In his Review of Aenesidemus, J.G. Fichte provides insightful commentary on the skeptical criticisms made by G.E. Shulze in regard to Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s Philosophy of the Elements. Essentially, Shulze, or Aenesidemus, argues against the validity of Reinhold’s first principle, which highlights the subject’s faculty of representations. This principle is referred to as the “principle of consciousness,” which, in a transcendentally idealistic fashion, designates the title of “cause” to the subject and “effect” to the object, or representation. (Review of Aenesidemus, 139, 149). Ultimately, Fichte is rather sympathetic to Shulze’s commanding criticisms of Reinhold even though he believes that Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is not as affected by Shulze’s remarks.
Fichte almost entirely champions Aenesidemus’s argument in the opening of his Review. The problem with Reinhold seems to lie in the statement “in consciousness, representation is distinguished by the subject from the subject and object, and is referred to both” (ROA, 138). In other words, Reinhold presumes that the subject is inherently different from the object, and is responsible for understanding the relationship between subject and object. Fichte highlights some setbacks that Aenesidemus found in the principle of consciousness, which culminate in the subject being reduced to the same level as the object: (1) the principle of consciousness cannot be the absolutely first proposition since it is subject to the principle of contradiction (2) distinguishing and referring are not enough to completely determine the consciousness through itself (3) the principle of consciousness is tied down to “some determinate experience” and “some definite reasoning” (ROA, 138-39). Thus, Fichte seems to agree that the principle of consciousness is not as well founded as it originally seems because it is dependent on many other circumstances.
Fichte then adds to the objections introduced by Aenesidemus. Although he agrees that the principle of consciousness is synthetic instead of analytic, Fichte elaborates on this issue by noting that there must be some sort of thesis and antithesis that undergirds this extremely high-level synthesis that we call consciousness (ROA, 140). Furthermore, delimiting the idea of consciousness even more, Fichte is also in agreement with Aenesidemus in that the principle of consciousness is an abstraction, and not an a priori condition. Fichte strengthens this claim by pointing out that the principle of consciousness is based on empirical self-observation (ROA, 140-41). And thus, consciousness, having been reduced to a mere representation itself, cannot transcend the bounds--nor determine the bounds--of abstraction.
Aside from noting that Aenesidemus does not consistently convey Reinhold’s argument properly (ROA, 143), and adding some of his own criticism, it seems that Fichte is does accept Schulze’s claims to be somewhat of a blow to the new philosophy, albeit not a definitive one. Moreover, Fichte shows us that Reinhold’s desire to provide a first principle was not in vain, in that, by trying to solidify Kant’s philosophy with a first principle, Reinhold helped the “new philosophers” realize that there was still more to be done in order to combat the weighty criticisms of the skeptics (ROA, 153). Thus, in light of Fichte’s Review, Kant’s Critique remained virtually unscathed, but was undoubtedly left in need of some refinement...
3 comments:
Perhaps I am misreading (I had some trouble understanding Fichte), but I'm not sure he is entirely in agreement with Aenesidemus. Fichte claims that Aenesidemus may have read the Critique of Pure Reason, but "[he] has not understood it" (ROA 145). Later he seems to claim that the critiques of Aenesidemus are based on "that old mischief about a thing-in-itself" (ROA 149). If I interpret him correctly, Fichte seems to be saying the transformation of the faculty of representation into a thing-in-itself is Aenesdimus' doing, not Reinhold's, which would undermine the former's skepticism.
I think this is a great critique of the material, however, I am left kind of confused at "empirical self-observation." Isn't Fichte's work all involved with transcendental realism, so that we would not really be able to examine anything empirically? There wouldn't really be a self to empirically observe, since all that we see of it is a representation, and all that we represent it with is our own ego, or intellectual intuition. I just don't understand how the two relate.
Michael, to be honest with you, I did not wholly understand Fichte myself. But I do think that he gives some credit to Aenesidemus's skeptical excavation, only so he can later provide his own, nuanced insight. At one point, Fichte does credit Aenesidemus, viz., he says "if his (Aenesidemus's) examination ended here, he could honourably lay claim to a contribution to philosophy" (ROA 143). But who knows, maybe he's just being tongue in cheek...you never can really tell with these idealists...
SDiMaria, I am not sure who you are, but I do take your point to be a friendly amendment; in that, Fichte most likely would convert that "empirical" self-observation into an idealistic, subjectively-grounded observation.
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