The value of the Inaugural Dissertation rests in at least two features. First, the Dissertation repeatedly makes the point that different forms of knowing must not be confused in respect of their objects and then draws out the consequences of this view. At the end of the first section, Kant writes:
Anyone seeking to escape from this thorny problem should note that the co-ordination of a plurality, whether successive or simultaneous … does not concern the intellectual concept of a whole but only the conditions of sensitive intuition; and so, even though such totalities may not be conceivable in sensitive terms, they do not thereby cease to be intellectual concepts. For these it suffices that co-ordinate things be in some way given and be thought as belonging to one (126-27)In this passage, Kant is effectively saying, the limitations of conceiving something by “sensitive terms” does not negate the coherence of “intellectual concepts”. The intellectual concept of the whole, despite the fact that it does not have a “sensitive” correlate—that is, some kind of sense experience that also testifies to the “co-ordination” of that whole—remains coherent.
Through this object lession, we find Kant recommending a path like that of the first Critique: we must determine what cognition is and what it can do. Until we have a clear account of what the forms of knowing are and their “laws”, our knowledge will be confused and we will continue to uncover concepts, like that of world, that are self-contradictory.
Second, the Dissertation tries to separate and adequately examine both of our sources of knowledge: sensible intuition, which results in appearances; and intellection, which knows things “as they are”. What Kant says of sensible intuition, at least in its formal aspect, will agree almost completely with what he will say of it in the first Critique. That is, space and time are not things known through experience, but are presupposed by experience (here I am using the word “experience” in a non-technical sense). They are the quantitative forms by which all “appearances” are presented to us. Space and time present the relations of objects known empirically, but in their pure function are capable of clarity the likes of intellectual concepts.
Empirically, space and time regulate how objects of experience appear. The things that happen to me are all indexed to unique spaces and times. The table is there, the chair is here. The earthquake was then, the rescue effort is now. Nothing that appears to me does not already assume these forms.
In addition, apart from shaping empirical sensations, space and time are pure forms in which mathematical constructions can be produced. It is because I have this “concept” of space that I can construct a geometric object and understand its properties with absolute certainty. Similarly, the calculations of physical mechanics are possible through the forms of space and time. See §14.4 (134-35) and §15D (138-39) in elaboration of these points.
There is more to say, but I will stop here for now.
3 comments:
Although this seems to have been only alluded to, what I find interesting in the Dissertation, particularly when it comes to the two different forms of knowing, is the fine distinctions Kant seems to be making. While one cannot confuse intellectual concepts with sensible intuitions, the faculty of intellect can still be applied to intuitions. Kant notes that "sensitive cognitions being given, they are subordinated by the logical use of the intellect to other sensitive cognitions as to common concepts, and as phenomena to more general laws of phenomena" (128). This would seem to anticipate Kant's attempt to bridge rationalism and empiricism. I think it would be interesting to look for his ability to navigate the ability of concepts and intuitions to interact with one another without creating a subreptive axiom, in the Critique.
To amplify your comment, Michael: intellectual concepts are generated by the "real use" of the intellect, but the "logical use" of the intellect may order both intellectual concepts and intuitive/sensible "concepts." So the intellect may dominate the products of the sensibility, but it cannot make judgments, from given intuitions, about intellectual concepts. The latter would be a subreption of the first type.
I would like to know in what sense you think it would "bridge rationalism and empiricism". I also wonder if you can suggest examples of the non-subreptive co-operation (?) of intellectual concepts and intuitions. I can think of one, but I am curious what you think.
Also, I just wanted to note, as I said in class yesterday, I think it is false that the pure intuitions of space and time are "relations" in the Disseration. Rather, relations are drawn from these pure intuitions. Just a correction.
When I say such uses of the intellect bridge rationalism and empiricism, I meant that I think Kant neither privileges innate ideas or experiential data entirely. While there does seem to be a rationalist emphasis in the Dissertation (only innate ideas being objective and the elenctic function of concepts would seem to support this), there is also an intuitive way of thinking about the world.
As far as an example of a non-subreptive logical use for intuitive concepts, perhaps something related to necessity? Kant points this out as a concept abstracted from "laws inborn in the mind" (130), but I could see this concept applied to phenomena that are contingent on each other, such as a spoken word being heard after one experiences the sight of someone speaking. I'm not sure if I'm applying Kant's faculties properly, however.
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