Maimon's Critique of the Critique

Salomon Maimon offers a series of critiques of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason in his Letters from Philaletes to Aenesidemus, in order to establish his skepticism. The most prevalent of theses is the critique of Kant’s idea of the “thing-in-itself.” For Kant, a thing in itself is outside the sphere of possible experience, yet is also the source of cognition. Maimon agreed with Kant that the thing in itself is beyond the sphere of possible experience, but holds that this does not mean that the thing in itself cannot be an object of cognition in principle. (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/maimon)
Maimon looks at the relationship between logic and transcendental philosophy in the first part of his sixth letter, and claims that Kant inverts the two. While the logical forms are all that can be truly known, they “have no meaning at all when abstracted from their transcendental meaning.” (185, emphasis in original) One cannot give the meaning of logical affirmation and negation apart from the corresponding transcendental concepts of reality and negation. Maimon then goes on to argue that logical reality and negation presuppose the transcendental and absolute categories and “otherwise they would not have meaning at all.” (186) Logic must, therefore, have transcendental philosophy as its premise, rather than the other way around, as Kant has it.
Part of Maimon’s objection rises from his contention that the logical forms have not yet been subjected to proper scrutiny and have always just been assumed to be valid and complete, since they were proposed by Aristotle. “[The Critique of Reason] assumes [the logical forms]…even though without a previous critique they cannot be either correctly determined or complete in number, and cannot have either a meaning or a ground.” (186) So, to use the logical forms as a basis for transcendental philosophy would be to base that philosophy on an unproven foundation.
Even with his problems with the logical forms, Maimon still has problems accepting things in themselves as objective, as we see in the previous post. For Maimon, we cannot know anything objectively because we can only know our representations, not the things in themselves. If, as Maimon seems to believe, we cannot truly know things in themselves, but can only have perfect knowledge of pure thought, i.e. logic and math, then we seem to be on a slippery slope towards solipsism. For, if we cannot know anything objectively, but can only be sure of representations and pure thought, then how can we truly know that anything actually exists outside of our mind? This is, obviously, a position that one would not want to hold, but I think is one that could be drawn from Maimon’s skepticism.

Philaletes Skeptic Letters

In the first two letters to Aenesidemus, Philaletes challenges Aenesidemus’ philosophy, going through Aenesidemus’ arguments step by step. Although they are both trying to lay the grounds for skepticism, Philaletes claims that that is the only thing that they have in common. Additionally, Reinhold, Hume, and Kant are also the victim of Philaletes critiques.

            A main argument that Philaletes brings to the table is the topic of what representations are, and how we come to have them. He disagrees with critical philosophy, which follows that representations are “ideas of reason that are grounded in its nature” and instead puts forth his own view that representations are “grounded only in the nature of the imagination” (161). Where and if reason comes into Philaletes philosophy, I am not sure.

            In Philaletes’ argument on representations, the principle of contradiction and the principle of consciousness are important. If I understand correctly, Philaletes claims that the principle of contradiction is the superior principle. However, I am unclear in his explanation because Reinhold contrarily believes the principle of consciousness to be higher because it includes the more important functions, like the thinking and representing of objects, while the principle of contradictions only relates to thought (164). Regardless, Philaletes agrees that the principle of consciousness may depend on the principle of contradiction (because the possibility has to be established first), but disagrees with Aenesidemus that it is determined by it (163).

            The principle of consciousness cannot become necessary or a universal law because “it can…mean something different for anybody” (167). We cannot even know that others have a consciousness, or if they do, if it is the same as ours. Each of our own consciousnesses apparently is a unique constant presence in our daily lives and affects how we each perceive objects.

            When we perceive an object, we are only forming what Philaletes calls a “partial representation” because the representation of the perceived object has been reproduced in our mind by the imagination, using our memory to recreate the object (169). Our representation of an object is our consciousness’ best attempt to recreate the original object that we had initially perceived through our senses.  

            I like Philaletes’ discussion on how the “original sensible perception [i.e. the actual chair, not the chair reproduced in your mind through the imagination] does not represent anything besides itself – and this means that in fact it does not represent anything at all” (169). What! But it makes sense that what I’m calling the original objects are not representations in themselves, and therefore do not represent themselves, or anything. They just are.

            However, we never call anything something in itself, we only call things representations. When I look at a chair, I don’t think that I’m looking at the actual thing in itself. I’m perceiving what I recreate through my faculties and consciousness as a chair. Possibly because that’s how we perceive everything. We only ever ‘see’ objects as representations in our minds, thanks to our memory and imagination. Philaletes says that this is an “illusion of the imagination” (169). Unlike Reinhold, we must remember that “every perception refers to a thing-in-itself” (170). Got it. 

How Exactly did Kant get Caught in the Middle of an Aenesidemusian Love Triangle? Idk...

In his Review of Aenesidemus, J.G. Fichte provides insightful commentary on the skeptical criticisms made by G.E. Shulze in regard to Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s Philosophy of the Elements. Essentially, Shulze, or Aenesidemus, argues against the validity of Reinhold’s first principle, which highlights the subject’s faculty of representations. This principle is referred to as the “principle of consciousness,” which, in a transcendentally idealistic fashion, designates the title of “cause” to the subject and “effect” to the object, or representation. (Review of Aenesidemus, 139, 149). Ultimately, Fichte is rather sympathetic to Shulze’s commanding criticisms of Reinhold even though he believes that Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is not as affected by Shulze’s remarks.

Fichte almost entirely champions Aenesidemus’s argument in the opening of his Review. The problem with Reinhold seems to lie in the statement “in consciousness, representation is distinguished by the subject from the subject and object, and is referred to both” (ROA, 138). In other words, Reinhold presumes that the subject is inherently different from the object, and is responsible for understanding the relationship between subject and object. Fichte highlights some setbacks that Aenesidemus found in the principle of consciousness, which culminate in the subject being reduced to the same level as the object: (1) the principle of consciousness cannot be the absolutely first proposition since it is subject to the principle of contradiction (2) distinguishing and referring are not enough to completely determine the consciousness through itself (3) the principle of consciousness is tied down to “some determinate experience” and “some definite reasoning” (ROA, 138-39). Thus, Fichte seems to agree that the principle of consciousness is not as well founded as it originally seems because it is dependent on many other circumstances.

Fichte then adds to the objections introduced by Aenesidemus. Although he agrees that the principle of consciousness is synthetic instead of analytic, Fichte elaborates on this issue by noting that there must be some sort of thesis and antithesis that undergirds this extremely high-level synthesis that we call consciousness (ROA, 140). Furthermore, delimiting the idea of consciousness even more, Fichte is also in agreement with Aenesidemus in that the principle of consciousness is an abstraction, and not an a priori condition. Fichte strengthens this claim by pointing out that the principle of consciousness is based on empirical self-observation (ROA, 140-41). And thus, consciousness, having been reduced to a mere representation itself, cannot transcend the bounds--nor determine the bounds--of abstraction.

Aside from noting that Aenesidemus does not consistently convey Reinhold’s argument properly (ROA, 143), and adding some of his own criticism, it seems that Fichte is does accept Schulze’s claims to be somewhat of a blow to the new philosophy, albeit not a definitive one. Moreover, Fichte shows us that Reinhold’s desire to provide a first principle was not in vain, in that, by trying to solidify Kant’s philosophy with a first principle, Reinhold helped the “new philosophers” realize that there was still more to be done in order to combat the weighty criticisms of the skeptics (ROA, 153). Thus, in light of Fichte’s Review, Kant’s Critique remained virtually unscathed, but was undoubtedly left in need of some refinement...

Skeptical Skeptics and Skepticism: A Skeptical View

In his paper, Aenesidemus, skeptical thinker G.E. Schulz attacks the very grounds on which the determinations and conclusion of the First Critique rest. Schulz claims that in producing the First Critique, Kant fails to properly refute the skeptical system of David Hume, namely on the ground that Kant bases his system of philosophy on the principles toward which Hume directed all of his skeptical doubt rather than resolves them before moving forward. Among the most critical failures delineated by Schulz is Kant's failure to provide sufficient ground for the objective actuality of the "faculty of representation" (i.e. the condition of the knowing subject.

Schulz asserts that Kant fails in proving the objective validity of the faculty of representation by breaking down the syllogism on which Kant's claim is based: that, if any two things cannot be thought apart from one another, then they cannot be apart from one another (if objects cannot be thought apart from an objectively real faculty of representations, then this faculty of representation must, by necessity, exist if objects are to exist) (pg. 108). Schulz points out that if this were to hold true in all cases, then the Kantian claim that reason is incapable of determining the nature of things-in-themselves would be disproven, since we would have a principle with which we can deduce the nature of anything (pg. 108).

Schulz's attacks on the foundation of Kant's philosophy raise some interesting and provocative questions about the validity of Kant's claims and the basis of his system of critical philosophy. If this syllogism is to be regarded as true and as a sufficient proof for the validity of the faculty of representation, then is it also the case that every effect must contain within it all elements of its cause? For the syllogism to hold true, then representations (i.e., the effects of the faculty of representation) must contain in them the essence of this faculty. However, it seems that Kant asserts time and time again that it is not the representations that account for the essence of the conditions of the knowing subject, but rather the conditions and faculties of the knowing subject that determines the essence of the representations. Furthermore, if Kant's system of reasoning is indeed valid, then effects in general must be entirely reflective of their causes in all cases (that is, all aspects of a cause must be able to be seen in their effects). However, this appears impossible, since the entire essence of a cause cannot be transferred to its effect without the essence of the cause being eliminated altogether.

Though Schulz's accusations come from an unabashedly skeptical frame of reference, they nonetheless are important criticisms of Kant's critical philosophy. If the first critique indeed does refute Hume's skepticism, then the problems raised by Hume must be adequately addressed and thought through before they can be reconciled.

Skeptics Hating On Kant

G.E. Schulze is a supporter of Hume and a skeptic. His paper, Aenesidemus, is a criticism of Reinhold's support of Kant's philosophy and Kant himself. He basically brings up a defense of skepticism and Hume. He begins by questioning the connection between our representations and the things outside us, (105) i.e. the existence of causality, the soul, or the thing-in-itself. The Philosophy of the Elements however will be the center of this blog since Schulze dedicates quite a bit his attention to it. So what is the Philosophy of the Elements? Basically it is a theorem of the nature/concept of the faculty of representation. It is the cause and ground of the actual presence of representations; is present prior to ever representation , and is so in a determinate form; differs from representation as cause from effect and may be inferred only from its effect.(107) However, it implies causality of the representation but of course Schulze does not agree because it is not mentioned to be a proof unlike the Theory of the Faculty of Representation (Reinhold's support of Kant), which claims that the being and the actuality of a faculty of representation, which must exist objectively, can not be thought apart. In other words, the there must exist a cause which has some effect from the being of another which takes a physical form/ or a form all together.(?)( the faculty of representation) Not sure if I follow this at all. But overall Schulze is basically saying that the Philosophy of the Elements is a contradiction to the Critique of Pure Reason. The reason for Schulze's disagreement is because he believes that causes require that it be thought of as different from their effects but not manifested through the effects.(110-111) In other words, Schulze claims that the cause that Kant and Reinhold claims to have proven is really a fallacy of begging the question. (111)

Wag the Tail

In his critic of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, as Henry Allison informs us in his account, Eberhard sets out to “recover [us] from the stupor induced by the Critique of Pure Reason” (Allison 16). He attempts to do so by providing a clear critique of the publication, which he mostly develops around on Leibnizian arguments. Allison outlines his arguments into four clearly delineated parts. Eberhard firsts critics Kant’s work on the limits of knowledge; secondly, he provides the justification of knowledge derived from non-sensible conditions; he then critics Kant’s argument about the nature of sensible conditions, namely space and time; and lastly, he questions the originality of Kant’s work as he likens it to a lesser version of Leibniz’s philosophy (Allison 16). In his first argument, Eberhard claims knowledge cannot be simply limited to sensible conditions as intuitive knowledge. In other words, there is another “purely, rational non-intuitive knowledge about […] things in themselves” (Allison 17). This, of course, Kant argued against, for, according to him, we can only have knowledge about things as they are given to us in experience within the sensible conditions of space and time. Any claims about anything else outside of experience equate to stretching the bounds of our understanding beyond its grasp. Eberhard explains that this limitation cannot be carried out since we can make claims about super-sensible things that are consistent with themselves but also comply with the nature of reality. He asserts the Leibnizian argument that as compliant with the basic human principles, namely sufficient reason and the principle of non-contradiction, the “transcendental validity” (which would equate to Kant’s term, “objective reality”) of such claims stands (Allison 17). As such, anything “that follows logically from these principles” (Allison 17) contains truth. The validity of claims is dependent only on the parameters of these principles, not dependent on their pertaining to the sensible conditions of knowledge. From this view, he argues that doubting any claims made by reason would lead to skepticism. Truth, for Eberhard, is “ the agreement […] with the necessary laws of reason and the understanding” (Allison 18). Under this definition, doubting claims made by reason outside of the sensible conditions would deprive us of any certain truth. For Eberhard, as long as something complies with the principle of non-contradiction and providing sufficient reason can provide logical knowledge outside of sensible conditions. Yet, Kant is not leading us into skepticism. He is not challenging the logic of such principle, if anything he asserts within experience. What he is challenging is the extension of these principles beyond their realm. His critique of Leibnizian rationalism derives from its presupposed “erroneous identification of our concepts of things with the things themselves” (Allison 21). Eberhard seems to ignore this and simply makes the same claim that principles that coincide with the nature of things as we experience them must hold validity outside of experience for the very same reason that they hold validity with experience. Simply because we cannot think of anything within our experience that could not escape the principle of non-contradiction does it mean that we can extend this principle to things outside of experience. Regardless of whether Kant succeeds in his quest to evaluate the validity of reason and its claims, Eberhard simply regresses from any progress Kant made by simply brushing off any challenges made to the presupposed validity of reason with the same justification that Kant challenges.

Reinhold: Continuous Chain of Intellectual History

The Reinhold letters lend a great insight into the historical and intellectual context that Kant was immersed in. Opening with a long extracted passage, it seems as though everyone is intellectually at odds with reason, as it is “being accused ever more loudly as a disturber of the peace in the most important affair of humankind.” (Reinhold, 3)
The passage claims how the whole world is “driving reason into a corner.” (Reinhold, 4) The social religious and despotic orders want to suppress the “voice of their enemy,” which is reason of course, to maintain their current status quos. Reinhold maintains a dissenting view from the passage and challenges the writer to understand how any religious or secular faction is always utilizing reason to a certain extent. In fact, when one observes an isolated group or faction, it may seem frightening, but when viewed in a larger historical context, “as a whole in their connection with one another” the viewer can witness the “far-reaching and beneficent revolutions” that are continuously occurring (Reinhold, 4).
Reinhold does not believe the world of ideas to be stagnant or at odds with reason, but rather that it is in a constant state of flux. No single opinion or metaphysical answer is ever permanently sound, but rather there is an “ever-growing inadequacy of every answer offered to date.” (Reinhold, 7)
He then goes into great length of how various groups will latch reason to their beliefs, but how diametrically opposed groups will tear each other apart, “The deist drives pantheism out from all fortifications, while the pantheist tears down the bastions of deism.” (Reinhold, 8) All outdated modes of dogmatic thought are squabbling to assert their own belief structure but are at constant odds with one another. Reinhold, however, is glad that the current epoch has arrived. With a greater extent of intellectual freedom, there does not have to be any particular metaphysical universals, rather a limitless field of inquiry and potential for investigation can foster and develop.
Reinhold certainly seems to express a very far-reaching and broad-minded view of intellectual history and its development. No idea is capable of being a permanent fixture, but rather it is continuous chains of ideas, which are perpetually being altered or further developed to suit the needs of a particular era.

The Super Best Friends

I couldn’t think of a title, and I just watched South Park, so that’s the best I could do.

In rejecting the possibility of apodictic proofs as well as blind faith providing for God’s existence, Reinhold is enamored with Kant’s faith through practical reason. He holds that Kant manages to combine the best of both worlds, as he uses both doctrines for grounds in his argumentation. More importantly, Reinhold argues that a proper balance is stricken between reason and faith. While both are necessary, they cannot be allowed to encroach upon one another. Practical reason leads to the necessity of faith, not to its elimination.

Despite all this adoration, Reinhold doesn’t actually spend too much time in this letter actually discussing what Kant has proved, so I had to cheat and look at what Kant says. Kant argues that through reason, one can neither prove God’s existence, nor his non-existence. Instead, he classifies God as the faultless ideal, something that can never be proven yet never refuted (B669 589). Due to the transcendental qualities we ascribe to God (infinity, unity, omnipresence, omnipotence, etc.), only a transcendental theology could explain them. And as we are incapable of producing such a theology, we can never empirically prove or disprove God’s existence. Conversely, Kant also ascribes the concept of God to morality. Specifically, the idea of God is necessary when trying to conceptualize the highest idea of good. In this sense, one cannot separate the idea of God from the idea of supreme happiness. Thus, the ideal of the highest good is a necessary part of the moral world, which is seen as a consequence of the sensible world (A811 680). Therefore, God is a necessary idea behind the motivations of the good and morality.

Reinhold seems to encapsulate this when he argues that both wise sages and common men seem to accept the idea that there is some future rewarder or judge that will either approve or condemn one’s actions. Thus, Reinhold argues the best part of Kant’s proof is that it grounds the cognition of God’s existence, while still allowing for faith.

Ultimately, the problem I have with this is the effort Kant goes to explain the abilities and boundaries of pure reason, only to determine that it is unable to provide a definitive answer to God’s existence. And then to say that some idea of God is necessary for morality almost seems contradictory to me. If we cannot prove the existence of God, yet God is linked to the prime motivation of morality, then what’s the real point behind morality? I’m not saying this is a call to start rioting in the streets, just that there’s a bridge of faith in Kant’s reasoning that I’m uncomfortable with. I’m accepting of the symbiotic relationship between faith and reason in determining the idea of God, but not the subsequent inference into the reason for morality.

There's no such thing as a free and necessary lunch

In keeping with his distinction between "world" (mathematical) and "nature" (dynamic) (465-466), Kant calls the first two conflicts of the antithetic of pure reason (the finitude or infinitude of the world with regard to space and time and the existence of simple parts) "world-concepts in a narrower sense" (466), dealing with the composition and divisions of the world. The last two are "transcendent concepts of nature" (467).
The third conflict is over freedom: whether, in addition to the laws of nature, freedom causes certain appearances of the world, or it is simply the laws of nature that do so. According to the former position (the thesis), if there were no freedom (i.e., if there were no unconditioned causes), but only caused causes (i.e., the laws of nature), then there could be no beginning of things and the chain of causality would extend infinitely into the past. This, for Kant, is unacceptable, for "nothing happens without a cause sufficiently determined a priori" (484). The antithesis asserts that freedom leaves causation in an invalid in-between place, violating the law of causality (485).
It seems that tension might exist between freedom and necessity, both of which Kant attributes to the unconditioned (A419/B447). So, under this conception, the unconditioned is both free (i.e., without cause by anything else and the absolute beginning of a series of events) and necessary. But that which must occur (the necessary) seems to be conditioned by that necessity; it occurs because it cannot not occur. This contradicts with the free, which has no condition, no prior cause. How can Kant call the unconditioned both free and necessary What is the relationship between freedom and necessity?
The fourth conflict is concerned with the existence of a necessary being. It is interesting to note the connection between the thesis here (there exists a necessary being) and the thesis of the third conflict (freedom causes certain things). Kant writes that that which is conditioned "presupposes, in respect of its existence, a complete series of conditions up to the unconditioned,,," (A452/B480). This idea assumes that unconditioned causes indeed exist, which the thesis of the third conflict asserts and the antithesis denies. It is necessary to consider these four conflicts not only individually but also collectively.

William Wallace and Kant Would Not Get Along

In the Antithetic of Pure Reason Kant sets up the four transcendental ideas of cosmology and the conflict that results from them. Before he even begins to set up the four conflicts he seems to indicate his opinion that "their dispute is nugatory" (CPR 468). Kant really seems to like the word nugatory.

A brief note of interest before Kant explores the transcendental ideas is his distinction between a skeptical method and skepticism. The latter is defined as "a principle of artful and scientific ignorance that undermines the foundations of all cognition" (CPR 468), whereas the skeptical method ultimately seeks to determine what the certain limits of cognition are. This is one of those myriad examples of Kant's influence from Descartes. While Descartes aimed at a skeptical method, Kant believes its only result was actual skepticism.

The first two ideas that Kant considers are the conflicts over the spatial and temporal boundaries of the world, as well as the extent to which substances in the world can be divided. The third idea, which would seem to have far more wide-ranging practical implications, is the conflict between the laws of nature and causal necessity versus freedom. The thesis argues that freedom is necessary to explain the initiation of causal progression, whereas the antithesis claims that freedom would negate the lawful progression of natural causes.

Each thesis or antithesis of the conflicts attempts to be proven using reductio ad absurdam arguments, which would seem to move the argument nowhere other than claiming that the opposite position is absurd. This is perhaps part of the reason why the conflict seems so insoluble.

At their heart, Kant seems to reject the solutions offered to the antimonies of pure reason because they seek to apply the category of causality beyond the boundaries of appearances. This implies that causality has some sort of transcendental status, which Kant would not be willing to grant. However, the debate seems to be a necessary one nontheless, because freedom is a necessary element in moral decisions.

Kant seems willing to grant the necessary status of freedom for practical philosophy, but is certainly not willing to grant its place in speculation. If one assumes that freedom exists, Kant claims one must grant "a first mover for the explanation of motions of the world" (CPR 488), which seems to be an interesting inversion of the cosmological argument. However, if one rejects freedom, Kant concludes that "it is...not necessary for you to seek for something dynamically first as far as causality is concerned" (CPR 487). So either one assumes there is moral freedom, and a first cause follows, or there is no freedom, and the universe has no temporal beginning. No wonder Kant wanted to dodge the whole question.

An Alternate Ending?

April 6: 409-444, The Paralogisms
         9: 460-496 (484-490), 532-546, The Antinomies
       13: Garve/Feder reviews
       16: Reinhold’s Letters on the Kantian Philosophy
       20: Henry Allison’s summary of Eberhard’s critique
       23: G.E. Schulze, “Aenesidemus, or …”
       27: J.G. Fichte, “Review of Aenesidemus”
       30: S. Maimon, “Letters of Philaletes to Aenesidemus”
 May 4: CPR, 672-690, 702-704

Kant's got soul, and it's super bad.

Disclaimer: For those of you who don’t get the reference, please listen to James Brown. It’s for your own good.

So Kant, in a pretty unexpected move, decides to talk about the immortal soul or, as he calls it, the physiology of inner sense. I figured the whole immortal soul thing kind of fell under the category of those blasted dogmatic thinkers that Kant seems to dislike so much, but I guess Kant has to face the music at some point.

Basically, he mentions the doctrine of the soul and the doctrine of bodies as opposites, with the soul concerning inner sense and bodies concerning objects of outer sense, which are basically anything that exists in space. So that leaves time as the only thing governing our souls, which doesn’t seem to make too much of any kind of sense. Unfortunately for Kant, he digs himself even deeper by saying that all of our a priori concepts can only be found in the doctrine of bodies, since the doctrine of the soul has “in it nothing abiding” (A381 pg432). With no a priori concepts to fall back on how can Kant give any account of the soul at all, since it clearly isn’t something we can observe.

All that is really left to the soul is its possession of some type of “I,” or sense of self-identity, which ties together some constant flux of the soul with no manifold to unite. So it seems that Kant believes a soul must exist somehow, although he doesn’t give it much credit. He seems to at least think that the observer needs to have this thing to tie everything together and be able to synthesize experience. I think he kind of gives up on the soul here, and just begins to focus on exploring whatever the I is, since that only turns out to be some presupposed intuition with no meaning at all.

I guess in Kant’s view, the soul doesn’t have too much of a purpose then, which would, in a way, accomplish his goal of vanquishing the dogmatics and their penchant for eternal life. However, he establishes a thinking Self, which I suppose is a piece of the soul, and the purpose of its study. He says that study of the soul helps us “remain within the limit of those questions that do not go beyond that whose content can be provided by possibly inner experience” (A382 pg433), which is a fancy way of saying that we should limit our treatment of inferences as facts. This inner sense which is so important for the soul and the thinking Self again asserts out need to synthesize experience with a priori synthetic concepts and all of that fun, transcendental idealist method.

So even though Kant doesn’t place as much importance on the soul as most other philosophers do, he takes his own view that falls in line with his usual doctrine of synthesis of experience. He still said it loud, he’s a transcendental idealist and he’s proud.