In his first introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant makes a distinction between two different types of judgments. He defines analytic judgments as “judgments of clarification” because within these only one concept is explored (Critique, 130). For instance, the judgment ‘all trees have branches’ is an analytic judgment because even though it involves two concepts - (A) trees and (B) branches - the nature of the B is included in the nature of A. In other words, Kant defines any judgment that only explicitly defines an aspect of one concept as analytic. The judgments that add something outside of one concept are synthetic or “judgments of amplification” (Critique, 130). For example, ‘all trees are beautiful” would be a synthetic judgment because B (beauty) is adding something that is not inherent in concept A (trees).
After I read the his explanation, I expected Kant to deal with analytic judgments since these are concerned with the clarity of ideas. But Kant thinks that, while important, analytic arguments are limited to “only ... attaining ... distinctiveness of concepts” and allowing the proper application of synthetic judgments (Critique, 132). I think he dismisses them as a way of moving forward with his critique. Then he discusses the peculiarities of synthetic judgments and also dismiss them from further consideration (Critique, 132). From this line of arguments Kant made a confusing leap to what he is proposing to do in his Critique: find a way “for the purification of our reason” (Critique, 133). If his critique is not intended to amplify pure reason as he explicitly claims (Critique, 133), why did he make a distinctions regarding the types of judgments in the first place? It seems that the two part are completely unrelated, or at the very least their connection is unclear. The latter is most likely the case since up to this point the page numbers between his first introduction in 1781 and his second in 1788 are close and after it there’s a 10 page difference between the two versions.
I may be completely wrong, and please comment to let me know, but I think the relationship between the two parts of his first introduction is as follows. The reason Kant made the distinction between analytical and synthetic judgments is to prepare the reader to understand what he means by pure reason. As I read it, pure reason is similar to analytical judgments since he defines pure as “not mixed with anything foreign to it,” i.e. pure reason deals only with clarifying it’s a priori concepts within reason (Critique, 132). Additionally, synthetic judgments provide a means building complex ideas out of those basic concepts.
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I agree with you in your summary of how Kant describes the differences between analytic and synthetic judgments. I’m going to go out on a limb here and ponder that maybe Kant makes the distinction between the two because of metaphysics. Metaphysics is supposed to be the solution to the problems of pure reason itself (God, freedom, immortality), but metaphysical judgments are ironically a priori and synthetic (Critique 139, 146). Somehow, metaphysical judgments can give us new knowledge, but how can it be pure if it is from experience? Kant goes on to question whether metaphysics is even possible as a science, but says that it is “indispensable for human reason” (Critique 148). This may just add to the overall confusion, but I’m thinking that he’s explaining in the differences between analytic and synthetic to describe how they relate to metaphysics…
It seems to me that the content of a particular concept can vary from person to person, so that a judgement may be analytic for one person and synthetic for another. E.g., Kant takes it to be given that the concept of something happening is distinct from the concept of causality (pp. 142-143). But could someone else not have a conception of something happening that includes with in it the idea of causality? For Kant, the two ideas are clearly different (albeit related), but couldn't these concepts be so tightly bound in the mind of someone else that they are parts of one concept? Similarly, we talked of the proposition, "This tree is beautiful" as a synthetic judgement. But it seems to me that there could be a person (or culture) for whom beauty is as much an essential and intrinsic element of "tree" as are branches, rendering the above proposition an analytic judgement. I think Kant is too cavalier in labeling what may be a subjective conception an objective truth.
Even if that is the case, I don't know what, if any, effect this would have on his critique.
James apparently just saw Avatar.
I think that your objection could lead to a kind of cognitive whitewash, or maybe just laziness. If you really think about it, everyone's initial, basic, everyday conception of "the pot broke because it fell" is so closely bound with causality that it does not become a distinct player or justification in the chain of events that lead to the broken terra cotta pot on my dorm room floor. It's really only upon closer reflection that you realize it must be because of causality that the mattress being swung haphazardly around the room transfered its motion to the pot, and I can justify the statement. But it's not immediately apparent. Kant is assuming you've already interrogated your mental processes enough to realize the different levels at work here. If you just chalk everything up to one monolithic thought, you're never going to get anywhere.
Just as James, I still have trouble accepting the distinctions Kant makes between synthetic and analytic judgments and where some concepts lie in these two. When considering the concept of causality, Kant explains, "Everything that happens has a cause." As such, cause is not always and necessarily the predicate of everything that happens thus deems this connection a synthetic judgment. However, it seems to me that whether this is a synthetic or an analytic judgment becomes a matter of how the two conditions are phrased. If one said "a cause is had by everything that happens" then it is seen that "everything that happens," in experience that is, must always be accompanied by a cause, determining this an analytic cause. This becomes even clearer if we consider Kant's own idea that, when we experience a cause and effect, we are not deducting the principle of causality from it, but rather we experience the event on a causal mindset because we have the principle of causality as an apriori concept. This is another way of showing that these two relations are not mere conditions put together in synthetic judgment, but rather an analytic deduction. The experience could not stand outside of its causal relation because it is the only way we can come to experience. To us, every event must have a cause.
As James points out, we could argue that a claim that Kant comes to deem objective judgment, might in truth just be a subjective assumption that he promotes with no justification.
If Kant wants analytic and synthetic judgements to hold among different persons (i.e., be objective), then objective criteria for needed distinguishing conceptions are necessary. You write, Jenna, about interrogating our mental processes; but without rules about how to do, this would be a highly subjective endeavor, tending to produce subjective results. If, after closely examining my thoughts and mental processes, I come to the conclusion that 'something happening' and 'causality' are parts of one conception, how can you criticize that--unless there are objective criteria. Conceptions seem to be highly personal constructs.
For example, Kant writes of something that happens as a single conception: "In the concept of something that happens, I think, to be sure, of an existence that was preceded by a time, etc., and from that analytic judgments can be drawn" (pp. 142-143). But who is to say that 'an existence' and 'a time' are not two, distinct concepts, which combine to form a synthetic, rather than (as Kant would have it) an analytic, judgement?
Maybe Kant will explain how to distinguish analytic and synthetic judgements later in the Critique. I'm curious to see if he gives us any objective criteria for what he labels as objective.
As soon as I am done with my seminar on Wittgenstein right now I'm going to lay down a devastating rebuttal to your silly criticism. BE PREPARED.
Who dares incite the wrath of Jenna? Sounds like a metallic container for forcibly striking the posterior region with the foot is about to be evacuated ...
A few comments, before blood is shed.
Chelsea: yes, metaphysics is the reason for the distinction, but you need to spell out what this means. Which is a big task.
James: this is an interesting question. I think, however, rather than leading to judgment already, we need to ask why Kant thinks that he is not being "cavalier." Why does he think that certain concepts are analytic and only analytic (or synthetic, etc.), regardless of who is thinking it?
Your example suggests that someone might think that the concept of "something happening" could be inseparably connected to that of the concept of a cause, whereas that might not be the case for someone else. What is Kant's presupposition that makes it so this could not be the case? Is it justifiable?
Jenna: (Nice ad hominem.) Your response is, that Kant is assuming certain distinctions that are merely there (between different concepts) and cannot be subjectively variant. Otherwise, we cannot do philosophy, but wind up in dark night in which all cows are black?
Anuar: thanks for clarifying matters a bit. So the problem is if analytic and synthetic judgments are truly distinct. Your example is meant to show how the determination could depend on how a concept is articulated, I think. Yet aside from articulation, it seems on reflection that merely a phenomenal event doesn't necessarily require causality, but that causality might be added to it. Yet I cannot see how anyone can believe the causal relation is analytic, particularly since it establishes a universal and necessary relation between two events.
But your last point, about it being a subjective judgment, raises the scope of the matter. For the question is, where would this subjective judgment have come from? Would it have come from experience? If so, then it is beset by the problems that Hume diagnoses and Kant sets to overcome. If not, then it would be a feature of cognition. And then the only question is if this is a concept good for everyone. But I think that is already assumed by the argument about the necessary conditions for experience. Otherwise, perhaps we have a very different problem: how do we know that what I mean by causality is what you mean by it? Would that be the problem?
Okay, obviously there is more to say here, but I'll stop and let you all tussle.
Since the weather has created a window of opportunity I'll to respond to all the comment in chronological order.
First, I agree with Chelsea's comment that need for the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments in order to set up his system of metaphysics. My original post was only dealing with the first introduction where the connection between the different type of judgments was not clearly correlated to Kant's metaphysics. To answer your question about how it is possible to get to pure reason from experience, I think that Kant is merely acknowledging that all our knowledge comes from the outside. For instance, it a person is completely self enclosed, there would be no way to communicate with the outside world. The very fact we are reading a book on the critique of pure reason means that we would have to at the very least learn several things from the outside: language, literacy, etc. But from the information we gather from the outside world we can abstract to pure concepts such as time and space.
Next to James's first comment. As we discussed in class, there is a clear difference once we are precise in what a synthetic argument is. Whether or not my original example - trees are beautiful - is an objective synthetic judgment may be the root of your comment. I concede that at the time I wrote it I was trying to figure out something about trees that wouldn't be part of the concept of a tree. Originally, whenever I tried to describe a tree, I kept thinking a tree is green, wide, tall, or has leaves: all analytical judgments. A think a better example is saying an analytic judgment is something like "A house is in the Bronx". There is nothing in the concept of a house that necessarily holds the concept that it must be in the Bronx, it could be anywhere.
Next on Jenna's first comment. Having not seen Avatar yet, I don't know whether or not James's comments relates to the movie. I disagree with Jenna's comment that James is being lazy, the example was just unclear. Nonetheless, I agree that understanding Kant requires seeing the minute differences in our thoughts and clearly seeing the roots of our concepts.
Next on to Anuar's comment. Causality is an example of a priori synthetic judgment because it is something we can think of outside of experience. For instance, using Jenna's example, if you ask me the effect of swinging a mattress in an enclosed space, I can use the a priori knowledge of causality to say that something will most likely be knocked over. The fact that the proof of this judgment is found in experience doesn't diminish its objectivity. After all, I don't think that Kant would argue that there is a certain subjective element since every human interaction that involves other people is going to be grounded in the subjectivity of the people involved.
On to James's second comment. I think that the simple way to resolve the difficulty you raise is to realize that sifting through our thoughts to find separate concepts is hard. As you point out, there is always the possibility that some people may stop before others and say that two concepts are really one. But I think that you don't need another objective criteria. All you need is the ability to justify why you think it is two concepts to the other person. For instance, the difference between "something happening" and "causality" is that the former falls under Hume's approach that the we can't extrapolate a universal necessity, whereas we can from the concept of causality. Next, the reason why existence and time are not separate concepts is based on our human condition: we can only conceive of existence as something existing in time. Thus, the ultimate criteria that differentiates if a concept can be further broken down is just human comprehension: it is therefore limited to human fallibility. It might be helpful to think of a priori synthetic judgments as those that are mitigated by our human ability. In a way, this is why Kant is writing a Critique and not the actual system of metaphysics for pure reason because of this limitation of the human understanding.
On Jenna's second comment. I think Wittenstein's would have interesting thing to say about this debate. Something along the lines of it all boils down to the way we use language to express our ideas and the limitations associated with the written word. Or I could be remembering a completely different philosopher and be way of base.
Next on to Prof. Vaught. I think I answered in part your questions already. If I haven't let me know.
P.S. The reason for the three separate posts is Blogger's limits on comment posts.
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