In the first two letters to Aenesidemus, Philaletes challenges Aenesidemus’ philosophy, going through Aenesidemus’ arguments step by step. Although they are both trying to lay the grounds for skepticism, Philaletes claims that that is the only thing that they have in common. Additionally, Reinhold, Hume, and Kant are also the victim of Philaletes critiques.
A main argument that Philaletes brings to the table is the topic of what representations are, and how we come to have them. He disagrees with critical philosophy, which follows that representations are “ideas of reason that are grounded in its nature” and instead puts forth his own view that representations are “grounded only in the nature of the imagination” (161). Where and if reason comes into Philaletes philosophy, I am not sure.
In Philaletes’ argument on representations, the principle of contradiction and the principle of consciousness are important. If I understand correctly, Philaletes claims that the principle of contradiction is the superior principle. However, I am unclear in his explanation because Reinhold contrarily believes the principle of consciousness to be higher because it includes the more important functions, like the thinking and representing of objects, while the principle of contradictions only relates to thought (164). Regardless, Philaletes agrees that the principle of consciousness may depend on the principle of contradiction (because the possibility has to be established first), but disagrees with Aenesidemus that it is determined by it (163).
The principle of consciousness cannot become necessary or a universal law because “it can…mean something different for anybody” (167). We cannot even know that others have a consciousness, or if they do, if it is the same as ours. Each of our own consciousnesses apparently is a unique constant presence in our daily lives and affects how we each perceive objects.
When we perceive an object, we are only forming what Philaletes calls a “partial representation” because the representation of the perceived object has been reproduced in our mind by the imagination, using our memory to recreate the object (169). Our representation of an object is our consciousness’ best attempt to recreate the original object that we had initially perceived through our senses.
I like Philaletes’ discussion on how the “original sensible perception [i.e. the actual chair, not the chair reproduced in your mind through the imagination] does not represent anything besides itself – and this means that in fact it does not represent anything at all” (169). What! But it makes sense that what I’m calling the original objects are not representations in themselves, and therefore do not represent themselves, or anything. They just are.
However, we never call anything something in itself, we only call things representations. When I look at a chair, I don’t think that I’m looking at the actual thing in itself. I’m perceiving what I recreate through my faculties and consciousness as a chair. Possibly because that’s how we perceive everything. We only ever ‘see’ objects as representations in our minds, thanks to our memory and imagination. Philaletes says that this is an “illusion of the imagination” (169). Unlike Reinhold, we must remember that “every perception refers to a thing-in-itself” (170). Got it.
4 comments:
Philaletes is suggesting solipsism, then, correct? If all we can know are parts of representations, and the objects we experience only exist on our individual minds as representations, than can we ever do anything but doubt everything around us? Philaletes, however, seems to suggest that Kant's idea of the "thing-in-itself" is still valid, however, so couldn't this thing-in-itself be the unifying factor for consciousness despite the array of possible representations created and experienced by each individual? What I mean is, couldn't all these different representations created by separate consciousnesses all be part of the manifold of the "thing-in-itself," thereby still having some sense of universality?
So basically we see things, and represent them in ways entirely different based on our imagination, which limits our knowledge of objects to experiences we have had before? Correct me if I'm wrong, because that sounds kind of strange. If everything that we represent is done through our imagination and its relevance to previous experience, then how did we get any previous experience in the first place by which to judge things? This is where universality is necessary I suppose, and Kants manifolds and a prioris seem to answer the question in a way.
I am also very confused about this. What we form when perceiving an object are only partial representations, because our representations are rooted in memory and imagination. However, to do this, must not we have had access at some point to object, such as that at some point we formed the memory from which the partial representation would later come. In other words, for us to form a partial representation from memory, the memory must have some basis on the actual object. Otherwise, we are just forming a representation that may or may not have anything to do with the actual object. This, as JT mentions, leads us into solipsism. But, then, what role does the object play here? We can never make an actual representation, but we must have some idea about the general object, even if at any particular moment all we have are partial representations.
I am really resistant to the idea that Maimon is in bed with solipsism. The reason for this is that we would have to have some basis by which to claim that we were in fact being solipsistic.
But in denying that we can have knowledge of things in themselves, M is in accord with Kant. I think that Chelsea's point about these being presentations, not representations, following Maimon, is essential. This is something that I have mentioned in class. Following Strawson, the problem is why Kant even uses this language of "representation", when the relation to the supposed thing causing our representation is something we can say nothing about!
When Maimon is saying that the imagination and no reason is at work in our representations, he is not saying, pace Stephen above, that they are things that are "entirely different", for this would be to cite a basis for difference which cannot be conceived. Instead, he is saying why do we assume that the understanding is responsible for the unity of our judgments. What is, like Hume thinks, the unity of our judgments is not logically formed, as Kant thinks, but only an effect of the imagination. Hume thinks that any connection between cause and effect is a result of association--of the imagination. And this is a vitally different tact from Kant's. But I don't think this results in solipsism.
To respond to another point of Stephen's comment, you say "how did we get any previous experience", but this question implies a causal relation with the external world and our receptive capacities such that we "get" experience. But this is precisely what we cannot say, once we limit the applicability of the concepts of the understanding to actual experience (and not what is outside of experience).
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