CPR, The Finale.

"If the reader has had the pleasure and patience in traveling along in my company, he can now judge" CPR 704

When I wrote my last entry, there were hints of this. An overarching goal, a greater 'reason'. It now seems to manifest itself in the last few pages of the CPR, as the syllabus takes its last breath and goes to sleep.

If not keen as to why Kant was writing CPR, it seems that there was an objective in mind. Throughout the work the writing style was painful, exhaustive--different from other works. But the manner in which the writing built upon itself was amazing. Piece by piece, the transcendental was constructed from the ground up to this point, the zenith of CPR's pyramid.

The cannon of pure reason distills the questions of CPR, we finally get to see why the Critique is necessary and why it is so important; the world is constituted by morality which is established by the practical interest of pure reason. It is important to note a distinction here. Pure Reason, as designated by Kant, is of worth because it is a negative faculty that does not serve as an organon or expansion of thought, but rather a disciplinary tool or "guard against errors."(CPR672)

The exclusionary aspect of CPR then leaves three questions.
1.What can I know?
2.What should I do?
3.What may I hope?

Kant's pace here is more efficient by leaps and bounds. However, it may move too fast. This is, after all, his crowning moment, his fifteen minutes of fame, his proverbial Alamo. His answers are relatively brief ( A:1. What I can know is speculative, revert back A:2. This is an answer of practical philosophy, specifically moral and is not subject to this critique A:3. Both practical and theoretical, something is because something ought to happen). (CPR677)

These answers are brief, but still leave much to be questioned later. I hope because happiness ought to happen. This passes. But the interjection of God when answering why we have a notion of duty provides discontinuity for me. "Morality is only an idea, the realization of which rests on the condition that everyone do what he should, i.e., that all actions of rational beings occur as if they arose from a highest will..." The cause of all morality in the world is then drawn from the "morally most perfect will, combined with the highest blessedness." (CPR 679-680)

Morals=God?

Not quite. The moral world, a world which we do what we are supposed to do and everyone is happy, would be a consequence of our conduct in the sensible world. Therefor, morals do not lead to god, but lead to a future life in which the concept of God and hope are ostensibly interconnected.

God=Perfection of Morality?

If you were a Kantian and and an atheist, sit down. Kant creates what seems to be an allusion to the Kingdom of God in the New Testament. Some of us are evil(immoral) and must pray(hope) for a future in which God's kingdom (the morally mot perfect will providing the future life not separated from obligation) and we will all be saved. Pardon the iconoclastic summary.

But does this prove God? Earlier, Kant wrote of how CPR was an exercise of 'negative' thought, that is exclusionary thought that should be used to determine what is impossible, not what is. This makes criticism much more difficult, as one cannot necessarily disprove Kant's moral world, but can question it.

One question that came to mind was the subjectivity of "The Morally Perfect Will", how does morality prove that there is a god, even if I were to assume a primordial being capable of establishing the rules of the game? Kant later answers that the being would have to be omniscient and omnipresent, the divine being must know all and be a single voice in order to know of and create the moral world.(CPR 686)

Once again, we are left with more questions than answers. I am not sure. Kant's arguments follow a very precise logical path to get here, but the origin of morality seems flimsy to say the least. It is designed not to be definitive, yet is used in order to make authoritative points in Kant's later works. I remain a critic.

"No one will be able to boast that he knows that there is a God...for if he knows that, then he is precisely the man I have long sought."(CPR689)

Maimon's Critique of the Critique

Salomon Maimon offers a series of critiques of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason in his Letters from Philaletes to Aenesidemus, in order to establish his skepticism. The most prevalent of theses is the critique of Kant’s idea of the “thing-in-itself.” For Kant, a thing in itself is outside the sphere of possible experience, yet is also the source of cognition. Maimon agreed with Kant that the thing in itself is beyond the sphere of possible experience, but holds that this does not mean that the thing in itself cannot be an object of cognition in principle. (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/maimon)
Maimon looks at the relationship between logic and transcendental philosophy in the first part of his sixth letter, and claims that Kant inverts the two. While the logical forms are all that can be truly known, they “have no meaning at all when abstracted from their transcendental meaning.” (185, emphasis in original) One cannot give the meaning of logical affirmation and negation apart from the corresponding transcendental concepts of reality and negation. Maimon then goes on to argue that logical reality and negation presuppose the transcendental and absolute categories and “otherwise they would not have meaning at all.” (186) Logic must, therefore, have transcendental philosophy as its premise, rather than the other way around, as Kant has it.
Part of Maimon’s objection rises from his contention that the logical forms have not yet been subjected to proper scrutiny and have always just been assumed to be valid and complete, since they were proposed by Aristotle. “[The Critique of Reason] assumes [the logical forms]…even though without a previous critique they cannot be either correctly determined or complete in number, and cannot have either a meaning or a ground.” (186) So, to use the logical forms as a basis for transcendental philosophy would be to base that philosophy on an unproven foundation.
Even with his problems with the logical forms, Maimon still has problems accepting things in themselves as objective, as we see in the previous post. For Maimon, we cannot know anything objectively because we can only know our representations, not the things in themselves. If, as Maimon seems to believe, we cannot truly know things in themselves, but can only have perfect knowledge of pure thought, i.e. logic and math, then we seem to be on a slippery slope towards solipsism. For, if we cannot know anything objectively, but can only be sure of representations and pure thought, then how can we truly know that anything actually exists outside of our mind? This is, obviously, a position that one would not want to hold, but I think is one that could be drawn from Maimon’s skepticism.

Philaletes Skeptic Letters

In the first two letters to Aenesidemus, Philaletes challenges Aenesidemus’ philosophy, going through Aenesidemus’ arguments step by step. Although they are both trying to lay the grounds for skepticism, Philaletes claims that that is the only thing that they have in common. Additionally, Reinhold, Hume, and Kant are also the victim of Philaletes critiques.

            A main argument that Philaletes brings to the table is the topic of what representations are, and how we come to have them. He disagrees with critical philosophy, which follows that representations are “ideas of reason that are grounded in its nature” and instead puts forth his own view that representations are “grounded only in the nature of the imagination” (161). Where and if reason comes into Philaletes philosophy, I am not sure.

            In Philaletes’ argument on representations, the principle of contradiction and the principle of consciousness are important. If I understand correctly, Philaletes claims that the principle of contradiction is the superior principle. However, I am unclear in his explanation because Reinhold contrarily believes the principle of consciousness to be higher because it includes the more important functions, like the thinking and representing of objects, while the principle of contradictions only relates to thought (164). Regardless, Philaletes agrees that the principle of consciousness may depend on the principle of contradiction (because the possibility has to be established first), but disagrees with Aenesidemus that it is determined by it (163).

            The principle of consciousness cannot become necessary or a universal law because “it can…mean something different for anybody” (167). We cannot even know that others have a consciousness, or if they do, if it is the same as ours. Each of our own consciousnesses apparently is a unique constant presence in our daily lives and affects how we each perceive objects.

            When we perceive an object, we are only forming what Philaletes calls a “partial representation” because the representation of the perceived object has been reproduced in our mind by the imagination, using our memory to recreate the object (169). Our representation of an object is our consciousness’ best attempt to recreate the original object that we had initially perceived through our senses.  

            I like Philaletes’ discussion on how the “original sensible perception [i.e. the actual chair, not the chair reproduced in your mind through the imagination] does not represent anything besides itself – and this means that in fact it does not represent anything at all” (169). What! But it makes sense that what I’m calling the original objects are not representations in themselves, and therefore do not represent themselves, or anything. They just are.

            However, we never call anything something in itself, we only call things representations. When I look at a chair, I don’t think that I’m looking at the actual thing in itself. I’m perceiving what I recreate through my faculties and consciousness as a chair. Possibly because that’s how we perceive everything. We only ever ‘see’ objects as representations in our minds, thanks to our memory and imagination. Philaletes says that this is an “illusion of the imagination” (169). Unlike Reinhold, we must remember that “every perception refers to a thing-in-itself” (170). Got it. 

How Exactly did Kant get Caught in the Middle of an Aenesidemusian Love Triangle? Idk...

In his Review of Aenesidemus, J.G. Fichte provides insightful commentary on the skeptical criticisms made by G.E. Shulze in regard to Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s Philosophy of the Elements. Essentially, Shulze, or Aenesidemus, argues against the validity of Reinhold’s first principle, which highlights the subject’s faculty of representations. This principle is referred to as the “principle of consciousness,” which, in a transcendentally idealistic fashion, designates the title of “cause” to the subject and “effect” to the object, or representation. (Review of Aenesidemus, 139, 149). Ultimately, Fichte is rather sympathetic to Shulze’s commanding criticisms of Reinhold even though he believes that Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is not as affected by Shulze’s remarks.

Fichte almost entirely champions Aenesidemus’s argument in the opening of his Review. The problem with Reinhold seems to lie in the statement “in consciousness, representation is distinguished by the subject from the subject and object, and is referred to both” (ROA, 138). In other words, Reinhold presumes that the subject is inherently different from the object, and is responsible for understanding the relationship between subject and object. Fichte highlights some setbacks that Aenesidemus found in the principle of consciousness, which culminate in the subject being reduced to the same level as the object: (1) the principle of consciousness cannot be the absolutely first proposition since it is subject to the principle of contradiction (2) distinguishing and referring are not enough to completely determine the consciousness through itself (3) the principle of consciousness is tied down to “some determinate experience” and “some definite reasoning” (ROA, 138-39). Thus, Fichte seems to agree that the principle of consciousness is not as well founded as it originally seems because it is dependent on many other circumstances.

Fichte then adds to the objections introduced by Aenesidemus. Although he agrees that the principle of consciousness is synthetic instead of analytic, Fichte elaborates on this issue by noting that there must be some sort of thesis and antithesis that undergirds this extremely high-level synthesis that we call consciousness (ROA, 140). Furthermore, delimiting the idea of consciousness even more, Fichte is also in agreement with Aenesidemus in that the principle of consciousness is an abstraction, and not an a priori condition. Fichte strengthens this claim by pointing out that the principle of consciousness is based on empirical self-observation (ROA, 140-41). And thus, consciousness, having been reduced to a mere representation itself, cannot transcend the bounds--nor determine the bounds--of abstraction.

Aside from noting that Aenesidemus does not consistently convey Reinhold’s argument properly (ROA, 143), and adding some of his own criticism, it seems that Fichte is does accept Schulze’s claims to be somewhat of a blow to the new philosophy, albeit not a definitive one. Moreover, Fichte shows us that Reinhold’s desire to provide a first principle was not in vain, in that, by trying to solidify Kant’s philosophy with a first principle, Reinhold helped the “new philosophers” realize that there was still more to be done in order to combat the weighty criticisms of the skeptics (ROA, 153). Thus, in light of Fichte’s Review, Kant’s Critique remained virtually unscathed, but was undoubtedly left in need of some refinement...

Skeptical Skeptics and Skepticism: A Skeptical View

In his paper, Aenesidemus, skeptical thinker G.E. Schulz attacks the very grounds on which the determinations and conclusion of the First Critique rest. Schulz claims that in producing the First Critique, Kant fails to properly refute the skeptical system of David Hume, namely on the ground that Kant bases his system of philosophy on the principles toward which Hume directed all of his skeptical doubt rather than resolves them before moving forward. Among the most critical failures delineated by Schulz is Kant's failure to provide sufficient ground for the objective actuality of the "faculty of representation" (i.e. the condition of the knowing subject.

Schulz asserts that Kant fails in proving the objective validity of the faculty of representation by breaking down the syllogism on which Kant's claim is based: that, if any two things cannot be thought apart from one another, then they cannot be apart from one another (if objects cannot be thought apart from an objectively real faculty of representations, then this faculty of representation must, by necessity, exist if objects are to exist) (pg. 108). Schulz points out that if this were to hold true in all cases, then the Kantian claim that reason is incapable of determining the nature of things-in-themselves would be disproven, since we would have a principle with which we can deduce the nature of anything (pg. 108).

Schulz's attacks on the foundation of Kant's philosophy raise some interesting and provocative questions about the validity of Kant's claims and the basis of his system of critical philosophy. If this syllogism is to be regarded as true and as a sufficient proof for the validity of the faculty of representation, then is it also the case that every effect must contain within it all elements of its cause? For the syllogism to hold true, then representations (i.e., the effects of the faculty of representation) must contain in them the essence of this faculty. However, it seems that Kant asserts time and time again that it is not the representations that account for the essence of the conditions of the knowing subject, but rather the conditions and faculties of the knowing subject that determines the essence of the representations. Furthermore, if Kant's system of reasoning is indeed valid, then effects in general must be entirely reflective of their causes in all cases (that is, all aspects of a cause must be able to be seen in their effects). However, this appears impossible, since the entire essence of a cause cannot be transferred to its effect without the essence of the cause being eliminated altogether.

Though Schulz's accusations come from an unabashedly skeptical frame of reference, they nonetheless are important criticisms of Kant's critical philosophy. If the first critique indeed does refute Hume's skepticism, then the problems raised by Hume must be adequately addressed and thought through before they can be reconciled.

Skeptics Hating On Kant

G.E. Schulze is a supporter of Hume and a skeptic. His paper, Aenesidemus, is a criticism of Reinhold's support of Kant's philosophy and Kant himself. He basically brings up a defense of skepticism and Hume. He begins by questioning the connection between our representations and the things outside us, (105) i.e. the existence of causality, the soul, or the thing-in-itself. The Philosophy of the Elements however will be the center of this blog since Schulze dedicates quite a bit his attention to it. So what is the Philosophy of the Elements? Basically it is a theorem of the nature/concept of the faculty of representation. It is the cause and ground of the actual presence of representations; is present prior to ever representation , and is so in a determinate form; differs from representation as cause from effect and may be inferred only from its effect.(107) However, it implies causality of the representation but of course Schulze does not agree because it is not mentioned to be a proof unlike the Theory of the Faculty of Representation (Reinhold's support of Kant), which claims that the being and the actuality of a faculty of representation, which must exist objectively, can not be thought apart. In other words, the there must exist a cause which has some effect from the being of another which takes a physical form/ or a form all together.(?)( the faculty of representation) Not sure if I follow this at all. But overall Schulze is basically saying that the Philosophy of the Elements is a contradiction to the Critique of Pure Reason. The reason for Schulze's disagreement is because he believes that causes require that it be thought of as different from their effects but not manifested through the effects.(110-111) In other words, Schulze claims that the cause that Kant and Reinhold claims to have proven is really a fallacy of begging the question. (111)

Wag the Tail

In his critic of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, as Henry Allison informs us in his account, Eberhard sets out to “recover [us] from the stupor induced by the Critique of Pure Reason” (Allison 16). He attempts to do so by providing a clear critique of the publication, which he mostly develops around on Leibnizian arguments. Allison outlines his arguments into four clearly delineated parts. Eberhard firsts critics Kant’s work on the limits of knowledge; secondly, he provides the justification of knowledge derived from non-sensible conditions; he then critics Kant’s argument about the nature of sensible conditions, namely space and time; and lastly, he questions the originality of Kant’s work as he likens it to a lesser version of Leibniz’s philosophy (Allison 16). In his first argument, Eberhard claims knowledge cannot be simply limited to sensible conditions as intuitive knowledge. In other words, there is another “purely, rational non-intuitive knowledge about […] things in themselves” (Allison 17). This, of course, Kant argued against, for, according to him, we can only have knowledge about things as they are given to us in experience within the sensible conditions of space and time. Any claims about anything else outside of experience equate to stretching the bounds of our understanding beyond its grasp. Eberhard explains that this limitation cannot be carried out since we can make claims about super-sensible things that are consistent with themselves but also comply with the nature of reality. He asserts the Leibnizian argument that as compliant with the basic human principles, namely sufficient reason and the principle of non-contradiction, the “transcendental validity” (which would equate to Kant’s term, “objective reality”) of such claims stands (Allison 17). As such, anything “that follows logically from these principles” (Allison 17) contains truth. The validity of claims is dependent only on the parameters of these principles, not dependent on their pertaining to the sensible conditions of knowledge. From this view, he argues that doubting any claims made by reason would lead to skepticism. Truth, for Eberhard, is “ the agreement […] with the necessary laws of reason and the understanding” (Allison 18). Under this definition, doubting claims made by reason outside of the sensible conditions would deprive us of any certain truth. For Eberhard, as long as something complies with the principle of non-contradiction and providing sufficient reason can provide logical knowledge outside of sensible conditions. Yet, Kant is not leading us into skepticism. He is not challenging the logic of such principle, if anything he asserts within experience. What he is challenging is the extension of these principles beyond their realm. His critique of Leibnizian rationalism derives from its presupposed “erroneous identification of our concepts of things with the things themselves” (Allison 21). Eberhard seems to ignore this and simply makes the same claim that principles that coincide with the nature of things as we experience them must hold validity outside of experience for the very same reason that they hold validity with experience. Simply because we cannot think of anything within our experience that could not escape the principle of non-contradiction does it mean that we can extend this principle to things outside of experience. Regardless of whether Kant succeeds in his quest to evaluate the validity of reason and its claims, Eberhard simply regresses from any progress Kant made by simply brushing off any challenges made to the presupposed validity of reason with the same justification that Kant challenges.

Reinhold: Continuous Chain of Intellectual History

The Reinhold letters lend a great insight into the historical and intellectual context that Kant was immersed in. Opening with a long extracted passage, it seems as though everyone is intellectually at odds with reason, as it is “being accused ever more loudly as a disturber of the peace in the most important affair of humankind.” (Reinhold, 3)
The passage claims how the whole world is “driving reason into a corner.” (Reinhold, 4) The social religious and despotic orders want to suppress the “voice of their enemy,” which is reason of course, to maintain their current status quos. Reinhold maintains a dissenting view from the passage and challenges the writer to understand how any religious or secular faction is always utilizing reason to a certain extent. In fact, when one observes an isolated group or faction, it may seem frightening, but when viewed in a larger historical context, “as a whole in their connection with one another” the viewer can witness the “far-reaching and beneficent revolutions” that are continuously occurring (Reinhold, 4).
Reinhold does not believe the world of ideas to be stagnant or at odds with reason, but rather that it is in a constant state of flux. No single opinion or metaphysical answer is ever permanently sound, but rather there is an “ever-growing inadequacy of every answer offered to date.” (Reinhold, 7)
He then goes into great length of how various groups will latch reason to their beliefs, but how diametrically opposed groups will tear each other apart, “The deist drives pantheism out from all fortifications, while the pantheist tears down the bastions of deism.” (Reinhold, 8) All outdated modes of dogmatic thought are squabbling to assert their own belief structure but are at constant odds with one another. Reinhold, however, is glad that the current epoch has arrived. With a greater extent of intellectual freedom, there does not have to be any particular metaphysical universals, rather a limitless field of inquiry and potential for investigation can foster and develop.
Reinhold certainly seems to express a very far-reaching and broad-minded view of intellectual history and its development. No idea is capable of being a permanent fixture, but rather it is continuous chains of ideas, which are perpetually being altered or further developed to suit the needs of a particular era.

The Super Best Friends

I couldn’t think of a title, and I just watched South Park, so that’s the best I could do.

In rejecting the possibility of apodictic proofs as well as blind faith providing for God’s existence, Reinhold is enamored with Kant’s faith through practical reason. He holds that Kant manages to combine the best of both worlds, as he uses both doctrines for grounds in his argumentation. More importantly, Reinhold argues that a proper balance is stricken between reason and faith. While both are necessary, they cannot be allowed to encroach upon one another. Practical reason leads to the necessity of faith, not to its elimination.

Despite all this adoration, Reinhold doesn’t actually spend too much time in this letter actually discussing what Kant has proved, so I had to cheat and look at what Kant says. Kant argues that through reason, one can neither prove God’s existence, nor his non-existence. Instead, he classifies God as the faultless ideal, something that can never be proven yet never refuted (B669 589). Due to the transcendental qualities we ascribe to God (infinity, unity, omnipresence, omnipotence, etc.), only a transcendental theology could explain them. And as we are incapable of producing such a theology, we can never empirically prove or disprove God’s existence. Conversely, Kant also ascribes the concept of God to morality. Specifically, the idea of God is necessary when trying to conceptualize the highest idea of good. In this sense, one cannot separate the idea of God from the idea of supreme happiness. Thus, the ideal of the highest good is a necessary part of the moral world, which is seen as a consequence of the sensible world (A811 680). Therefore, God is a necessary idea behind the motivations of the good and morality.

Reinhold seems to encapsulate this when he argues that both wise sages and common men seem to accept the idea that there is some future rewarder or judge that will either approve or condemn one’s actions. Thus, Reinhold argues the best part of Kant’s proof is that it grounds the cognition of God’s existence, while still allowing for faith.

Ultimately, the problem I have with this is the effort Kant goes to explain the abilities and boundaries of pure reason, only to determine that it is unable to provide a definitive answer to God’s existence. And then to say that some idea of God is necessary for morality almost seems contradictory to me. If we cannot prove the existence of God, yet God is linked to the prime motivation of morality, then what’s the real point behind morality? I’m not saying this is a call to start rioting in the streets, just that there’s a bridge of faith in Kant’s reasoning that I’m uncomfortable with. I’m accepting of the symbiotic relationship between faith and reason in determining the idea of God, but not the subsequent inference into the reason for morality.

There's no such thing as a free and necessary lunch

In keeping with his distinction between "world" (mathematical) and "nature" (dynamic) (465-466), Kant calls the first two conflicts of the antithetic of pure reason (the finitude or infinitude of the world with regard to space and time and the existence of simple parts) "world-concepts in a narrower sense" (466), dealing with the composition and divisions of the world. The last two are "transcendent concepts of nature" (467).
The third conflict is over freedom: whether, in addition to the laws of nature, freedom causes certain appearances of the world, or it is simply the laws of nature that do so. According to the former position (the thesis), if there were no freedom (i.e., if there were no unconditioned causes), but only caused causes (i.e., the laws of nature), then there could be no beginning of things and the chain of causality would extend infinitely into the past. This, for Kant, is unacceptable, for "nothing happens without a cause sufficiently determined a priori" (484). The antithesis asserts that freedom leaves causation in an invalid in-between place, violating the law of causality (485).
It seems that tension might exist between freedom and necessity, both of which Kant attributes to the unconditioned (A419/B447). So, under this conception, the unconditioned is both free (i.e., without cause by anything else and the absolute beginning of a series of events) and necessary. But that which must occur (the necessary) seems to be conditioned by that necessity; it occurs because it cannot not occur. This contradicts with the free, which has no condition, no prior cause. How can Kant call the unconditioned both free and necessary What is the relationship between freedom and necessity?
The fourth conflict is concerned with the existence of a necessary being. It is interesting to note the connection between the thesis here (there exists a necessary being) and the thesis of the third conflict (freedom causes certain things). Kant writes that that which is conditioned "presupposes, in respect of its existence, a complete series of conditions up to the unconditioned,,," (A452/B480). This idea assumes that unconditioned causes indeed exist, which the thesis of the third conflict asserts and the antithesis denies. It is necessary to consider these four conflicts not only individually but also collectively.

William Wallace and Kant Would Not Get Along

In the Antithetic of Pure Reason Kant sets up the four transcendental ideas of cosmology and the conflict that results from them. Before he even begins to set up the four conflicts he seems to indicate his opinion that "their dispute is nugatory" (CPR 468). Kant really seems to like the word nugatory.

A brief note of interest before Kant explores the transcendental ideas is his distinction between a skeptical method and skepticism. The latter is defined as "a principle of artful and scientific ignorance that undermines the foundations of all cognition" (CPR 468), whereas the skeptical method ultimately seeks to determine what the certain limits of cognition are. This is one of those myriad examples of Kant's influence from Descartes. While Descartes aimed at a skeptical method, Kant believes its only result was actual skepticism.

The first two ideas that Kant considers are the conflicts over the spatial and temporal boundaries of the world, as well as the extent to which substances in the world can be divided. The third idea, which would seem to have far more wide-ranging practical implications, is the conflict between the laws of nature and causal necessity versus freedom. The thesis argues that freedom is necessary to explain the initiation of causal progression, whereas the antithesis claims that freedom would negate the lawful progression of natural causes.

Each thesis or antithesis of the conflicts attempts to be proven using reductio ad absurdam arguments, which would seem to move the argument nowhere other than claiming that the opposite position is absurd. This is perhaps part of the reason why the conflict seems so insoluble.

At their heart, Kant seems to reject the solutions offered to the antimonies of pure reason because they seek to apply the category of causality beyond the boundaries of appearances. This implies that causality has some sort of transcendental status, which Kant would not be willing to grant. However, the debate seems to be a necessary one nontheless, because freedom is a necessary element in moral decisions.

Kant seems willing to grant the necessary status of freedom for practical philosophy, but is certainly not willing to grant its place in speculation. If one assumes that freedom exists, Kant claims one must grant "a first mover for the explanation of motions of the world" (CPR 488), which seems to be an interesting inversion of the cosmological argument. However, if one rejects freedom, Kant concludes that "it is...not necessary for you to seek for something dynamically first as far as causality is concerned" (CPR 487). So either one assumes there is moral freedom, and a first cause follows, or there is no freedom, and the universe has no temporal beginning. No wonder Kant wanted to dodge the whole question.

An Alternate Ending?

April 6: 409-444, The Paralogisms
         9: 460-496 (484-490), 532-546, The Antinomies
       13: Garve/Feder reviews
       16: Reinhold’s Letters on the Kantian Philosophy
       20: Henry Allison’s summary of Eberhard’s critique
       23: G.E. Schulze, “Aenesidemus, or …”
       27: J.G. Fichte, “Review of Aenesidemus”
       30: S. Maimon, “Letters of Philaletes to Aenesidemus”
 May 4: CPR, 672-690, 702-704

Kant's got soul, and it's super bad.

Disclaimer: For those of you who don’t get the reference, please listen to James Brown. It’s for your own good.

So Kant, in a pretty unexpected move, decides to talk about the immortal soul or, as he calls it, the physiology of inner sense. I figured the whole immortal soul thing kind of fell under the category of those blasted dogmatic thinkers that Kant seems to dislike so much, but I guess Kant has to face the music at some point.

Basically, he mentions the doctrine of the soul and the doctrine of bodies as opposites, with the soul concerning inner sense and bodies concerning objects of outer sense, which are basically anything that exists in space. So that leaves time as the only thing governing our souls, which doesn’t seem to make too much of any kind of sense. Unfortunately for Kant, he digs himself even deeper by saying that all of our a priori concepts can only be found in the doctrine of bodies, since the doctrine of the soul has “in it nothing abiding” (A381 pg432). With no a priori concepts to fall back on how can Kant give any account of the soul at all, since it clearly isn’t something we can observe.

All that is really left to the soul is its possession of some type of “I,” or sense of self-identity, which ties together some constant flux of the soul with no manifold to unite. So it seems that Kant believes a soul must exist somehow, although he doesn’t give it much credit. He seems to at least think that the observer needs to have this thing to tie everything together and be able to synthesize experience. I think he kind of gives up on the soul here, and just begins to focus on exploring whatever the I is, since that only turns out to be some presupposed intuition with no meaning at all.

I guess in Kant’s view, the soul doesn’t have too much of a purpose then, which would, in a way, accomplish his goal of vanquishing the dogmatics and their penchant for eternal life. However, he establishes a thinking Self, which I suppose is a piece of the soul, and the purpose of its study. He says that study of the soul helps us “remain within the limit of those questions that do not go beyond that whose content can be provided by possibly inner experience” (A382 pg433), which is a fancy way of saying that we should limit our treatment of inferences as facts. This inner sense which is so important for the soul and the thinking Self again asserts out need to synthesize experience with a priori synthetic concepts and all of that fun, transcendental idealist method.

So even though Kant doesn’t place as much importance on the soul as most other philosophers do, he takes his own view that falls in line with his usual doctrine of synthesis of experience. He still said it loud, he’s a transcendental idealist and he’s proud.

Grow Up! Get Over Your (Empirical) Idealism

In his criticism of the fourth paralogism, Kant once again visits the debate between realism and idealism and concludes that empirical idealism can't work. Mind you, the transcendental dialectic is based about errors in logic, but the error made by empirical idealism is too big. But first, let's define what Kant means by an idealist: "someone who … does not admit that [external objects are] cognized through immediate perception and infers from this that we can never be fully certain of their reality from any possible experience” (CPR p.426 A369 ). Kant goes on to illustrate the difficulty faces by empirical idealist since he believes that they are also transcendental realist (CPR p.427 A372). If this is the case, however, the issue is confused because it “must always remain doubtful whether the cause [of our perception of objects] is in us or outside of us” since the idealist would claim that the cause is in us and the realist would claim that it is outside of us (CPR 427).

The correct position according to Kant should be that of transcendental idealism where all objects (outside of ourselves) are just “mere representations” (CPR 426). Furthermore, this position is better because it makes an object’s reality “immediately perceived” that doesn’t need to “be inferred” (CPR 427). Instead of doubting the actual reality of the objects in the world (empirical idealism), we should realize the limits of our reason: this is the task that Kant has set out to accomplish in the transcendental dialectic. In the transcendental analytic he established that we can’t know anything about things in themselves and that we only interact with the appearance of things (CPR 424). Due to this fact, we can only work with the perception we have, objects “cannot be actual [read ‘real’] in any other way” and that is precisely what the transcendental idealism states (CPR 429).

But overall, empirical idealism doesn’t make sense because, as Hume thought, we can’t really believe it. We wouldn’t be able to function if we truly thought the world was a figment of our imagination. Nevertheless, this type of idealism was a precursor to what Kant is suggesting with his transcendental critique. In other words, the empirical idealist claim is true in as far as our ability to describe outside objects; just wrong in doubting that they are really there. But doesn’t it seem logical to doubt the existence of something you know you can’t say anything about? Shouldn’t the standard for existence be that we can say something positive about the object? Not if you’re Kant. He is only interested in setting out the bounds reason. Existence is based around what must be the case to have the possibility of experience, not on what we can exhaustibly describe.

Book Two: Easier and with More Goodies

Where are we?
Transcendental Doctrine of Elements → Part II → Division II → Book II, that’s where.
Today’s topic: The Transcendental Dialectic. In this book, Kant will revisit the topic of “the thinking self” as it relates to issues of logic, reason, nature, and awareness. He puts forth a number of theories and refutes them, mostly on the grounds that the theories confuse the self with …um … the other self. I wanted to focus on this concept because Kant is very clear that the self needs to be defined in a certain way for these statements to have any validity.
Kant goes on to describe what he calls the transcendental illusion, which takes several different forms. The first of which is the illusion of the self, which is where he begins his Paralogisms of Pure Reason. These are, essentially, syllogisms that are not acceptable as valid. Rational psychology follows the reasoning that the self is a substance, since it is the subject of one’s own thoughts (following the assumption that anything that is the subject of judgment is a substance). Kant rejects this claim, asserting that while the “I” is always the subject of one’s own thoughts, it does not make the “I” a substance in the real sense.

Wait, what?

Okay, so Kant believes that the “I” (as in “I think…”) is the subject of thoughts. However, simply being a subject of our own thoughts does not make the “I” a substance, because the logical realm and the real realm are distinct (and mutually exclusive, I assume). Basically, he’s saying that the logical subject is an intangible entity, but cannot be substantively experienced (CPR 411-2).
He goes on to address other paralogisms, including “the soul is simple.” This is the concept that the soul is simple in some fundamental way. Kant says that “…the assertion of the simple nature of the soul is of unique value only insofar as through it I distinguish this subject from all matter, and consequently except it from the perishability to which matter is always subjected.” (CPR, 420 A356). Basically, Kant’s saying that the only reason we would say the soul is simple is to distinguish it from regular matter in nature, and thus distinguish it from the rules of mortality that constrains regular matter in nature (basically, to suggest the soul is immortal).
I thought this was a good point on which to focus because this distinction between the “logical I” and the “real I” is a fundamental principle on which Kant will refute a number of paralogisms in these chapters.

3 Sexy Analogies

The first:

"In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature." We can determine changes in objects of our perception, and not just a change in the way we are perceiving them, only by viewing our perceptions as successive states of persisting substances. Because we can never know the origination or cessation of substances themselves, but only changes in their states, Kant believes that the sum of all substances is permanent and unchanging. This means that substance remains and doesn’t change, while substance has particular ways for it to exist, called accidents (or determinations). Kant offers the analogy of a philosopher asking how much smoke weighs. The philosopher replies: “If you take away form the weight of the wood that was burnt the weight of the ashes that are left over, you will have the weight of the smoke.” Therefore, the philosopher is recognizing that the substance itself has not changed, merely its appearance. Kant also offers the proposition “Nothing comes form nothing” for another proof that persistence, or the existence of the proper “substance” in appearances.

The second:

“All alterations occur in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect.” Here in the second analogy Kant is arguing that in order to grasp a succession of appearances (i.e. the wood becoming smoke and ash) we must observe causality and understand that what is left later in time (smoke and ash) is a consequence of what occurred previously (burning wood). However, Kant goes on to say that the manifold of the appearance of the house, which we have just determined to be successive, might be successive in itself (the manifold), and therefore is merely an appearance and not a transcendental object. “…I must therefore derive the subjective sequence of apprehension from the objective sequence of appearances, for otherwise the former would be entirely undetermined and no appearance would be distinguished form any other.” The subjective sequence, however, proves nothing unless the manifold of appearances in the apprehension of one thing that follows another thing adheres to the rule of causality.

The third:

“All substances, insofar as they can be perceived in space as simultaneous, are in thoroughgoing interaction.” In his third analogy Kant tackles another attribute of time, simultaneity. In order to argue a co-existence of objects simultaneously Kant argues for a “community” of objects, which by co-existing, also interact to allow for empirical perception of any place, by using the relation of the surrounding matter to determine it. Without this community all perception is broken off from all other perception, and can no longer combine or be synthesized together to form a more whole picture.

Immanuel doesn't pun. He Kant.

Even Oscar Wilde appreciated a good Kant pun. Kant takes a break from some heavy duty postulating to bring you: The Refutation of Idealism! 

Kant begins his refutation of idealism by clearly defining what it is he is arguing against. He terms it "material idealism" and divides it into two categories, with each holding that the existence (or reality?) of external objects is either uncertain or flat-out impossible. These two related but differing schools of thought are attributed to Descartes and Berkeley, respectively. We are familiar with what Kant is referencing in each case: 

     - Descartes' Meditations hold that the only thing which can be empirically ascertained is the mind; "I think therefore I am" holds that the mind can only be proven to be real at the exact moment in which that thought occurs. Everything else is kind of a crapshoot. Kant terms this "problematic idealism." 

     - Next comes the "dogmatic idealism" of Berkeley, who holds space to be purely fictitious and all things thence contained in space as the same. 

Kant rather brusquely swats aside Berkeley's dogmatism with reference to the Transcendental Aesthetic. He claims that the only way one can arrive at a standpoint of dogmatic idealism is by considering space to be a property, but as we know, space is a priori, a pure intuition, and doesn't represent any property of things-in-themselves, and is also the answer to life, the universe, and everything. So now the only issue at hand becomes Descartes' doubt. Kant will attempt to prove that experience actually happens, which can be established only if our inner experience ("I am") can be possible if the external reality of the world (outer experience) is presupposed. The man managed to pack a lot into p. 326, B275. 

In a rare burst of syntactic clarity that is unlikely to be repeated, Kant's thesis is "the mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me." He goes about supporting it thusly: 

1. I am aware of the fact that I exist in time.

2. There is something persistent in this perception. (Did someone say...THE FIRST ANALOGY? see p. 299 for more on this)

3. Whatever this persistent thing is, it cannot be internal, as my own existence is only made clear to me through this persistence in the first place.

4. Because this persistent thing is not inside of me, it must therefore be external to me (as a thing, and not just the mere representation of a thing internally).

5. In other words: the awareness of my existence is only possible because of external things.

6. Awareness of my own existence is simultaneously an awareness of the existence of externalities. 

(All of this to be found on p. 327, B276.)

Kant finishes laying the smackdown on idealism with three Notes, wherein he decides to make up for his previous clarity by ironically obfuscating the point more with what was intended to elucidate his argument.

Note 1: Idealism's major flaw is its assumption that immediate experience is confined to the internal, and from this external realities must be inferred. Rather, it is outer experience that is truly immediate to us: it is only through outer sense that we become aware of the mind's determination in time (that is, inner sense). Outer objects are a requirement for the determination of the subject. (p. 327-8, B277)

Note 2: Sensibile experience completely proves this to be the case. We only understand time via the changes of objects in space (case in point: a day is the rotation of the Earth around the Sun). The only other way we could possibly understand the persistence of the proof would be through matter, but this too is presupposed a priori, and also comes to inner sense through the existence of outer things. Consciousness is merely a representation of the subject and cannot be the persistence. (p. 328, B 278)

Note 3: Just because it must be the case that outer objects exist for there to be a determinate consciousness, this does not mean that every time we perceive an object it exists. We could be completely imagining that stuff. (p. 328-9, B 279)

This concludes our broadcast, we now return you to your regularly scheduled programming. 

5 questions

1. Are the concepts of space and time prior to even perception? I understand that A priori means that there is no experience involved, and the concept is entirely innate, but how is that possible?

2. What is a synthetic A priori judgment, are they purely mathematical? How do those words fit together when synthetic and judgment both imply some sort of construction through experience and A priori means that the concept exists in ones' mind prior to any judgments or experience.

3. What are Kant's attitudes towards God or a god figure (a constructor of the universe)?

4. What is Pure reason? And how is the concept of reason or the rational world possible if not through experience?

5. We were given a handout about quantity, quality, relation and modality. That sheet attempted to define an infinite judgment, but I am still confused by it, can anyone offer a clarification?

Kant stop, won't stop.

Building on his previous writing, Kant begins by trying to establish a relationship between experience and cognition, what we can perceive and what we can mentally acquire through time.(CPR 295) There is certainly a synthesis of perceptions, which leads to the perception of the subject in temporal space(time itself). If all 'things' are known, or perceived, through experience the three analogies provided a characterization and categorization of the subjects. I believe that it seems as if Kant is trying to define substance in relation to time, through experience of the three analogies to be mentioned. The determining factors--Persistence, Succession and Simultaneity--are all key components to understanding Kant's writing of temporal relations, and more specifically must be proven through a priori reasoning. Otherwise, how one can determine that a subject is the same as it once was before or if in fact it changed from the previous state?(CPR 319) Persistence relates to substance by remaining static, by simply not changing. Succession is a temporal series, or progression(perhaps even digression?) of events. Simultaneity, lastly, is the relation of time as a sum or totality.

Theoretically, this approach appears to follow a cohesive line of logic and reasoning.

In order to experience something it must exist in the temporal space, and the objects within the temporal space are defined by the three analogies, Persistence, Succession and Simultaneity, which all describe the possible relations of substance in the temporal.

An interesting example is found in Kant's explanation of the manifold of experience, how substance remains the same and only the accidents change. This follows most everything taught on the laws of energy and transfer of motion. Energy is neither created nor destroyed. It is rather absorbed then transferred from substance to substance, highlighting Kant's analogy. This is where one would expect trouble with the writing, but alas, there is no fight to be had.

The manifold is given considerable attention in the second addition of CPR, and rightfully so. It is at the heart of the reading, proving that there must be a combination between experience and the nexus, or connection of time. Unfortunately, this is exactly where everything falls apart in grand fashion for me on an intellectual level...

The refutation of material idealism strikes at the heart of Decartes' Cogito, Ergo Sum
and the dogmatic idealism of Berkely. "Idealism," Kant postulates," is the theory that declares the existence of objects in space outside us to be either merely dubtful and indemonstrable(Descartes), or else false and impossible(Berkely)."(CPR 326) Kant denounces both, as shown deliberately by the quote above. So Idealism is now acceptable, what happened to the transcendentally aesthetic Immanuel?

Kant proposes problematic idealism as a solution to answer both problems with Descartes and Berkely, that the assertio of Descartes can not physically prove existence of other substance, and that Berkely's thoughts lead to an imaginary state of the universe. So far, I am with Kant--Cogito does not provide an affirming empirical basis, and that the inseparable condition of Berkely leaves out the possibility for knowing something exists without the experience of it.

This is where it falls into place, the purpose of the differentiation and distinguishing factors of temporal space were derived in order to provide a formal response to material idealism. Kant writes, "the consciousness of my own experience is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me." To paraphrase, inner experience is not the only immediate experience--we are defined by our understanding of the immediate outside world as known through ourselves.

But does this generate the best doctrine? Do we only know of foreign lands just because some other individual has been there before? How do we know what the universe consists of? What of existence itself? There seems to be a very strong argument here, but it is not completely defensible. Notice the use of language, postulates of modality. Even though Kant addresses this lapse, it still seems suspect(CPR 332). It is still very uncertain to me. The metaphysical questions can not stop here, and will not stop here, this is just the beginning.

Questions

1. I still am not quite grasping how synthetic a priori judgments are possible...how can I extend my knowledge without experience?
2. I have this question written in my notes from 03.02: 
Can the pure forms of intuition present experience by themselves?
3. Can we go over those subreptive axioms?
4. So, is objective knowledge entirely impossible?
5. Can someone simply summarize all those transcendental doctrines for me?
...and just out of curiosity, how does Kant feel that God fits into all of this?

Critique of Kant's Schemata

Up until this point, Kant’s theory has had one gaping hole: how do concepts relate to intuitions? That is, how can pure concepts of understanding be applied to intuitions in a way that the representations can be judged and understood? As concepts are intellectual and intuitions are sensible, there must be something which bridges the gap between the two and allows for the subject to understand particular intuitions as they relate to general concepts. As Kant says, “the representations of the [object] must be homogeneous with the [concept].” (CPR 271) Kant’s answer for this is the idea of schemata.

Schemata are the homogeneous, mediating representations between categories and intuition and are produced by the imagination. Schemata are not really images, but methods for generating images. (273) They are pure intuition, seemingly a blend between pure concepts and empirical intuition, and are hence founded in time (transcendental schematism).

Kant’s idea of schemata is somewhat problematic. How can something be both sensible and intellectual? If there are only two divisions of representations, intuitions and concepts, then it would seem that the gap cannot be bridged. Schemata would have to be concepts that are somehow related to intuitions, or intuitions formed from concepts. Both of which are impossible, based on Kant’s own definitions. But, if schemata can be thought of as both sensible and intellectual, then the gap is not really there. Intuitions and concepts would then already be linked without need for this third division of representations. Schemata seem to be either impossible or unnecessary.

It seems to me that schemata are really just concepts which are applied to intuitions. Thinking of a perfect triangle does not seem to be possible without some image applied to it. One can think of the idea of a perfect triangle, i.e. that it has three perfectly straight sides and the angles all add up to exactly 180°, but one cannot actually think of the triangle without an image. Maybe this ‘idea of perfect triangle’ is actually what Kant means by schemata, but I would argue that one could hold in one’s mind the image of a perfect triangle. To me, schemata do not seem to be necessary, though I would argue that Kant’s idea of concepts as distinct from intuition is merely just imposed definitions on the world and not necessarily the way it has to be, but that is for another time.

So, while some notion of a representation which can allow concepts to be applied to intuitions seems necessary in Kant’s theory of experience, it remains to be seen whether such a representation is possible given Kant’s constructions.

Kant's Definition of Stupidity

            Kant begins his Second Book by reminding us that the higher faculties of cognition are understanding, the power of judgment, and reason, but that only understanding and the power of judgment are analytical (CPR 267).

In his intro to The Analytic of Principles, Kant discusses why he will be referring to the power of judgment. According to Kant, the analytic of principles is relevant to the power of judgment because “it teaches it to apply to appearances the concepts of understanding, which contain the condition for rules a priori” (CPR 267). Therefore, the concepts of understanding are important because they are used in making judgments and “are the basis for the formation of all other, empirical concepts,” whose truths The Transcendental Analytic tries to determine though these judgments and rules (Gardner 116).

            Following is Kant’s introduction to the transcendental power of judgment, where he contrasts the understanding, which is the “faculty of rules” and the power of judgment, which is the faculty of “subsuming under rules” for the understanding (CPR 268). These rules are “given in the pure concept of the understanding,” where concepts originate (CPR 269). However, it seems that not everyone has that power of judgment, and that unfortunately, if you don’t posses it, you can’t learn it. Ultimately, if you lack the power of judgment, you are stupid (make sure to read his asterisk note). So, is one merely born with this power then? Do we have no control over this?

Yet, Kant  appears to contradict himself by initially saying originally that that you can’t be taught the power of judgment, but then a few lines later says that you can “sharpen the power of judgment” (and not of understanding) through learning from empirical examples (CPR 268, 269). He states that learning from these examples is important to every person who lacks judgment, but that they must remember that these examples are not principles. The examples cannot be universal principles because they are based on experiences, and they don’t usually “fulfill the condition of the rule” (CPR 269).  So, you can’t learn the power of judgment, but can empirically improve upon what powers you do happen to be born possessing?

Throughout, Kant also contrasts general logic with transcendental logic, and says that transcendental logic is more important and relevant to the power of judgment because the origination of the rules is determined through transcendental logic, as well as is the “a priori the case to which the rules ought to be applied” (CPR 269).

            

Me + Kant = Ice Cream and Vinegar

We just don't mix. Of course, I'm the ice cream because I'm much easier to "digest" than Kant is. That being said, here's my junk:

1. I don't get the difference between Understanding and Pure Understanding.

2. Synthesis of Recognition in the Concept and Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding... huh?!

3. My class notes are a hot mess. What's the end of this sentence?: "A logical form of judgment gives clues to the ______."

4. So Intuition and Understanding are both needed for the possibility of experience, right?

5. Can someone remind me why we can't derive general concepts from other general concepts?

I think it's still Wednesday in American Samoa...

1. In the last class we talked about the distinction between the pure and the empirical: pure concepts form the basis for empirical concepts (which seems similar in proposition to me when recalling previous discussions of the relationship between pure and empirical intuitions). I guess this is an issue that has been bothering me for the whole class: how is Kant justifying the "pure" as truly a priori? I concede the point that we have certain innate understandings of things like space, but don't we truly only frame those cognitions through experience? I think this entire business is arbitrary.

2. I have multiple questions concerning the categories, but first I want to make sure I'm understanding something correctly. Is Kant's intention to place all these concepts into the realm of understanding? All of these seem to be logical propositions (either p or ~p, especially in the categories of modality, is kind of jumping off the page all over the place) and would those not be related to simple reason, as mere logic?

3. What exactly is meant by the "unity of consciousness" as necessary for the relation of intuition or concepts to experience? This seems like a clandestine way of saying causality to me.

4. I am no fan of the ontological proof, but if Kant describes non-existence as a category (which he does on pp. 212), he also places no other categories contingent to it - like reality, or inherence or substance, so then doesn't his criticism "existence is not a predicate" fail? God could be a reality with non-existence, yes?

5. Can we just recap transcendental deduction?

Questions

1. Is the dialectic of logic identical with the misuse of logic (wherein one asserts an objective fact using only logic)? Or is the dialectic simply the part of logic in which one would commit this error, IF one were to commit this error?

2. I'm afraid I know very little geometry, though Kant uses his notion of the subject as evidence in several sections. Can geometry somehow be a human 'construct,' such that it is apodictic because that is how we 'make' it? As an a priori certainty, Kant seems to take it to be more sacrosanct than that.

3. Some commentators talk about Kant's dependence on Euclidean geometry for his ideas about geometry. How, if at all, does non-Euclidean geometry affect his ideas?

4. Was anyone else surprised to find out that Konigsberg was that far east, in what is now Kaliningrad? Always thought it was in present-day Germany.

5. To paraphrase Kant (hopefully correctly), he talks of experience triggering a priori concepts. What is the relationship between these latent faculties and the experience that activates them?

The Q's

1. What is the function of the "Table of Categories" present on page 212? I understand that it identifies what Kant believes to be the extent of types of "judgments" but what is the purpose or judgement of identifying and separating all of them into this chart?

2. Why does Kant have an A version focusing on the subjective faculties such as intuition, imagination, and understanding, followed by a B version that focuses on objective ideas about why concepts must apply to objects? Why is there such a sudden switch and how does it intrinsically change his ideology?

3. As a transcendental idealist that believes appearances are the grounds for the possibility of experience, is Kant an empirical realist (concepts precede experience) as a result of these beliefs?

4. I have transcendental deduction defined as "the explanation of the way in which concepts can relate to objects apriori" in my notebook, but what does this "explanation" actually consist of?

5. Secondly, I don't understand how we could possibly have a priori knowledge of objects, as children don't we learn through experience that things are hot, sharp, etc. If we had apriori knowledge of the concepts of these objects wouldn't we, as humans, implicitly know things without experiencing them?

Inquiries

1. If the conditions for knowing are present in the subject, not the object, then how can Kant agree with empirical realism, since, if we know things through our representations of them, how can we know the object as it truly is?

2. Likwise, if a judgement is a unity of subject and predicate, then how can we find truth by uniting a subjective representation with a separate object which may not be as it appears to be. Is it even truly possible?

3. How would imagination synthesize reproduction and a continuity of moments, since they would consist of real, not imaginary events? Are the two even that relatable?

4. If we can understand experience as a manifold, then wouldn't the manifold consist of differing times as well as experiences, which would contradict Kant's view of time being a whole concept, not that of isolated bits? Would this a priori synthesis exist involving time before experience, thus making the experience's synthesis of moments less momentous?

5. So would our methods of synthesis of experience be a priori, even though experience is, by definition, not? Wouldn't we first need experience to learn how to synthesize it, thus negating its status as a priori, since we would have to learn it through our experiences?

Q&A

1. How is it that the transcendental deduction establishes objective validity?

2. How is it that a priori concepts can be considered universal, especially when the conditions for experience are subjective? How can these conditions achieve objective validity?

3. How can we ever establish a convincing distinction between empirical deductions and a simple empirical observation that relies on a priori concepts being present?

4. What, other than necessity, is the justification for claiming that space and time have a synthetic apprehension that stands a priori? How can this apprehension be a priori if it depends on the act of apprehension itself?

5. How does Kant establish an objective determination of synthetic and analytic concepts?

5 Questions

1.What exactly is meant by Kant’s use of “manifold?”
2.For another definition, what does Kant mean when he discusses “consciousness?” (CPR 231)
3.How does Kant specifically justify the universal validity of transcendental ideality for all human persons?
4.As time is an “inner sense” does that mean it is a faculty of the mind or is it something else entirely?
5.What role does judgment have in regards to understanding? Kant mentions that Judgment is “the representation of a representation,” I am not entirely sure what is meant by this (CPR 205)

?s

1.) Does our subjective condition, namely our a priori intuition of space and time, prevent us from knowing anything objectively?
2.) How is it that Kant can call our concepts of understanding a priori if he deduced them from experience?
3.) Since Kant's list of concepts was a major area of revision, and, in addition, is widely regarded as incomplete, can we say that his overall argument is flawed as a result?
4.) Is there anything in the "manifold" that cannot be combined, or unified?
5.) Must synthesis always precede analysis? If so, is this Kant's best response to Hume's skeptical view of causality?

5 Q's

1. Why do space and time possess transcendental ideality?
2. If a concept is not immediately related to an object, how is it still related to the object’s representation?
3. Why does Kant make the distinction between affirmative judgments versus infinite judgments? I’m not quite sure I understand the difference.
4. Why is affinity a necessary consequence of the synthesis in imagination?
5. How can the understanding both be a faculty of rules and the source of the laws of nature?

My Five Questions

Ok, so I went through my notes and came up with questions on some things I still do not understand, though Michael already took some of mine.

1. Why does Transcendental Idealism require Transcendental Deduction?
2. Why does Kant consider arithmetic to be an a priori synthetic judgment?
3. Why are subjective conditions necessarily objectively valid?
4. What is empirical reality and what is the idea of empirical reality opposed to?
5. And this last one may be a little early for where we are in the text, but how does God fit into Kant's theory of Transcendental Idealism?
   

Kant Questions

Hello all,

I will try and start off the question assignment:

1) How does the imagination link the faculties of sensibility and the understanding?
2) What is the difference between an appearance and a representation? I keep thinking I have this straightened out and then I get confused again.
3) Is there a definite and certain number of derivative concepts for Kant? And if so, why does he decline to actually enumerate them?
4) If we can only cognize ourselves as appearances of the inner sense, how does the self act as a synthetic unity for all experience?
5) Does the use of the apperception as a means of unity for our experience open Kant up to a solipsism?

Sensibility and Understanding Were Made For Each Other

Having already established the innate concepts of understanding, i.e., quantity, quality, relation and modality, Kant now provides us with the transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of understanding. In this section, he further elaborates on how our a priori understanding works in conjunction with our intuition so that we can synthesize experience. He also emphasizes the importance of the original synthetic unity of apperception as the fulcrum of our understanding in general.

As we all know, our sense data would be “unruly heaps” of representations if we did not have a means of synthesizing our experience (CPR 239). In fact, experience would not even be possible without the unity of given concepts that precede the combination of representations (246). As humans, we almost automatically combine the representations that experience gives us. Thus, I think Kant is right to point out that we must have some way of consistently shaping our experience. However, this shaping is not arbitrary because it must be deduced from these concepts that we have all been given. In other words, we must inherently have a coherent way of filtering through our experiences that are only possible within space in time. But the question remains, how does Kant’s notion of the understanding surpass the boundaries of merely rational and empirical claims, and seal the bond between the immaterial world of thought and the physical world that exists in space and time?

Well, the answer to this question is still somewhat unclear, though Kant is certainly making strides. Specifically, he claims that the original synthetic unity of apperception, or the act of combining what is intuited in one consciousness, is the “supreme principle of all intuition in relation to the understanding” (248). The significance of this claim rests on the fact that our minds are what give order to nature, as he mentions earlier in the Analytic (242). Thus, he continues along the tradition of relating everything abstracted from nature back to the subject. Kant’s tendency to focus on the subject in relation to the objects seems counterintuitive at first, but in this section he gives us glimpses of objectivity that show us that he is gradually closing in on truth.

Kant distinguishes the transcendental unity of apperception from the subjective unity of consciousness. He does this by grouping objectivity with the former and the inner sense, or time, with the latter (250). Here we find a sliver of separation between what is intuited and what can be considered truthful. Thus, after bringing sensibility and understanding together through the unity of apperception, he reveals to us, our very own ability to sift through reality in an objectively a priori manner. At the moment, it seems that our ability to conceptualize the relation of representations is our only hope of ever knowing the ever so elusive "things in themselves."

Grounding Experience: Kant's Deduction of The Conditions of Possible Experience

In the second chapter concerning the Transcendental Analytic lies a section entitled "The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding", in which Kant attempts to establish a priori grounds for the possibility of all experience. He begins by stating recognizing the absurdity of a priori concepts that relate to objects of experience, saying, “It is entirely contradictory and impossible that a concept should be generated completely a priori and be related to an object although it belongs itself within the concept of possible experience nor consists of elements of a possible experience” (CPR 226-7).

On this note, Kant proceeds assert that although pure a priori concepts can contain nothing empirical, they must “nevertheless be strictly a priori conditions for a possible experience” (CPR 227). Kant goes on to explain that the relation between a priori concepts and empirical reality is that the a priori concepts provide a rational grounding for all the objects of possible experience and serve to make intelligible that which human beings experience through their senses and intuition. In order to prove this, Kant provides a four-part deductive argument concerning the conditions of the knowing subject and how a priori concepts make experience possible for them.

Kant begins by discussing the concept of unity and its role in the creation of a priori concepts that govern all experience. In a section entitled “On the synthesis of apprehension in the intuition”, he explains the way in which the manifold nature of intuitions must be understood before the experience can be made intelligible by pointing out that the manifold representations that are possible of an object must be unified into one temporal representation before the process of understanding can take place. This process he dubs the synthesis of apprehension, and states that “without it we could have a priori neither space nor time, since these can be generated only through the synthesis of the manifold” (CPR 229).

Next, Kant goes on to explain the next step in his argument for a priori principles governing experience, which he refers to as the synthesis of reproduction. This, he explains, involves the recognition of the totality of the aggregate of previous representations in the understanding of a representation as a single concept. He explains this as recognition that the manifold of a certain representation is not due to each individual representation having a particular, distinct identity, but rather are reproductions of a governing concept. Essentially, he is explaining the role that different representations of identical concepts (i.e. counting integers, recognizing that each is the product of successive addition of other representations) is that it reminds the knowing subject of the manifold nature of the representation itself, and that in order to recognize something as having a unified identity, the previous conceptions of that representation must be kept in mind.

In the third section of his argument, Kant explains that the previous two premises coalesce together to form what he calls the unity of rule. Basically, Kant states the next step in establishing a priori conditions for possible experience is the recognition of the a priori concept itself as a general rule for all subsequent representations. He uses the example of the concept of a body, saying, “the concept of a body serves as the rule for our cognition of outer appearances by means of the unity of the manifold that is thought through it.” (CPR 232) If we consider those categorical outer representations that we experience as falling in accordance with a priori rules established for their recognition, then it becomes clear that a priori rules indeed provide the ground for all possible experience by providing a system by which the knowing subject can make their outer intuitions and experiences intelligible. Kant wraps up this argument in the fourth by stating that “the synthetic unity of perceptions [which was outlined in the previous three sections] is precisely what constitutes the form of experience”, thus confirming what he originally posited about the role of a priori concepts in establishing the foundation for all experience.

Kant pushes the idea that judgment and intuition share a common root which is called the pure concept of understanding. "The same function that gives unity to the different representations in a judgement also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representation in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of understanding."(CRP 211) He then creates a Table of Categories, similar to his previous table the Table of Judgments, in A70/B95, but this table lists categories that Kant believes are of a pure concept, not attained through any sensuous means.

Somehow I find it amusing that Kant thinks his table is uncommonly useful, a little egotistic don't you think? (CPR214) He goes on to show how his table of Categories have some bearing on the nature of understanding, such as the mathematical and the dynamical categories. Unity, truth, and perfection are the criteria of all cognition of things, which I believe Kant is emphasizing in the last bit of his doctrine of The Analytic of concepts.

Kant's second chapter of The Transcendental Analytic begins with an examination of how concepts can relate to objects a priori, which he calls transcendental deduction, and tries to clarify its difference from empirical deduction, which is a concept acquired from experience. (CPR 220) However, due to my limited knowledge/understanding, I don't fully understand how Kant arrives to these two terms because the way I see it, our cognition allows us to deduce certain concepts whether they are attained through empirical means or a priori. In other words, how is it that deductions itself can be distinguished from empirical or a priori?

The Hitchhiker’s Guide to All Pure Concepts of the Understanding

After establishing the conditions for experience and how objects can be intuited in the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant goes on to develop on their cognitive qualities, or, in other words, how objects can be thought, in the Transcendental Analytic. He begins his exposition by introducing the idea of transcendental logic. This concept refers to one in the distinction of two versions of logic, the other one being general logic. While General knowledge “contains the absolutely necessary rules of thinking […] without regard to the difference of the objects to which it may be directed” (CPR 194), transcendental logic refers to the rules governing thought, giving consideration to objects. This in turn is divided into two parts, the analytic and the dialectic, the former referring to the specific conditions under which though has objects and, and the latter referring to the fall of the understanding into “ the dangers of making a material use of the merely formal principles of pure understanding […] and of judging without distinction about objects that are not given to us” (CPR 199). The most salient and attention-given one of these two is the Transcendental Analytic.

As it consists of the analysis of all a priori knowledge, Kant assigns it four essential parts. (1) The concepts must be pure, (2) belong to intuition, (3) be elementary, (4) and that the table of them be complete (CPR 201), the latter one being of much further interest to Kant. He explains that the concepts must cover the whole field of understanding not in an arbitrary fashion, but rather as part of the idea of a whole of a priori knowledge and a division of the concepts composing that knowledge (CPR 201). But never fear, Kant provides us with the ultimate guide to the discovery of all pure concepts of the understanding. He explains that since these concepts “spring, pure and unmixed, as absolute unity” (CPR 204), they must be related to one another on the basis of the same concepts. This connection also serves as a rule that can determine the completeness of all the a priori concepts. We can apply this rule when concepts come into use, which can only be done through judgment. In other words, since concepts can only make use of objects through their judgment, it is through these judgments that we can learn of these a priori concepts. As the “mediate cognition of an object” (CPR 205), judgment serves as the expositor of a priori concepts. The functions of judgment can be categorized in four ways, each containing three modes: quality (affirmative, negative, infinite), quantity (universal, particular, singular), relation (categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive), and modality (problematic, assertoric, apodictic). Yet, although Kant claims this list to avoid arbitrariness, his claim, to me, seems unfounded.

Kant explains pure concepts lie in the human understanding “until with the opportunity of experience they are developed and exhibited in their clarity” (CPR 203). If experiences expose a priori concepts, granting that these concepts that precede experience do in fact exist, then it follows that these are what allow us to see the functions of judgments. It seems, then, arbitrary to limit judgment to only the list Kant provides us with. We can always conceive the idea that, as we progress, we may one day come across experiences that may be conceptualized, or “judged,” in other ways different from those he mentions. Even if we can’t think of other ways, we cannot limit causality as the concept of all experience, especially if Kant gives no justification for doing this other than out of necessity. As such, we can never “complete the table of concepts,” not until we exhaust every experience that might “develop and exhibit the clarity of pure concepts,” which I cannot conceive as possible. In this way, Kant just leads us back to “milking the billy-goat” instead of the discovery of all pure concepts of the understanding.