?

3. As a transcendental idealist that believes appearances are the grounds for the possibility of experience, is Kant an empirical realist (concepts precede experience) as a result of these beliefs?

4. I have transcendental deduction defined as "the explanation of the way in which concepts can relate to objects apriori" in my notebook, but what does this "explanation" actually consist of?

5. Secondly, I don't understand how we could possibly have a priori knowledge of objects, as children don't we learn through experience that things are hot, sharp, etc. If we had apriori knowledge of the concepts of these objects wouldn't we, as humans, implicitly know things without experiencing them?

Inquiries

1. If the conditions for knowing are present in the subject, not the object, then how can Kant agree with empirical realism, since, if we know things through our representations of them, how can we know the object as it truly is?

2. Likwise, if a judgement is a unity of subject and predicate, then how can we find truth by uniting a subjective representation with a separate object which may not be as it appears to be. Is it even truly possible?

3. How would imagination synthesize reproduction and a continuity of moments, since they would consist of real, not imaginary events? Are the two even that relatable?

4. If we can understand experience as a manifold, then wouldn't the manifold consist of differing times as well as experiences, which would contradict Kant's view of time being a whole concept, not that of isolated bits? Would this a priori synthesis exist involving time before experience, thus making the experience's synthesis of moments less momentous?

5. So would our methods of synthesis of experience be a priori, even though experience is, by definition, not? Wouldn't we first need experience to learn how to synthesize it, thus negating its status as a priori, since we would have to learn it through our experiences?

Q&A

1. How is it that the transcendental deduction establishes objective validity?

2. How is it that a priori concepts can be considered universal, especially when the conditions for experience are subjective? How can these conditions achieve objective validity?

3. How can we ever establish a convincing distinction between empirical deductions and a simple empirical observation that relies on a priori concepts being present?

4. What, other than necessity, is the justification for claiming that space and time have a synthetic apprehension that stands a priori? How can this apprehension be a priori if it depends on the act of apprehension itself?

5. How does Kant establish an objective determination of synthetic and analytic concepts?

5 Questions

1.What exactly is meant by Kant’s use of “manifold?”
2.For another definition, what does Kant mean when he discusses “consciousness?” (CPR 231)
3.How does Kant specifically justify the universal validity of transcendental ideality for all human persons?
4.As time is an “inner sense” does that mean it is a faculty of the mind or is it something else entirely?
5.What role does judgment have in regards to understanding? Kant mentions that Judgment is “the representation of a representation,” I am not entirely sure what is meant by this (CPR 205)

?s

1.) Does our subjective condition, namely our a priori intuition of space and time, prevent us from knowing anything objectively?
2.) How is it that Kant can call our concepts of understanding a priori if he deduced them from experience?
3.) Since Kant's list of concepts was a major area of revision, and, in addition, is widely regarded as incomplete, can we say that his overall argument is flawed as a result?
4.) Is there anything in the "manifold" that cannot be combined, or unified?
5.) Must synthesis always precede analysis? If so, is this Kant's best response to Hume's skeptical view of causality?

5 Q's

1. Why do space and time possess transcendental ideality?
2. If a concept is not immediately related to an object, how is it still related to the object’s representation?
3. Why does Kant make the distinction between affirmative judgments versus infinite judgments? I’m not quite sure I understand the difference.
4. Why is affinity a necessary consequence of the synthesis in imagination?
5. How can the understanding both be a faculty of rules and the source of the laws of nature?

My Five Questions

Ok, so I went through my notes and came up with questions on some things I still do not understand, though Michael already took some of mine.

1. Why does Transcendental Idealism require Transcendental Deduction?
2. Why does Kant consider arithmetic to be an a priori synthetic judgment?
3. Why are subjective conditions necessarily objectively valid?
4. What is empirical reality and what is the idea of empirical reality opposed to?
5. And this last one may be a little early for where we are in the text, but how does God fit into Kant's theory of Transcendental Idealism?
   

Kant Questions

Hello all,

I will try and start off the question assignment:

1) How does the imagination link the faculties of sensibility and the understanding?
2) What is the difference between an appearance and a representation? I keep thinking I have this straightened out and then I get confused again.
3) Is there a definite and certain number of derivative concepts for Kant? And if so, why does he decline to actually enumerate them?
4) If we can only cognize ourselves as appearances of the inner sense, how does the self act as a synthetic unity for all experience?
5) Does the use of the apperception as a means of unity for our experience open Kant up to a solipsism?

Sensibility and Understanding Were Made For Each Other

Having already established the innate concepts of understanding, i.e., quantity, quality, relation and modality, Kant now provides us with the transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of understanding. In this section, he further elaborates on how our a priori understanding works in conjunction with our intuition so that we can synthesize experience. He also emphasizes the importance of the original synthetic unity of apperception as the fulcrum of our understanding in general.

As we all know, our sense data would be “unruly heaps” of representations if we did not have a means of synthesizing our experience (CPR 239). In fact, experience would not even be possible without the unity of given concepts that precede the combination of representations (246). As humans, we almost automatically combine the representations that experience gives us. Thus, I think Kant is right to point out that we must have some way of consistently shaping our experience. However, this shaping is not arbitrary because it must be deduced from these concepts that we have all been given. In other words, we must inherently have a coherent way of filtering through our experiences that are only possible within space in time. But the question remains, how does Kant’s notion of the understanding surpass the boundaries of merely rational and empirical claims, and seal the bond between the immaterial world of thought and the physical world that exists in space and time?

Well, the answer to this question is still somewhat unclear, though Kant is certainly making strides. Specifically, he claims that the original synthetic unity of apperception, or the act of combining what is intuited in one consciousness, is the “supreme principle of all intuition in relation to the understanding” (248). The significance of this claim rests on the fact that our minds are what give order to nature, as he mentions earlier in the Analytic (242). Thus, he continues along the tradition of relating everything abstracted from nature back to the subject. Kant’s tendency to focus on the subject in relation to the objects seems counterintuitive at first, but in this section he gives us glimpses of objectivity that show us that he is gradually closing in on truth.

Kant distinguishes the transcendental unity of apperception from the subjective unity of consciousness. He does this by grouping objectivity with the former and the inner sense, or time, with the latter (250). Here we find a sliver of separation between what is intuited and what can be considered truthful. Thus, after bringing sensibility and understanding together through the unity of apperception, he reveals to us, our very own ability to sift through reality in an objectively a priori manner. At the moment, it seems that our ability to conceptualize the relation of representations is our only hope of ever knowing the ever so elusive "things in themselves."