CPR, The Finale.

"If the reader has had the pleasure and patience in traveling along in my company, he can now judge" CPR 704

When I wrote my last entry, there were hints of this. An overarching goal, a greater 'reason'. It now seems to manifest itself in the last few pages of the CPR, as the syllabus takes its last breath and goes to sleep.

If not keen as to why Kant was writing CPR, it seems that there was an objective in mind. Throughout the work the writing style was painful, exhaustive--different from other works. But the manner in which the writing built upon itself was amazing. Piece by piece, the transcendental was constructed from the ground up to this point, the zenith of CPR's pyramid.

The cannon of pure reason distills the questions of CPR, we finally get to see why the Critique is necessary and why it is so important; the world is constituted by morality which is established by the practical interest of pure reason. It is important to note a distinction here. Pure Reason, as designated by Kant, is of worth because it is a negative faculty that does not serve as an organon or expansion of thought, but rather a disciplinary tool or "guard against errors."(CPR672)

The exclusionary aspect of CPR then leaves three questions.
1.What can I know?
2.What should I do?
3.What may I hope?

Kant's pace here is more efficient by leaps and bounds. However, it may move too fast. This is, after all, his crowning moment, his fifteen minutes of fame, his proverbial Alamo. His answers are relatively brief ( A:1. What I can know is speculative, revert back A:2. This is an answer of practical philosophy, specifically moral and is not subject to this critique A:3. Both practical and theoretical, something is because something ought to happen). (CPR677)

These answers are brief, but still leave much to be questioned later. I hope because happiness ought to happen. This passes. But the interjection of God when answering why we have a notion of duty provides discontinuity for me. "Morality is only an idea, the realization of which rests on the condition that everyone do what he should, i.e., that all actions of rational beings occur as if they arose from a highest will..." The cause of all morality in the world is then drawn from the "morally most perfect will, combined with the highest blessedness." (CPR 679-680)

Morals=God?

Not quite. The moral world, a world which we do what we are supposed to do and everyone is happy, would be a consequence of our conduct in the sensible world. Therefor, morals do not lead to god, but lead to a future life in which the concept of God and hope are ostensibly interconnected.

God=Perfection of Morality?

If you were a Kantian and and an atheist, sit down. Kant creates what seems to be an allusion to the Kingdom of God in the New Testament. Some of us are evil(immoral) and must pray(hope) for a future in which God's kingdom (the morally mot perfect will providing the future life not separated from obligation) and we will all be saved. Pardon the iconoclastic summary.

But does this prove God? Earlier, Kant wrote of how CPR was an exercise of 'negative' thought, that is exclusionary thought that should be used to determine what is impossible, not what is. This makes criticism much more difficult, as one cannot necessarily disprove Kant's moral world, but can question it.

One question that came to mind was the subjectivity of "The Morally Perfect Will", how does morality prove that there is a god, even if I were to assume a primordial being capable of establishing the rules of the game? Kant later answers that the being would have to be omniscient and omnipresent, the divine being must know all and be a single voice in order to know of and create the moral world.(CPR 686)

Once again, we are left with more questions than answers. I am not sure. Kant's arguments follow a very precise logical path to get here, but the origin of morality seems flimsy to say the least. It is designed not to be definitive, yet is used in order to make authoritative points in Kant's later works. I remain a critic.

"No one will be able to boast that he knows that there is a God...for if he knows that, then he is precisely the man I have long sought."(CPR689)

Maimon's Critique of the Critique

Salomon Maimon offers a series of critiques of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason in his Letters from Philaletes to Aenesidemus, in order to establish his skepticism. The most prevalent of theses is the critique of Kant’s idea of the “thing-in-itself.” For Kant, a thing in itself is outside the sphere of possible experience, yet is also the source of cognition. Maimon agreed with Kant that the thing in itself is beyond the sphere of possible experience, but holds that this does not mean that the thing in itself cannot be an object of cognition in principle. (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/maimon)
Maimon looks at the relationship between logic and transcendental philosophy in the first part of his sixth letter, and claims that Kant inverts the two. While the logical forms are all that can be truly known, they “have no meaning at all when abstracted from their transcendental meaning.” (185, emphasis in original) One cannot give the meaning of logical affirmation and negation apart from the corresponding transcendental concepts of reality and negation. Maimon then goes on to argue that logical reality and negation presuppose the transcendental and absolute categories and “otherwise they would not have meaning at all.” (186) Logic must, therefore, have transcendental philosophy as its premise, rather than the other way around, as Kant has it.
Part of Maimon’s objection rises from his contention that the logical forms have not yet been subjected to proper scrutiny and have always just been assumed to be valid and complete, since they were proposed by Aristotle. “[The Critique of Reason] assumes [the logical forms]…even though without a previous critique they cannot be either correctly determined or complete in number, and cannot have either a meaning or a ground.” (186) So, to use the logical forms as a basis for transcendental philosophy would be to base that philosophy on an unproven foundation.
Even with his problems with the logical forms, Maimon still has problems accepting things in themselves as objective, as we see in the previous post. For Maimon, we cannot know anything objectively because we can only know our representations, not the things in themselves. If, as Maimon seems to believe, we cannot truly know things in themselves, but can only have perfect knowledge of pure thought, i.e. logic and math, then we seem to be on a slippery slope towards solipsism. For, if we cannot know anything objectively, but can only be sure of representations and pure thought, then how can we truly know that anything actually exists outside of our mind? This is, obviously, a position that one would not want to hold, but I think is one that could be drawn from Maimon’s skepticism.

Philaletes Skeptic Letters

In the first two letters to Aenesidemus, Philaletes challenges Aenesidemus’ philosophy, going through Aenesidemus’ arguments step by step. Although they are both trying to lay the grounds for skepticism, Philaletes claims that that is the only thing that they have in common. Additionally, Reinhold, Hume, and Kant are also the victim of Philaletes critiques.

            A main argument that Philaletes brings to the table is the topic of what representations are, and how we come to have them. He disagrees with critical philosophy, which follows that representations are “ideas of reason that are grounded in its nature” and instead puts forth his own view that representations are “grounded only in the nature of the imagination” (161). Where and if reason comes into Philaletes philosophy, I am not sure.

            In Philaletes’ argument on representations, the principle of contradiction and the principle of consciousness are important. If I understand correctly, Philaletes claims that the principle of contradiction is the superior principle. However, I am unclear in his explanation because Reinhold contrarily believes the principle of consciousness to be higher because it includes the more important functions, like the thinking and representing of objects, while the principle of contradictions only relates to thought (164). Regardless, Philaletes agrees that the principle of consciousness may depend on the principle of contradiction (because the possibility has to be established first), but disagrees with Aenesidemus that it is determined by it (163).

            The principle of consciousness cannot become necessary or a universal law because “it can…mean something different for anybody” (167). We cannot even know that others have a consciousness, or if they do, if it is the same as ours. Each of our own consciousnesses apparently is a unique constant presence in our daily lives and affects how we each perceive objects.

            When we perceive an object, we are only forming what Philaletes calls a “partial representation” because the representation of the perceived object has been reproduced in our mind by the imagination, using our memory to recreate the object (169). Our representation of an object is our consciousness’ best attempt to recreate the original object that we had initially perceived through our senses.  

            I like Philaletes’ discussion on how the “original sensible perception [i.e. the actual chair, not the chair reproduced in your mind through the imagination] does not represent anything besides itself – and this means that in fact it does not represent anything at all” (169). What! But it makes sense that what I’m calling the original objects are not representations in themselves, and therefore do not represent themselves, or anything. They just are.

            However, we never call anything something in itself, we only call things representations. When I look at a chair, I don’t think that I’m looking at the actual thing in itself. I’m perceiving what I recreate through my faculties and consciousness as a chair. Possibly because that’s how we perceive everything. We only ever ‘see’ objects as representations in our minds, thanks to our memory and imagination. Philaletes says that this is an “illusion of the imagination” (169). Unlike Reinhold, we must remember that “every perception refers to a thing-in-itself” (170). Got it. 

How Exactly did Kant get Caught in the Middle of an Aenesidemusian Love Triangle? Idk...

In his Review of Aenesidemus, J.G. Fichte provides insightful commentary on the skeptical criticisms made by G.E. Shulze in regard to Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s Philosophy of the Elements. Essentially, Shulze, or Aenesidemus, argues against the validity of Reinhold’s first principle, which highlights the subject’s faculty of representations. This principle is referred to as the “principle of consciousness,” which, in a transcendentally idealistic fashion, designates the title of “cause” to the subject and “effect” to the object, or representation. (Review of Aenesidemus, 139, 149). Ultimately, Fichte is rather sympathetic to Shulze’s commanding criticisms of Reinhold even though he believes that Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is not as affected by Shulze’s remarks.

Fichte almost entirely champions Aenesidemus’s argument in the opening of his Review. The problem with Reinhold seems to lie in the statement “in consciousness, representation is distinguished by the subject from the subject and object, and is referred to both” (ROA, 138). In other words, Reinhold presumes that the subject is inherently different from the object, and is responsible for understanding the relationship between subject and object. Fichte highlights some setbacks that Aenesidemus found in the principle of consciousness, which culminate in the subject being reduced to the same level as the object: (1) the principle of consciousness cannot be the absolutely first proposition since it is subject to the principle of contradiction (2) distinguishing and referring are not enough to completely determine the consciousness through itself (3) the principle of consciousness is tied down to “some determinate experience” and “some definite reasoning” (ROA, 138-39). Thus, Fichte seems to agree that the principle of consciousness is not as well founded as it originally seems because it is dependent on many other circumstances.

Fichte then adds to the objections introduced by Aenesidemus. Although he agrees that the principle of consciousness is synthetic instead of analytic, Fichte elaborates on this issue by noting that there must be some sort of thesis and antithesis that undergirds this extremely high-level synthesis that we call consciousness (ROA, 140). Furthermore, delimiting the idea of consciousness even more, Fichte is also in agreement with Aenesidemus in that the principle of consciousness is an abstraction, and not an a priori condition. Fichte strengthens this claim by pointing out that the principle of consciousness is based on empirical self-observation (ROA, 140-41). And thus, consciousness, having been reduced to a mere representation itself, cannot transcend the bounds--nor determine the bounds--of abstraction.

Aside from noting that Aenesidemus does not consistently convey Reinhold’s argument properly (ROA, 143), and adding some of his own criticism, it seems that Fichte is does accept Schulze’s claims to be somewhat of a blow to the new philosophy, albeit not a definitive one. Moreover, Fichte shows us that Reinhold’s desire to provide a first principle was not in vain, in that, by trying to solidify Kant’s philosophy with a first principle, Reinhold helped the “new philosophers” realize that there was still more to be done in order to combat the weighty criticisms of the skeptics (ROA, 153). Thus, in light of Fichte’s Review, Kant’s Critique remained virtually unscathed, but was undoubtedly left in need of some refinement...

Skeptical Skeptics and Skepticism: A Skeptical View

In his paper, Aenesidemus, skeptical thinker G.E. Schulz attacks the very grounds on which the determinations and conclusion of the First Critique rest. Schulz claims that in producing the First Critique, Kant fails to properly refute the skeptical system of David Hume, namely on the ground that Kant bases his system of philosophy on the principles toward which Hume directed all of his skeptical doubt rather than resolves them before moving forward. Among the most critical failures delineated by Schulz is Kant's failure to provide sufficient ground for the objective actuality of the "faculty of representation" (i.e. the condition of the knowing subject.

Schulz asserts that Kant fails in proving the objective validity of the faculty of representation by breaking down the syllogism on which Kant's claim is based: that, if any two things cannot be thought apart from one another, then they cannot be apart from one another (if objects cannot be thought apart from an objectively real faculty of representations, then this faculty of representation must, by necessity, exist if objects are to exist) (pg. 108). Schulz points out that if this were to hold true in all cases, then the Kantian claim that reason is incapable of determining the nature of things-in-themselves would be disproven, since we would have a principle with which we can deduce the nature of anything (pg. 108).

Schulz's attacks on the foundation of Kant's philosophy raise some interesting and provocative questions about the validity of Kant's claims and the basis of his system of critical philosophy. If this syllogism is to be regarded as true and as a sufficient proof for the validity of the faculty of representation, then is it also the case that every effect must contain within it all elements of its cause? For the syllogism to hold true, then representations (i.e., the effects of the faculty of representation) must contain in them the essence of this faculty. However, it seems that Kant asserts time and time again that it is not the representations that account for the essence of the conditions of the knowing subject, but rather the conditions and faculties of the knowing subject that determines the essence of the representations. Furthermore, if Kant's system of reasoning is indeed valid, then effects in general must be entirely reflective of their causes in all cases (that is, all aspects of a cause must be able to be seen in their effects). However, this appears impossible, since the entire essence of a cause cannot be transferred to its effect without the essence of the cause being eliminated altogether.

Though Schulz's accusations come from an unabashedly skeptical frame of reference, they nonetheless are important criticisms of Kant's critical philosophy. If the first critique indeed does refute Hume's skepticism, then the problems raised by Hume must be adequately addressed and thought through before they can be reconciled.

Skeptics Hating On Kant

G.E. Schulze is a supporter of Hume and a skeptic. His paper, Aenesidemus, is a criticism of Reinhold's support of Kant's philosophy and Kant himself. He basically brings up a defense of skepticism and Hume. He begins by questioning the connection between our representations and the things outside us, (105) i.e. the existence of causality, the soul, or the thing-in-itself. The Philosophy of the Elements however will be the center of this blog since Schulze dedicates quite a bit his attention to it. So what is the Philosophy of the Elements? Basically it is a theorem of the nature/concept of the faculty of representation. It is the cause and ground of the actual presence of representations; is present prior to ever representation , and is so in a determinate form; differs from representation as cause from effect and may be inferred only from its effect.(107) However, it implies causality of the representation but of course Schulze does not agree because it is not mentioned to be a proof unlike the Theory of the Faculty of Representation (Reinhold's support of Kant), which claims that the being and the actuality of a faculty of representation, which must exist objectively, can not be thought apart. In other words, the there must exist a cause which has some effect from the being of another which takes a physical form/ or a form all together.(?)( the faculty of representation) Not sure if I follow this at all. But overall Schulze is basically saying that the Philosophy of the Elements is a contradiction to the Critique of Pure Reason. The reason for Schulze's disagreement is because he believes that causes require that it be thought of as different from their effects but not manifested through the effects.(110-111) In other words, Schulze claims that the cause that Kant and Reinhold claims to have proven is really a fallacy of begging the question. (111)

Wag the Tail

In his critic of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, as Henry Allison informs us in his account, Eberhard sets out to “recover [us] from the stupor induced by the Critique of Pure Reason” (Allison 16). He attempts to do so by providing a clear critique of the publication, which he mostly develops around on Leibnizian arguments. Allison outlines his arguments into four clearly delineated parts. Eberhard firsts critics Kant’s work on the limits of knowledge; secondly, he provides the justification of knowledge derived from non-sensible conditions; he then critics Kant’s argument about the nature of sensible conditions, namely space and time; and lastly, he questions the originality of Kant’s work as he likens it to a lesser version of Leibniz’s philosophy (Allison 16). In his first argument, Eberhard claims knowledge cannot be simply limited to sensible conditions as intuitive knowledge. In other words, there is another “purely, rational non-intuitive knowledge about […] things in themselves” (Allison 17). This, of course, Kant argued against, for, according to him, we can only have knowledge about things as they are given to us in experience within the sensible conditions of space and time. Any claims about anything else outside of experience equate to stretching the bounds of our understanding beyond its grasp. Eberhard explains that this limitation cannot be carried out since we can make claims about super-sensible things that are consistent with themselves but also comply with the nature of reality. He asserts the Leibnizian argument that as compliant with the basic human principles, namely sufficient reason and the principle of non-contradiction, the “transcendental validity” (which would equate to Kant’s term, “objective reality”) of such claims stands (Allison 17). As such, anything “that follows logically from these principles” (Allison 17) contains truth. The validity of claims is dependent only on the parameters of these principles, not dependent on their pertaining to the sensible conditions of knowledge. From this view, he argues that doubting any claims made by reason would lead to skepticism. Truth, for Eberhard, is “ the agreement […] with the necessary laws of reason and the understanding” (Allison 18). Under this definition, doubting claims made by reason outside of the sensible conditions would deprive us of any certain truth. For Eberhard, as long as something complies with the principle of non-contradiction and providing sufficient reason can provide logical knowledge outside of sensible conditions. Yet, Kant is not leading us into skepticism. He is not challenging the logic of such principle, if anything he asserts within experience. What he is challenging is the extension of these principles beyond their realm. His critique of Leibnizian rationalism derives from its presupposed “erroneous identification of our concepts of things with the things themselves” (Allison 21). Eberhard seems to ignore this and simply makes the same claim that principles that coincide with the nature of things as we experience them must hold validity outside of experience for the very same reason that they hold validity with experience. Simply because we cannot think of anything within our experience that could not escape the principle of non-contradiction does it mean that we can extend this principle to things outside of experience. Regardless of whether Kant succeeds in his quest to evaluate the validity of reason and its claims, Eberhard simply regresses from any progress Kant made by simply brushing off any challenges made to the presupposed validity of reason with the same justification that Kant challenges.