Become a famous philosopher so your e-mail account can be hacked and published postmortem.

If we take away one thing from the reading of the Herz letters, it is that the only way to make Kant more absurd is to address him as "dearest Herr Professor" (Herz 278). Or make a super nerdy t-shirt about him, like this. 

In some kind of table-of-contents tomfoolery, three letters appear before the text of Herz's essay Observations from Speculative Philosophy (which is a gripping title indeed) and two after. The first, from Herz to Kant, is fairly pedestrian and almost editorial in nature, which is appropriate given that Herz was chosen by Kant to defend the work in public. This letter references some of the pair's contemporaries and their opinions on Kant's Dissertation. Here's a brief recap of the parts of the Dissertation that are referenced here:

     1. "...if the predicate of a proposition is sensible, it is only subjectively valid of the subject, while, on the hand, if the predicate is intellectual, etc'" (ibid). Recall the separate realms of the sensible and the intellectual, as well as the indistinct source of intellectual concepts. 

     2. "...in explaining the nature of space, one must use the words 'at the same time' [simul] and in explaining time the word 'after' [post]" (ibid). Recall the presuppositions of both the existence of time and space, as well as their subjective nature. 

The second, from the sincere and devoted Immanuel Kant, speaks first on the importance of his project. While it seems a little pompous (or arrogant, self-important, ridiculous, laughable, pretentious...) of him to describe the topic of his dissertation as crucial to "the most important ends of humanity in general," he is correct in this identification of the rather grandiose aspirations of what he is trying to do; namely, make a clear delineation between the subjective and the objective (Herz 279). This isn't exactly the Large Hadron Collider in practical importance here, but besides being one of the most fundamental questions of existence, man's relationship to the world, and philosophy, it is necessary for his next endeavor, which is even more ambitious in its topics of discussion (gasp).  Kant mentions that it will concern "the foundational principles and laws that determine the sensible world" as well as metaphysics and ethics (ibid). The plot thickens.

At this point in time we're all really tired of the terms of endearment between professor and student, but thankfully things perk up a bit in the third letter and get a little more interesting, philosophically. Herz fears that Kant has moved away from his fondness for metaphysics. This exchange details one of the discipline's more prickly questions concerning the practicality or even legitimacy of metaphysics versus the perhaps less esoteric and more useful discipline of moral philosophy. It is also a preview of what's up Kant's sleeve; we already know that in the first Critique he moves away from the kinds of unfettered intellectual formulations that have plagued philosophy. Kant is also now arguably more famous for his moral system, deontology, than for the work he does concerning epistemology. 

Herz passably parrots Kant for pages and pages and pages and pages...

and pages...

and we finally come to the last two letters, which demonstrate that people back then had a lot more patience for pen and ink than I have ever had in my entire life. In the fourth letter Kant goes into much greater detail on his aim in the work which he has thus far entitled The Limits of Sensibility and Reason. SPOILER ALERT: At the end of Titanic, the boat sinks, and we find out that The Limits of Sensibility and Reason will later be retitled Critique of Pure Reason (I think). So here's the sparknotes outline of the first Critique from Kant himself. 

     I. Theoretical

          A. General Phenomenology (I do not understand this term precisely as Kant uses it, only as philosophers in the 20th century and onward do. Perhaps they are similar? Kant's use of phenomena previously meant things as they appear)

          B. Metaphysics: "only in regard to its nature and method" (312)

     II. Practical 

          A. The universal principles of feeling, taste and sensuous desire (make your own joke)

          B. The first principles of morality. 

After laying out this handy dandy blueprint of one of the densest and most famous philosophical works of all time, he also poses a pretty timeless question, the problem of the relationship of an object with the mind's representation of that object, again reminiscent of the work he does in the Dissertation about the categorically separate relationships between subject and object, knower and known. 

The fifth letter is valuable only in that it reveals the phrase "pure reason" and his trademark a priori (317). These are crucial for his overarching goal to define the reach of knowledge outside of experience, as a foundation for all future hypotheses. 

Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal jam.

Hume on the Concept of the Cause and the Effect Relationship

Hume’s An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature wrestles with the goal of simplifying A Treatise of Human Nature’s main points. One major point from the work that Hume chooses to focus on is the relationship between cause and effect. Hume discusses that the main going of logic is to explain the principals of reason that govern our perceptions and organizations of the innate and physical world. Hume asserts that perception is what governs reason, and that we can never think of something which we have not seen with out us or felt within us. Hume breaks perception into two categories: ideas and impressions. Ideas come from a reflection on a passion or an object that is not present. Impressions are the immediate experience and are more “lively and strong”. Hume states that when an idea is obscure one should refer back to the original impression; if the impression can not be produced then idea becomes insignificant.

Hume then goes on to state that reasons which concern things that are “matter of fact” are founded upon the relationship between cause and effect. He uses the idea of transference of motion as a cause effect example. The reasoning that leads one to believe the cause and the effect are related is made through the senses and through experience. He states this effect of transference can be seen in contiguity of time and place, priority in time and constant conjunction between the cause and its subsequent effect. With out experience it is impossible to make inferences. Reason shows us nothing innate in the cause from which to derive its effect. Only with a comparison of ideas can the inference be made that the cause and effect are related. However an inference made from compared ideas is not sufficient to lead to a demonstration of what will happen in the future.

Metaphysically we can conceive anything and the concepts can not be proved untrue until a demonstration contradicts them. Cause and effect relationship, as stated earlier, is based off of experience. Experience is based upon the supposition that the “course of nature” will continue uniformly throughout time. There is no way to prove that the course of nature will remain uniform, it could change because we can conceive the change. There is nothing that states that the future is bound to the experiences of the past. Past experience makes no concrete statements about the future. The assertion of the cause and effect relationship is based in custom alone. Through this course of logic Hume states that “custom” is more a guide to life than “logic” and also that the cause effect relationship is not a concrete but only a concept that has yet to be proven as untrue. This also leads to the conclusion that there is no such thing as “matter of fact”.

The Subreptive Axioms of Kant's Dissertation

Towards the end of his Inaugural Dissertation, Kant presents his three subreptive axioms which create a formula that encompasses all "pretenses of sensitive cognition masquerading as intellectual knowledge."

The first subreptive axiom according to Kant is "The same sensitive cognition under which alone the intuition of an object is possible is a condition of the possibility of the object itself."

Kant explains this by stating that: "What is, is somewhere and somewhen." That is to say that anything that exists is defined by its occupation of space, and location in time. These objects are found to exist only because they can be identified through our subjective knowledge of space and time. Therefore, according to Kant, is impossible for us to know about things such as the "seat of the soul" or other intuitive ideas that are being mistaken for sensitive ones, because the "seat of the soul" is an immaterial idea, which can not be placed in space. As a result, Kant compares any intellectual effort put forth to prove things like this would be as wasteful as "milking a he-goat with a sieve under it." Kant believes a proof for God etc. is impossible because He is defined as omnipresent, which Kant sees as impossible because in order to be defined the object must be able to be placed within a specific space.

The second subreptive axiom states: "The same sensitive condition under which alone data can be collected and compared for the formation of an intellectual concept of an object is a condition of the object itself."

Kant attempts to tackle the idea of the rule of contradictions here in saying that while we may be able to say that "whatever is and is not at the same time is impossible" because this is inherently contradictory and therefore impossible, when this assertion is converted it does not hold as true. In another form the rule of contradiction could be stated as "everything impossible both is and is not at the same time." This suggests that the conditions of sensitive knowledge control the realm of possibility relating to intellectual knowledge. This suggests that nothing can exist unless there is sensitive knowledge about it. This means that if contradiction isn't present it is much more difficult for us to determine possibility or impossibility.

The third subreptive axiom according to Kant is: "The same sensitive condition under which alone the subsumption of any presented object under a given intellectual concept is possible is also a condition of the possibility of the object itself."

Kant explains this axiom by stating that some schools of thought believe that "whatever exists contigently has at some time not existed." That is to say that, unless it can be proven that something has at some time not existed, it is impossible to determine its contigency. Kant therefore believes that a more succinct way of expressing this subjective law would be "if there is no evidence that there was a time when a certain thing did not exist the common intelligence does not supply sufficient marks for us to infer its contingency." Kant is saying that being unable to prove that something did not exist at one time is not grounds to declare it impossible, but instead leaves us incapable of a conclusion.

What is Valuable in the Inaugural Dissertation?

Since I’ve had some difficulty getting in touch with people over the weekend to take the 25th blog spot and didn’t post one on the 22nd, I decided I would take over the 25th spot. After speaking with some people after class on Friday, I tried to assuage fears that they had that the fact that they were not yet “getting it” was not a problem. Afterwards, in thinking about the matter, I started to wonder if I should really content myself with the conclusion that this will simply take a while to kick in. Although I think that is true, I am not sure if it is a justifiable pedagogical position. To make a long story short, I’m going to try to be super clear, and brief, and hope that this helps to get us closer to the fabled “getting it”.

The value of the Inaugural Dissertation rests in at least two features. First, the Dissertation repeatedly makes the point that different forms of knowing must not be confused in respect of their objects and then draws out the consequences of this view. At the end of the first section, Kant writes:

Anyone seeking to escape from this thorny problem should note that the co-ordination of a plurality, whether successive or simultaneous … does not concern the intellectual concept of a whole but only the conditions of sensitive intuition; and so, even though such totalities may not be conceivable in sensitive terms, they do not thereby cease to be intellectual concepts. For these it suffices that co-ordinate things be in some way given and be thought as belonging to one (126-27)

In this passage, Kant is effectively saying, the limitations of conceiving something by “sensitive terms” does not negate the coherence of “intellectual concepts”. The intellectual concept of the whole, despite the fact that it does not have a “sensitive” correlate—that is, some kind of sense experience that also testifies to the “co-ordination” of that whole—remains coherent.

Through this object lession, we find Kant recommending a path like that of the first Critique: we must determine what cognition is and what it can do. Until we have a clear account of what the forms of knowing are and their “laws”, our knowledge will be confused and we will continue to uncover concepts, like that of world, that are self-contradictory.

Second, the Dissertation tries to separate and adequately examine both of our sources of knowledge: sensible intuition, which results in appearances; and intellection, which knows things “as they are”. What Kant says of sensible intuition, at least in its formal aspect, will agree almost completely with what he will say of it in the first Critique. That is, space and time are not things known through experience, but are presupposed by experience (here I am using the word “experience” in a non-technical sense). They are the quantitative forms by which all “appearances” are presented to us. Space and time present the relations of objects known empirically, but in their pure function are capable of clarity the likes of intellectual concepts.

Empirically, space and time regulate how objects of experience appear. The things that happen to me are all indexed to unique spaces and times. The table is there, the chair is here. The earthquake was then, the rescue effort is now. Nothing that appears to me does not already assume these forms.

In addition, apart from shaping empirical sensations, space and time are pure forms in which mathematical constructions can be produced. It is because I have this “concept” of space that I can construct a geometric object and understand its properties with absolute certainty. Similarly, the calculations of physical mechanics are possible through the forms of space and time. See §14.4 (134-35) and §15D (138-39) in elaboration of these points.

There is more to say, but I will stop here for now.

Making Connections, from Descartes to Kant

Because you all have read Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, it seemed to me that this might be a good place to begin making connections with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. I have listed four different points of intersection between Descartes and Kant in what follows. 

Both think:
(1) there is some doubt about the relation between representations and the objects they represent. This is for Descartes the principal reason that we cannot trust our knowledge through the senses. Although Kant does not thematize this issue, it is implied in the basic transcendental framework: if we can’t know the object except through its appearances, there must be some doubt about the relation of our representations to it.

(2) that “extension” and the principles of mathematics (including space and time) are something known “innately” by the mind. Descartes explains in his fifth Meditation that these are the characteristics of sensuous objects that we can always know clearly and distinctly, precisely because they are features that are known by reason and (although Descartes never says as such) synthesized in the judgment of the sensuous thing. Kant thinks that space and time are effects of our pure form of intuition. That is, we may only have experience through these forms of space and time. The difference is, that Descartes thinks these characteristics must actually belong to the things in the world, the example of this being the infinite, which is known by reason but must equally, according to Descartes, be attributable to an infinite being which is the cause of the idea of the infinite.

(3) that the idea of causality is an “innate” idea. Descartes does insofar as he assumes this for his cosmological proof. The objective reality of an idea must have a cause of equal or less formal reality (but not more than, note!). Without this idea, Descartes can’t get past the fragile certainty of the “cogito ergo sum”. Kant also thinks we have a concept, as he will call it, of causality, which is used to synthesize experience, and which is drawn from the purely logical use of the understanding. But he will not extend the usage of this concept beyond experience, whereas for Descartes, it’s essential if he wants to prove the existence of God (clearly something beyond experience).

(4) that the thinking subject is the starting place of our removal from skepticism. For Descartes, it is the “cogito ergo sum” that removes us from the abyss of unknowing. For Kant, it is the “critique” of this faculty that allows us to know what we can know. However, it will always be somewhat strange that Descartes is ready to make the Copernican turn, as Kant actually does, and yet immediately falls back into the hands of the Scholastic tradition and the proof for the existence of God. Despite our disappointment with Descartes’ results, we must remember that for him it will always be primarily an epistemological rather than metaphysical inquiry. This is a vital movement, anticipating Kant’s.